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This thesis provides a new insight into the role of board of directors in China. It consists 
of three main studies. The first examines the effects of board diversity on bank 
performance captured by profitability and risk. Using a sample of 97 Chinese banks over 
a period from 2009 to 2013, the results show that board age diversity is negatively 
associated with bank profitability. To further investigate why age-diverse boards 
influence bank performance, board age diversity is decomposed into diversity of directors’ 
personal values, utilizing the World Values Survey. The findings suggest that the 
heterogeneity among directors’ views on risk, prudence, and wealth is more likely to spark 
intragroup conflicts in the decision-making process. This prevents the board from 
functioning effectively and ultimately weakens bank profitability. 
 
The second study investigates the impact of tournament incentives on non-CEO 
executives by using data on Chinese firms from 2005 to 2015. Through the analysis of 
this data, a large pay gap between CEOs and non-CEO executives is found to increase 
firm performance. This link is even stronger when non-CEO executives are from the same 
age cohort. The peer pressure among the similar-aged non-CEO executives enhances the 
tournament competition. However, the tournament effect weakens when non-CEO 
executives belong to three or more age cohorts. The age heterogeneity of non-CEO 
executives leads to reduced incentives for younger non-CEO executives and discourages 
the tournament competition. 
 
The third study explores the impact of board characteristics on excessive managerial risk-
taking in state firms. Using a sample of Chinese firms from 2003 to 2015, the finding 
shows that state-owned companies have a lower cost of debt than private peers. The lower 
borrowing cost as well as the implicit government guarantees in state firms can also 
induce excessive risk-taking. On average, there is greater evidence of excess leverage and 




independent directors in state firms could encourage risk-taking by increasing the excess 
leverage but lowering the excess cost of debt, while board size is positively related to 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Corporate governance has attracted much attention from academics and practitioners in 
the past few decades. In modern corporations, the separation of ownership and control 
can create severe agency problems. For example, the agency conflict between powerful 
managers and dispersed shareholders is typical in Anglo-Saxon countries, while the 
conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders appears to be 
frequent in European countries. These agency problems, in turn, impair corporate 
performance. Since good corporate governance can alleviate agency problems, 
incentivise businesses to take the right decision, and improve performance, governments 
across the world have attempted to carry out a series of corporate governance reforms. 
 
Among various institutions, the board of directors is usually seen as a key part of the 
governance reform. There are two main reasons for this. First, in the past few years, 
several corporate scandals, such as Enron-WorldCom and Volkswagen in US and BP in 
UK, have pointed out boards’ inadequate scrutiny of firms and the failure of the corporate 
governance (Augar, 2017). Second, the global financial crisis in 2008 highlighted that the 
lack of effective monitoring mechanism contributed to the failure of some companies. In 
particular, boards failed in their responsibility for proper oversight of risk management 
and to implement risk control procedures effectively (Kumar and Singh, 2013). Given 
these striking facts, authorities have called for more accountable boards in modern 
corporations, in order to improve corporate governance. 
 
The academic research on board of directors mainly originated from agency theory. From 
the contractual view, the shareholders (principal) invest in the firm and delegate a 
professional manager (agent) to run the firm on their behalf. This separation of ownership 




(1932) and then is developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983). 
Since the contract between shareholders and managers is incomplete (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997) and managers possess superior information and expertise about the firm, managers 
usually end up with significant residual rights of control. In this way, moral hazard occurs 
when managers expropriate shareholders’ values to maximize their own utilities rather 
than serve the interests of shareholders, such as shirking and entrenchment. Within this 
framework, the board of directors is designed to align the managers’ interests with those 
of shareholders as an active monitor. 
 
There is a large discussion on how board of directors might alleviate the agency problem. 
In principle, the board of directors is expected to monitor and control the management on 
behalf of shareholders from the agency perspective. Boards are in charge of executive 
compensation and have the power to hire and fire top level managers, ratify important 
decisions and set strategies (e.g., Fama and Jensen, 1983; Tirole, 2001). Therefore, the 
decision control right of the board can ensure the separation of control and decision 
management at the top level of the firm. Additionally, the board of directors can also 
provide valuable advice and external resources to the management to improve 
information quality based on the resource dependence theory (e.g., Anderson et al., 2011; 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Pfeffer and Salacik, 1978). 
 
Given these functions, awareness about the role of board of directors in firms has 
increased in empirical research. The existing literature can be divided into three main 
streams. The first branch addresses the influence of board characteristics on firm 
performance. In particular, the impact of board functions, such as board meeting (e.g., 
Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach, 2013; Vafeas, 1999), and board composition, such as board 
size, board independence, board connection and board diversity (e.g., Adams and Ferreira; 
Cater et al., 2010; Cheng, 2008; Falato et al., 2014; Frijins et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2015; 




discussed topics. The second branch focuses on the impact of board of directors on tasks 
assigned to directors, such as CEOs (Chief Executive Officers) turnover, hostile takeover 
and executive compensation (e.g., Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009; Guo and Masulis, 
2015; Renneboog and Zhao, 2014; Weisbach, 1988). The third branch reviews the factors 
that affect board composition (e.g., Baker and Gompers, 2003; Jenter and Kanaan, 2015; 
Linck et al., 2008), which identifies board dynamics and the power struggle between the 
CEO and the board. 
 
However, prior studies on the role of boards of directors have devoted limited attention 
to emerging markets, where the corporate governance and investor protection appear to 
be weaker than that of developed economies. To shed light on this issue in emerging 
markets, China provides an ideal context for exploring the role of boards of directors. 
First, as a major emerging economy, China has gained an increasing influence in the 
world economy, though the corporate governance is very weak. In particular, the legal 
environment is still poor in China. The protection of investors, especially minority 
shareholders, is weak and law enforcement is ineffective. Additionally, unlike other 
western countries, institutional investors are less likely to monitor the firm, since China 
has a concentrated ownership structure where institutional investors only hold a small 
part of shares.  
 
Second, the Chinese government has attempted to intensively reform the governance 
system in past years where the board of directors has been considered to be at the heart 
of the reform. After joining the World Trade Organization in 2001, China placed corporate 
governance as the centre of economic reform. “The Principles of Corporate Governance” 
enacted by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was 
adopted in 2001, followed by a series of regulations. For example, the Chinese Security 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) published the guidelines for independent directors of 




the State Economic and Trade Commission issued the “Code of Corporate Governance 
for Listed Companies” which outlined the importance and rules of boards of directors. 
For example, board size is required to range from 5 to 19 and independent directors should 
account for one-third of the board since 2003. In addition, the board is required to 
implement shareholders’ resolutions, make major decisions and hold meetings. Under 
these governance codes, it is of importance to explore the changes and effectiveness of 
boards of directors in Chinese firms.  
 
Lastly, government intervention is prevalent in Chinese listed firms. There are two 
distinctive features of Chinese firms. One is that the majority of listed firms are former 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs); the other is that the government still impose tight 
controls on listed firms even after the split-share structure reform. Compared to private 
firms, state-owned firms have divergent primary goals. For example, state-owned firms 
are directed to pursue social and political objectives while private firms are profit-driven. 
In addition, state ownership can also discourage monitoring and develop agency problems 
as residual cash flow claims of state firms are not readily transferable (Borisova et al., 
2012; Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001). This, in turn, provides an interesting setting for 
comparing the differences in the role of boards of directors in state-owned firms and 
private firms. 
1.2 Motivations, research questions and data 
This thesis provides a new insight into the role of boards of directors in China. Three 
major research questions relating to boards of directors are investigated. In particular, the 
first two questions are about the interaction of directors. I first look at the age diversity 
of directors and then focus on peer competition among executives. In the last question, I 
focus on two important characteristics of boards of directors, namely board independence 
and board size.  




has received increased attention in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, since poor bank 
governance is more likely to trigger a bank failure and lead to a spillover effect on other 
financial institutions as well as on the whole economy (e.g., Haan & Vlahu, 2016; Pathan 
& Faff, 2013). Given the complexity of bank operations and opacity in bank lending 
activities, the role of bank directors is especially important (Levine, 2004). Compared to 
non-financial firms, bank directors’ roles are more complicated as they should align the 
manager not only with the interests of shareholders but also with that of depositors. In 
2014, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) released guidelines on bank 
governance, pointing out the importance of board diversity in banks. In the previous 
literature, directors’ attributes, such as gender and ethnicity, have been largely explored 
in both financial and non-financial firms. However, the key diversity dimension of age, 
which can capture an individual’s life experience (Mannheim, 1949) and encompasses a 
wide range of factors that influence the formation of personal values during our lifespan 
(Medawar, 1952; Rhodes, 1983), has so far attracted limited attention in the finance 
literature. Whether an age-diverse board provides comprehensive resources and expertise 
or leads to communication breakdown and conflicts remains an open question. Therefore, 
Chapter 2 looks at the board age diversity in Chinese banks and investigates how and why 
it could affect bank profitability and risk. 
 
Second, how does age heterogeneity of non-CEO executives affect the relationship 
between tournament incentives and firm performance? The excessive remuneration of 
CEOs shapes the debate on the workplace wage inequality in the media and has also 
triggered a large amount of research investigating the role of compensation gap between 
CEOs and other executives. Most empirical studies support the tournament theory that a 
huge pay gap provides inherent incentives for non-CEO executives to expend more efforts, 
and improve firm performance (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). While researchers have begun 
to explore whether the characteristic of the CEO can affect this tournament effect, no 




occupy important positions in the top management team (Pissaris et al., 2015) and are 
also the key objects of tournament incentives. To compete for the same tournament prize 
(pay gap), non-CEO executives can be viewed as an appropriate peer group and the 
degree of peer competition might depend on the demographic characteristics of non-CEO 
executives. Among different characteristics, age is found to have some influence on peer 
competition based on previous studies in psychology and management (e.g., Kunze et al., 
2013; Liu and Lafreniere, 2014). In particular, similar-aged individuals usually compete 
more fervently with each other for limited resources, while people of different age appear 
to compete less due to biased career opportunities caused by unbalanced human and social 
capital. Therefore, Chapter 3 focuses on the age cohort composition of non-CEO 
executives and estimates whether this can enhance or diminish the tournament 
competition. 
 
Third, do board characteristics encourage excessive risk-taking in state-owned firms? 
Issues relating to debt financing and state ownership have received considerable attention. 
The previous literature provides a range of empirical evidence that state-owned firms 
have lower cost of debt in debt financing due to implicit guarantees by the government. 
Given the favorable borrowing cost, it might be the case that state-owned firms will take 
on excessive leverage and hold less cash in hand, resulting in higher risk. Therefore, there 
is an important concern regarding whether state firms take excessive risks in debt 
financing decisions, compared to private firms (an issue that has not been thoroughly 
explored in the previous literature). Given the potential for excessive risk-taking in state-
owned firms, this raises another concern regarding how to reduce this risk.  In state firms, 
the separation of ownership and control leads to conflicts between shareholders and 
managers. Further, the ownership concentration can also turn the agency problem into 
conflicts between the controlling shareholders and the minority shareholders. 
Furthermore, there is one more type of agency problem between the state and the 




agency problems (Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001) than private firms. Based on agency 
theory, the board of directors is an important internal mechanism to mitigate the agency 
problem (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Therefore, it is important to examine whether the 
board of directors can reduce excessive risk-taking behaviour in state-owned firms. 
Unlike western firms, Chinese firms normally have a distinctively concentrated 
ownership with a large government stake. In addition, debt financing is an important 
finance source for Chinese listed firms (Shailer and Wang, 2014). Based on these facts 
and concerns, Chapter 4 aims to investigate the excessive risk-taking behaviours in the 
debt financing decision of Chinese state-owned firms and then explore whether board 
independence and board size can affect excessive risk-taking in state firms. 
 
To address all the research questions, several datasets from China are employed in this 
thesis. In Chapter 2, bank-specific financial data are extracted from Bankscope and data 
on board and ownership structure are hand collected from each individual bank’s annual 
report. The World Values Survey is also utilized to predict bank directors’ personal values. 
The final estimation sample in Chapter 2 consists of 97 Chinese banks from 2009 to 2013. 
In Chapters 3 and 4, CSMAR is the main dataset, which provides the firm-level financial 
information and governance variables for Chinese firms listed on either the Shanghai or 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The estimation sample of Chapter 3 includes 18,989 firm-
year observations, encompassing 2,600 Chinese listed firms from 2005 to 2015, while the 
sample of Chapter 4 consists of 2,294 firms from 2002 to 2015. 
 
It is of importance to show the characteristics of the data employed in this thesis, which 
provide a general picture of the empirical analysis of subsequent chapters. Figure 1.1 
presents the distribution of directors’ age in Chinese banks over time from 2009 to 2013. 
Most directors are aged from around 30 to 70, and therefore grew up in Mao Zedong’s or 
Deng Xiaoping’s era. In particular, the youngest director is 29 years old, while the oldest 




directors in Chinese banks in their forties and fifties. In general, directors in Chinese 
banks are found to be heterogeneous in age.  
<Insert Figure 1.1 here> 
Figure 1.2 shows the cohort composition of non-CEO executives in non-financial firms 
in China. Following previous studies (Egri and Ralston, 2004; Ralston et al., 1999), non-
CEO executives are divided into four cohorts corresponding to specific social and 
political events based on their birth year, namely 1926 – 1947 cohort (the Communist 
Consolidation generation), 1947 – 1958 cohort (the Cultural Revolution generation), 
1958 – 1974 cohort (the Social Reform generation) and 1974 – 1992 cohort (the Societal 
generation). In Figure 1.2, one cohort composition remains stable at around 20 percent 
with a slight increase, while the percentage of non-CEO executive with three or four age 
cohorts fluctuates between around 20% and 30% from 2005 to 2015. In addition, non-
CEO executives who are from any two different cohorts account for more than half of the 
whole sample. Thus, it can be concluded that age heterogeneity exists among non-CEO 
executives.  
<Insert Figure 1.2 here> 
Furthermore, Figure 1.3 depicts the annual change of board independence and board size 
in Chinese non-financial firms during the period from 2002 to 2015. In line with the 
Chinese governance regulation that board independence should account for one third of 
the board, an increase in the percentage of independent directors of listed firms from 2002 
is observed. In particular, independent directors accounts for around 33.14% of all 
directors in 2003. Notably, the upward trend of the board independence slowed down 
after 2003. Panel B of Figure 1.3 suggests that the board size started to shrink in 2003. 
More specifically, the number of directors reduced to around 8.63 in 2015 from 9.80 in 
2003, which is consistent with the regulation that the board should consist of 5 to 9 
directors in Chinese firms. Therefore, the implementation of board reform provides an 






<Insert Figure 1.3 here> 
1.3 Summary and contributions  
Chapter 2 examines the effect of board age diversity on bank profitability and risk. 
Previous literature has documented mixed evidence of the impact of board diversity on 
firm performance. On the one hand, board diversity could bring more ultimate outsiders 
into boards and enhance mutual monitoring, based on agency theory (Kandel & Lazear, 
1992; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992); expand board member networks and contacts according 
to resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978); and provide comprehensive 
and unique human capital in the boardroom grounded in human capital theory (Becker, 
1964; Terjesen et al., 2010). On the other hand, social psychology theories argue that 
board diversity could generate conflicts and protract decision-making processes (Byrne, 
1971; Williams & O’Reilly, 1996). 
 
Employing a sample of 97 Chinese banks from 2009 to 2013, the result suggests a 
negative relationship between age diversity and bank profitability, which is largely in line 
with a study on bank board diversity (Hagendorff and Keasey, 2012) and the strand of 
literature in non-bank samples. To further investigate why board age diversity negatively 
affects bank profitability, directors’ ages are linked to directors’ personal values. Since 
people’s values are not observable, I construct the measure of directors’ values on work-
related indicators by utilizing the World Values Survey. After this, the propensity score 
matching method is employed to predict individual bank directors’ personal values. The 
results show that heterogeneity in directors’ values on risk, prudence, and wealth creates 
additional obstacles for the efficient functioning of corporate boards and reduces banks’ 
profitability, while the variations in directors’ value on success, creativity, and slackness 
have no influence on bank performance. In addition, the results are robust after addressing 
the potential endogeneity concern by employing he fixed effect instrumental variable 




Moment (GMM) analysis.  
 
Chapter 3 investigates the role of age heterogeneity of non-CEO executives in the 
relationship between tournament incentives and firm performance. There are two 
alternative views regarding this issue. Based on seniority argument, elder people often 
occupy the top positions due to their rich experience and great influence in their field 
(Chen and Chung, 2012), which can lead to reduced incentives for younger people who 
might also anticipate lower probability of promotion in the workplace. In this case, 
younger executives might be discouraged from competing with older ones unless they 
have extremely outstanding talents and managerial abilities. In contrast, social category 
theory (Turner, 1985) and similarity-attraction theory (Byrne, 1971) together suggest that 
similar-aged individuals usually group themselves into the same social category with a 
greater perception of fairness. Non-CEO executives with similar ages might think that 
they have equal or similar chances of promotion and then compete more fervently, which 
consequently strengthens the tournament effect. 
 
Using a sample of Chinese firms from 2005 to 2015, a significant and positive 
relationship between executive compensation gap and firm performance is documented, 
which is consistent with the implication of tournament theory. Furthermore, the 
tournament effect becomes weaker when non-CEO executives come from three or more 
age cohorts, while it is stronger when the non-CEO executives are from the same age 
cohort. In addition, the impact of age heterogeneity on tournament effect is more 
pronounced in state firms than private firms. This suggests that the outmoded idea of 
seniority is overstressed in Chinese state firms. The analysis is also robust when 
controlling for the endogeneity problem and for several alternative measures of 
tournament incentives, age heterogeneity and firm performance. 
Chapter 4 examines the impact of board characteristics on excessive risk-taking in debt 




which provides effective monitoring and control of management (Fama and Jensen, 1983), 
can signal a high quality of board and hence reduce the cost of debt and cash holdings 
and increase leverage (Anderson et al., 2014; Fields et al., 2012; Kuan et al., 2011). In 
terms of board size, larger boards might be able to inject more valuable resources into the 
firm (Dalton et al., 1999) and improve information quality of the board, which could lead 
to lower borrowing cost and fewer loan covenants (Fields et al., 2012). However, large 
boards that have more than seven or eight directors tend to function less effectively, 
though being more controllable for CEOs (Jensen, 1993). As the board becomes larger, 
the monitoring offered by the directors might become less effective because of the free 
rider problem (Raheja, 2005). Given the benefits and costs of large boards, the effect of 
board size on the excessive risk in debt financing in state firms could be either positive 
or negative.  
 
Using a sample of 2,294 Chinese firms between 2002 and 2015, the findings first show 
that state-owned firms have lower cost of debt than private firms. Second, I follow Gao 
et al. (2013) to construct the measures of excess risk indicators, namely, excess leverage 
and excess cash holdings. The results show that state firms indeed take excessive risk in 
debt financing decisions. On average, there is greater evidence of positive excess leverage 
and negative excess cash holdings in state firms. Third, board characteristics are found to 
affect excessive risk-taking in state firms. In particular, the proportion of independent 
directors is negatively associated with an excess cost of debt but positively related to 
excess leverage, while board size has positive impacts on the excess cost of debt, leverage 
and cash holdings. These findings are robust to alternative econometric methods and 
measures.  
 
In summary, this thesis makes several contributions to the academic literature on board 
of directors, tournament incentives and debt financing. Chapter 2 contributes to the 




the relationship between board age heterogeneity and firm performance. Prior studies 
have only focused on the direct impact of age diversity among directors on organizational 
outcomes (Ali et al., 2014; Ararat et al., 2010; Goergen et al., 2015; Hafsi & Turgut, 2013; 
Mahadeo et al., 2012; Tarus & Aime, 2014). However, Chapter 2 takes the research a step 
further to examine why age diversity can affect bank performance by introducing 
directors’ personal values, an unobservable dimension of diversity. Second, to the best of 
my knowledge, this is the first study to impute directors’ personal values and to provide 
new empirical evidence that directors’ values change across generations. Finally, 
empirical studies on board diversity and bank performance are extended to China where 
limited attention has been paid to bank boards, the only extant study being by Liang et al. 
(2013), who focus on the impact of board composition and directors’ political connections 
on bank performance.  
 
Chapter 3 contributes to tournament literature in two ways. First, it provides a new insight 
into the tournament effect by introducing the interaction of non-CEO executives. Previous 
studies on executive compensation explore the link between pay gap and firm 
performance only through industry environment (Siegel and Hambrick, 2005), ownership 
structure (Hu et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2008) and CEOs’ background (Kale et al., 2009; 
Zalewska, 2014). In contrast, Chapter 3 focuses on a new channel, the age heterogeneity 
of non-CEO executives, and investigates how it affects the tournament effect. Second, 
this work also contributes to the compensation literature by linking society hierarchy to 
tournament incentives and providing empirical evidence on the hierarchy issue in China. 
Given the large population and limited resources in China, competition is strong, 
especially among similar-aged peers as they seek to acquire the same resources 
simultaneously (Liu and Lafreniere, 2014). Particular to Chinese culture, there is a high 
value placed on seniority. Based on the Five Code of Ethics by Confucian, there is an age 
hierarchical structure of human relationship. Elderly people usually enjoy the high status 





Chapter 4 contributes to the existing literature on debt financing and state ownership in 
two ways. First, it provides a new perspective to the study of debt financing in state-
owned firms. Prior studies usually focus on the effect of state ownership on cost of debt, 
leverage and cash holdings (e.g., Borisova and Megginson, 2011; Borisova et al., 2015; 
Dewentwe and Malatesta, 2001; Shailer and Wang, 2014). However,, this study predicts 
the leverage, cash holdings and cost of debt that state firms are likely to have by 
employing a propensity score matching method and then examine the difference between 
the predicted and observable values of leverage, cash holdings and cost of debt in state-
owned firms, namely, excess leverage, excess cash holdings and excess cost of debt. By 
doing this, excessive risk-taking in debt financing decisions in state-owned firms 
compared to private firms has been identified. Second, to the best of my knowledge, this 
is the first empirical study to provide a comprehensive perspective on the relationship 
between board characteristics and excessive managerial risk only in state-owned firms 
rather than private firms. 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 investigates the effect of board age diversity 
on Chinese bank performance. Chapter 3 discusses the role of age heterogeneity of non-
CEO executives in the relationship between tournament incentives and firm performance. 
Chapter 4 examines the relationship between board characteristics and excessive risk-
taking behavior in state-owned firms. Concluding remarks and implications are provided 









Figure 1.1 Distribution of Directors’ Age in Chinese Banks from 2009- 2013 
 
Source: Chinese bank annual report (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013) 

















Figure 1.2 Percentage of firms with non-CEO executive from different cohort 
composition 
 
Source: CSMAR (2005-2015) 
Notes: This figure reports the percentage of firms with non-CEO executives from different cohort 
composition in China from 2005 to 2015. In this study, executives are divided into four cohorts 
based on their birth year: 1926-1947 cohort, 1948-1958 cohort, 1959-1974 cohort and 1975-1992 
cohort. 1 Cohort means that non-CEO executives are from the same cohorts. 2 Cohorts means 
that non-CEO executives come from any two different cohorts. 3+ Cohorts refers to that non-
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Figure 1.3 Annual change of board independence of board size of Chinese firms, 
2002-2015 
 
Notes: This figure shows the annual trend of the percentage of independent directors and 










Chapter 2 Age diversity, directors’ personal values, and bank 
performance1 
2.1 Introduction 
Corporate governance in banks has received increasing attention in the wake of the 2008 
financial crisis. Notably, poor bank governance is more likely to trigger a bank failure, 
leading to serious systemic risk and negative externalities (e.g., Haan and Vlahu, 2016; 
Pathan and Faff, 2013). The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) recently 
issued a set of “Guidelines on Corporate Governance Principles for Banks” to emphasize 
the importance of effective governance for sound functioning of banks and the economy 
as a whole (BCBS, 2014). The report expands guidance on the roles of board of directors, 
specifically pointing out that the bank board should be composed of a diverse set of 
directors to reflect its complexity in operation.  
 
Compared with other attributes of directors (i.e., gender and ethnicity),2 age, which is a 
key diversity dimension, so far has attracted little attention in the finance literature. When 
profiling an individual, age is a dynamic proxy of an individual’s life experience 
(Mannheim, 1949) and encompasses a wide range of factors that influence the formation 
of personal values during our lifespan (Medawar, 1952; Rhodes, 1983). Whether an age-
diverse board provides comprehensive resources and expertise or leads to communication 
breakdown and conflicts remains as an open question. To date, however, studies on board 
diversity in banks have largely focused on developed countries (e.g., Adams and Mehran, 
2012; Farag and Mallin, 2017; García-Meca et al., 2015; Hagendorff and Keasey, 2012). 
 
 This chapter is published at International Review of Financial analysis. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2017.10.007 
2 Increasing attention has been recognized to board diversities by gender (Erhardt et al., 2003; Farag & 
Malin, 2017; Liu et al., 2014; Sila et al., 2016), nationality (Ruigrok et al., 2007 and García-Meca et al., 




To shed light on this issue in emerging markets in which the banking sector grows faster 
than their developed world counterparts, we choose to explore China as a context for 
board age diversity. 3 
 
China, as a major emerging economy, has gained an increased influence in the world 
economy. The Chinese banking sector has surpassed that of Eurozone to become the 
world’s largest by size. At the end of 2016, the total assets of the Chinese banking system 
hit $33 trillion (versus $31 trillion for the Eurozone). Furthermore, banks in China 
dominate the financial system, and the value of the Chinese banking system reached more 
than three times the size of China’s annual economic outputs in 2016. Given the huge size 
and unique position in the economy, the Chinese banking sector has gained an increased 
influence in the world financial system. Compared to developed markets, the board of 
directors in China plays an important role through its advising and monitoring activities 
in an environment with weak institutions and weak investor protections. Different from 
other emerging markets such as Eastern European countries, the gradual reform approach 
taken by the Chinese government (Jiang et al., 2009) provides us a chance to explore the 
diversity among directors of different ages who have experienced reform over time. We 
hope that our results can be generalized to other emerging markets that have experienced 
similar degrees of cultural, social, and economic reforms. 
 
Age diversity is particularly important in countries that have experienced significant 
transformations over a relatively short period of time. Along with the transition of the 
economic system, there has simultaneously been a push towards cultural change (Stulz 
and Williamson, 2003). For example, in China, under Chairman Mao’s socialist 
 
3 Chinese banks have a two-tier board system, including a board of directors and a board of supervisors. 
This study focuses on the board of directors, which is more functional, while the supervisory board seems 





orthodoxy, 4  people are more likely to be less educated and are dedicated to a 
conventional way of doing things, sacrificing creativity (Ralston et al., 1999). While 
under Deng Xiaoping’s modern policies, people are likely to be better educated, more 
qualified, confident, and individualistic and place emphasis on innovation and creativity 
(Huang et al., 2015; Tian, 1998; Vohra, 2000). Therefore, growing up in each distinctive 
cultural environment, the Chinese directors in different age cohorts tend to hold diverse 
values that can affect the quality and process of decision-marking.5 
 
To study the link between board age diversity and bank performance, we examine a 
sample of 97 Chinese banks over the period from 2009 to 2013. To date, very little is 
known about why age diversity may affect bank performance. To further investigate this 
relationship, we link directors’ age to directors’ personal values. Given the fact that 
individuals’ values are not observable, we utilize the World Values Survey to construct 
the measure of directors’ values on work-related indicators. 6  We first employ the 
propensity score matching method to identify a matched subgroup of respondents in the 
survey who have similar characteristics with bank directors in our sample. We then use 
the estimated parameters based on this matched subgroup combined with our individual 
bank directors’ characteristics to compute individual bank directors’ values. 
 
We document a negative relationship between age diversity and bank profitability 
measured by return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE), indicating that the costs 
 
4 In 1949, the Chinese Civil War ended with Mao Zedong’s Communist Party in power. Mao’s era covers 
Communist Consolidation (1949-1965) and Great Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), while Deng Xiaoping 
initiated the Social Reform Era (1978-1992) and part of the Societal Transition Era (1992-now) (Ralston et 
al., 1999; Egri and Ralston, 2004; Sun and Wang, 2010).   
5 Regarding other dimensions of board diversity, our sample shows that directors in Chinese banks are 
homogeneous in nationality and ethnicity, and a small proportion of directors are female. 
6 17 value indicators are extracted from the World Values Survey: risk, work, happiness, prudence, wealth, 
success, thoroughness, pressure, outgoing, active, creativity, helping others, finding faults, reserved, life 




of age diversity outweigh its benefits on bank profitability in China. To address the 
potential endogeneity problem, we employ the fixed effect instrumental variable 
approach using Lewbel's (2012) method and the dynamic panel Generalized Methods of 
Moment (GMM) analysis and obtain consistent results. When decomposing age diversity 
into value diversity, we find that the heterogeneity in directors’ values on risk, prudence, 
and wealth creates additional obstacles for efficient functioning of corporate boards and 
reduces banks’ profitability, while the variations in directors’ value on success, creativity, 
and slackness fail to have any influence on bank performance.  
 
Our study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, our work offers a 
new perspective in understanding the impact of board age heterogeneity on firm 
performance. Earlier literature mostly focuses on the direct relationship between age 
diversity among directors and organizational outcomes (Ali et al., 2014; Ararat et al., 
2010; Goergen et al., 2015; Hafsi and Turgut, 2013; Mahadeo et al., 2012; Tarus and 
Aime, 2014). Our work takes a step further to examine why age diversity can affect bank 
performance by introducing directors’ personal values, an unobservable dimension of 
diversity. Second, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to compute directors’ 
personal values and provide empirical evidence that directors’ values change across 
generations. Finally, we provide the first empirical study on board age (value) diversity 
and bank performance in China. The banking sector serves as an engine of economy 
growth in China and has undergone governance reform with special emphasis on boards. 
However, existing studies on bank boards in China are very limited; note that there is a 
single exception (i.e., Liang et al., 2013) on board composition and directors’ political 
connections with bank performance.  
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the institutional 
background of the Chinese banking sector. Section 2.3 discusses the theoretical 




diversity, value diversity, and bank performance in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 describes the 
data collection procedure and methodology. Section 2.6 presents the main results and is 
followed by a series of robustness tests in Section 2.7. Section 2.8 offers a summary and 
the conclusions. 
2.2 Institutional background 
The Chinese banking sector has experienced a series of reforms over the last forty years, 
transferring from a monopolistic and policy-driven system to a multi-ownership and 
market-oriented one. In the first period of reform (1979-1994), the Chinese banking sector 
has undergone an institutional restructuring and created the “two-tier” banking system, 
including the People’s Bank of China (the central bank) and four large state-owned 
commercial banks (SOCBs): Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), China 
Construction Bank of China (CCBC), Bank of China (BOC), and Agricultural Bank of 
China (ABC). Between 1985 and 1992, a more intensely competitive environment was 
created with the establishment of a number of nationwide and regional joint-stock 
commercial banks whose main objective was profit maximization.  
 
In the second period of reform (1994-2002), Chinese banks were commercialized even 
further. In 1995, the Chinese authorities merged the urban credit cooperatives into city 
commercial banks (CCBs). In the same year, the Commercial Banking Law was put into 
effect, which requires having a board of directors with professional knowledge when 
setting up commercial banks. In 2002, the People’s Bank of China issued Guidance on 
Independent Directors and External Supervisors of Joint-Stock Commercial Banks to 
establish and enhance the arrangements of independent directors (e.g., experience, 
expertise, independence). 
 
In the final period (2003 – present), Chinese banks have been experienced on-going deep 




banking regulatory body, was set up to take the overall responsibilities of formulating 
rules and regulations, supervising the banking sector and enhancing corporate governance. 
The SOCBs were restructured into modern joint-stock firms with sound corporate 
governance and were listed on the national and international stock exchanges. Apart from 
the privatization of SOCBs, foreign strategic investors were encouraged to bring capital 
and advanced governance into the Chinese banks.  
 
The board has been placed as a key in the bank governance reform in China. The 
Corporate Law requires banks to establish a two-tire board structure, including a board 
of directors and a supervisory board. As the Company Law does not subject supervisors 
to any legal liability, the supervisory board, so far, seems to be more decorative and is 
regarded as a “nominal organ” in China (e.g., Chen et al., 2006; Dahya et al., 2003; Tam, 
1995). To improve the effectiveness of the board of directors, the CBRC issued a series 
of guidelines on bank governance.7 The board of directors is ultimately responsible for 
the operation and management of a commercial bank. In addition to the responsibilities 
stipulated in the laws and regulations (e.g., Corporate Law and rules for commercial 
banks), the bank board should also develop the operation and development strategy and 
monitor its implementation. In addition to its monitoring and advising roles, the board 
also involves in risk management, setting internal control policies, capital planning, and 
taking the ultimate responsibility for the management of the capital adequacy ratio. 
Besides shareholders, the board should also safeguard the interest of depositors and other 
stakeholders.  
 
Previous studies on corporate governance in Chinese banks have mainly focused on the 
ownership structure (e.g., Berger et al., 2009; Dong et al., 2014; Jiang et al., 2013; Lin 
and Zhang, 2009). Researchers have only recently started to explore the role of bank 
 
7  The CBRC issued the “Guidelines on Board of Directors of Joint Stock Commercial Banks” in 2005 




boards. Liang et al. (2013) find that board meetings and independence are positively 
related with performance, while board size poses a negative effect. Qian et al. (2015) find 
that banks with more politically connected directors exhibit lower prudential behavior. 
So far, no study has investigated board diversity in Chinese banks. 
2.3 Theoretical perspective on board diversity  
Existing theoretical framework on the relationship between board diversity and firm 
performance is not based on a single theory, but instead draws on various perspectives 
including agency theory, resource dependency theory, human capital theory, and social 
psychology theory. 
 
Based on agency theory, the board of directors is an important internal mechanism to 
mitigate the conflicts between shareholders and managers (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Board diversity can increase board independence, since diversity can bring more ultimate 
outsiders into boards and enhance mutual monitoring (Kandel and Lazear, 1992; 
Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). An appropriate mix of diverse directors can better exercise 
their monitoring role when they provide high-quality and impartial advice. However, 
Cater et al. (2003) and Hermalin and Weisbach (2000) argue that agency theory does not 
provide a clear prediction, since board diversity may not lead to more effective 
monitoring because diverse board members may be marginalized.  
 
According to resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), firms depend on 
their external environment to survive. The key to reduce the dependencies is to establish 
a linkage with external entities and acquire resources. In this process, the corporate board 
occupies an important role: it is the provider of advice and counsel, legitimacy and 
communication channels (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Directors of different ages expand 
the board member networks and contacts. The network may lead firms to benefit from 




network of an age-diverse board may provide better access to capital and regulators 
(Macey and O’Hara, 2003) and enable the bank to meet the needs of different customers 
and penetrate deeper into the market (Mishra and Jhunjhunwala, 2013). 
 
Human capital theory complements resource dependence theory in some aspects. 
Directors with different educational background, knowledge, skills, and experiences 
provide their own unique human capital to the boardroom, which benefits the outcome of 
the firm (Becker, 1964; Terjesen et al., 2009). Older directors tend to be more 
knowledgeable and experienced, while younger directors are more energetic and have a 
greater appetite for adventures and new technologies (Mishra and Jhunjhunwala, 2013). 
Therefore, an age-diverse board may further an organization’s understanding of its current 
marketplace and industry dynamics and improve its performance.  
 
In contrast, board age diversity may come at a cost and hamper firm performance. On the 
basis of the “similarity-attraction paradigm” (Byrne, 1971), individuals perceive other 
people who are demographically different from them as “outsiders”. People tend to be 
reluctant to share information with “outside” individuals, leading to interpersonal 
attraction breakdown (Adams et al., 2010; Estélyi and Nisar, 2016). According to social 
psychology theories, when it comes to boards, different perspectives and cognitive 
abilities in the board may generate conflicts among different groups of directors (Byrne, 
1971; Williams and O’Reilly, 1996). Such conflicts are likely to hinder the development 
of boardroom cohesiveness, produce barriers for communication, protract decision-
making processes, and weaken firm performance (Wang and Hsu, 2013; Westphal and 
Bednar, 2005).  
2.4 Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.4.1 Board diversity in the banking sector 




bank directors is especially important, as the other stakeholders are not able to impose 
effective governance (Levine, 2004). For example, banks rely on depositors for funding. 
However, it is difficult for depositors to monitor the managers because of information 
asymmetry and high coordination costs (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002). Thus, 
directors in banks should align the manager not only with the interests of shareholders 
but also with that of depositors. Furthermore, holding a unique position in the economy, 
the failure of an individual bank will cause a spillover effect on other financial institutions. 
The banking industry is more heavily regulated than non-financial firms. Compared to 
non-financial firms, bank directors are subject to more scrutiny and should also be 
accountable to regulators. The existing literature on board diversity has largely focused 
on non-financial firms, while only a handful of studies provide empirical evidence on the 
impact of bank board diversity (i.e., gender and nationality) on financial risk (Farag and 
Mallin, 2017), bank performance (García-Meca et al., 2015; Pathan and Faff, 2013), and 
bank growth strategies (De Cabo et al., 2012).  
2.4.2 Board age diversity, bank profitability, and risk 
Age diversity may have positive or negative effects on bank profitability. On the one hand, 
age diversity may improve the experiences, resources, knowledge, and networks of the 
board, which in turn improve bank profitability. On the other hand, age diversity may 
suffer from cognitive conflicts and lower group cohesion, which harm bank profitability. 
The existing research on board age diversity tends to focus on non-financial firms and 
have so far provided mixed evidence. Some studies show that age-diverse boards lead to 
improved firm financial performance (Ararat et al., 2010; Kim and Lim, 2010; Mahadeo 
et al., 2012), while others find that age diversity weakens firm social performance (Hafsi 
and Turgut, 2013), profitability (Ali et al., 2014), and strategic changes (Tarus and Aime, 
2014). However, the board age diversity in the banking sector has received scant attention, 
except for one study by Hagendorff and Keasey (2012). They examine the US commercial 
banks and find that board age diversity is associated with wealth losses surrounding 




As mentioned earlier, the significant and gradual reform in economic system and culture 
over the past decades in China has shaped the generational gap. Growing up in each 
distinctive environment, bank directors from different generations provide different 
resources and perspectives to the board. Directors who are born in Chairman Mao’s 
generation are less educated, collective and conventional, while directors in Deng’s 
generation are innovative, individualistic and knowledgeable (Huang et al., 2015). Given 
the huge generation gap, Chinese directors of different ages are more likely to be reluctant 
to share information with each other due to the “similarity-attraction paradigm” (Byrne, 
1971) and then might approach decisions differently. Hence, the conflict is more likely 
an issue in the board decision-making process. With the gradual transition history and 
current weak corporate governance system of China, age-diverse board may generate 
conflicts in board cohesion and have negative effect on bank profitability. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that:  
H1: Board age diversity is negatively associated with bank profitability. 
 
In terms of risk, no study has investigated the effect of board age diversity on firm risks. 
Regarding the relationship between age and risk, young managers are found to have 
higher propensity to make risky decisions (Cheng et al., 2010) to signal to the market that 
they possess superior abilities (Prendergast and Stole, 1996). Older managers prefer lower 
risk due to the threat to financial security and are associated with lower financial leverage, 
lower capital expenditures, and higher cash holdings (Berger et al., 2014; Bertrand and 
Schoar, 2003). However, when career concerns dominate, younger managers may be 
more risk-averse since they face more uncertainty about their future career than their older 
counterparts (Holmstrom, 1999), while older managers are not afraid of career concerns 
due to their cumulative human capital (Nguyen et al., 2015). At the board level, age 
diversity may impact the process and the quality of decision marking. As we mentioned 
earlier, Chinese directors have experienced the gradual and tremendous transformation in 




directors from Chairman Mao’s generation have their unique and different experience and 
resources compared with younger directors born in Deng’s generation. These differences, 
in turn, are more likely to cause conflicts and make it difficult to reach a consensus in the 
boardroom. The extended decision-making process may expose banks to higher risk when 
it could not adjust their policy in time. Therefore, under China’s cultural and economic 
transition as well as the less developed corporate governance, we hypothesize the 
following: 
    H1b: Board age diversity is positively associated with bank risk. 
2.4.3 Board value diversity, bank profitability, and risk  
During the life span, ageing involves a wide range of factors that influence the 
development of personal values, such as risk-taking behavior, decision-making, and 
attitudes towards work (Child, 1974; Ferris et al., 1991; Medawar, 1952; Rhodes, 1983; 
Serfling, 2014; Sun and Wang, 2010). Existing studies suggest that there are significant 
value differences among managers across age cohorts. Younger mangers appear to be 
more creative with a greater risk appetite and are found to have a higher probability to 
challenge the existing system of company rules (Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Child, 1974; 
Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Mishra and Jhunjhunwala, 2013). Older mangers tend to be 
more cautious and conservative (Bantel and Jackson, 1989), and are more capable in 
dealing with external agencies such as regulators and authorities (Grove et al., 2011).  
 
At the group level, individuals of similar age prefer to interact with those whom they 
perceive to be similar to them. This can be explained by the “similarity-attraction 
paradigm”, where individuals born at similar times are more likely to develop similar 
views on their life experience. Such similarity, in turn, fosters interpersonal attraction, 
group thinking, and cooperation (Byrne, 1971; Goergen et al., 2015; Kunze et al., 2011; 
Zenger and Lawrence, 1989). The values of each generation change in accordance with 
the prevailing condition during their formative years (Inglehart, 2008). Age difference is 




2004; Sun and Wang, 2010). In turn, the difference in values causes a generation gap 
between young and old people (Prasad, 1992).  
 
Value diversity occurs when members of a board differ in terms of what they value, 
especially between young and old members. In many cases, the value difference can lead 
to disagreements and conflicts, which can in turn harm bank performance both in 
profitability and risk (Jehn et al., 1999). In China, the significant changes in economics 
and culture during the last decades have shaped individuals’ value formation. Bank 
directors growing up in each distinctive generation are more likely to hold different values 
due to the unique social and historical events in their life stages. Older directors from 
Mao’s generation are more likely to be risk-averse and prudential, while younger directors 
from Deng’s generation tend to be energetic and have a greater appetite of risk due to the 
modern policies. Given the huge value gaps from different generations, directors might 
approach decisions differently, which could protract the board decision process and affect 
the effectiveness of the board. Under the gradual transition and the current state of weak 
corporate governance in China, we hence hypothesize the following:  
H2a: Board value diversity negatively affects bank profitability.  
H2b: Board value diversity positively affects bank risk. 
2.5 Data and methodology 
2.5.1 Data and sample selection 
We build a sample of 97 Chinese banks during the period 2009-2013. We start with the 
universe of 190 Chinese banks available on Bankscope. We focus on state-owned banks, 
joint-stock banks, city commercial banks and rural commercial banks. To allow hand-
collection of data on the board and ownership structure, we exclude banks that fail to have 
at least one annual report during the study period. We focus on banks that disclose 
directors’ demographic characteristics, especially age, in their annual reports. The 





quarters of the total assets of Chinese banking institutions at the end of 2013 (China 
Banking Regulatory Commission, 2014).  
 
Bank-specific financial information is mainly extracted from Bankscope. We replace the 
missing values and questionable values in Bankscope by hand-collected data from each 
individual bank’s annual report. Most of the banks in our sample follow the local GAAP 
Chinese Accounting Standards (CAS), while the listed commercial banks employ the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).8 The CAS was developed recently 
following the principle of IFRS, and there is no material difference between the financial 
statements of the same bank under IFRS and CAS (Berger et al., 2009; Liang et al., 2013). 
The data for the economic indicator (i.e., GDP per capita) are extracted from China City 
Statistical Yearbook published by China Statistics Press. 
 
To predict individual director’s values, we employ the World Values Survey Sixth Wave, 
a cross-country project containing information about demographics, self-reported 
economic information, and answers to specific questions on fifteen categories of values 
on the economy, work ethics, religions, democracy, and other attitudes. The China Survey 
was conducted in 2012 and measures values and attitudes held by Chinese citizens. The 
respondents are aged from 18 to 75, and they reside in all provinces of China. In our study, 
the World Values Survey (China 2012)9 is employed to predict the values of Chinese 
directors. From this survey, we extract work-related value indicators.  
 
Among the 6,195 directors who served on the board of sample banks, we have 177 
(around 2%) foreign directors from 12 other countries/regions. To predict foreign 
 
8 18 Chinese banks in our sample are listed. 
9 The World Values Survey has six waves, and each wave has a five-year period. In each wave, there is 
only one survey for one country. In our study, we employ the China Survey (2012), which covers most of 




directors’ values, we also download the respective 12 foreign countries/regions’ World 
Values Surveys, including the United Kingdom, the United States, the Switzerland, Spain, 
the Netherlands, Taiwan, Singapore, Germany, Australia, France, Hong Kong, and Italy.  
2.5.2 Model specifications and descriptive statistics 
2.5.2.1 Board age diversity 
To examine the impacts of board age diversity on bank performance, we employ the 
following Model (1): 
!"#$	&'()*(+"#,'-,/ = α + 0!*"(1	23'	456'(7589-,/:; + <-,/:;= + >/		+ ?- + @-,/   (1)                   
where 5 is the bank identifier, and t is the year. Model (1) is estimated by a fixed-effects 
estimator, which is justified using the Hausman Test. The key coefficient of interest 0 
captures the impact of board age diversity on bank performance. ? is an individual-
specific effect that varies across banks, and >/ is the year fixed effect. @ denotes to the 
error term, which varies both among banks and periods of time. All of the independent 
variables are lagged by one year. The reported standard errors are adjusted for potential 
heteroscedasticity.  
!"#$	&'()*(+"#,' is captured by both profitability and risk. As for profitability, return 
on assets (ROA) is calculated as net income divided by total assets and shows how 
efficiently the bank produces profit by the given assets. Return on equity (ROE) is 
calculated as net income divided by total equity, assessing the return on shareholders’ 
investment. As alternative measures, Net Interest Margin is measured by net interest 
income divided by total earning assets. Since one of a bank’s primary functions is to issue 
liabilities and use the proceeds to purchase income-earning assets, higher Net Interest 
Margin reflects higher bank profitability. The Pre-Provision Profit Ratio is calculated as 
the difference between operating income and operating expense to total assets. The Pre-
Provision Profit Ratio provides a reasonable estimate as to what the bank expects to have 




terms of risk, the Z-score, defined as the return on assets plus the equity-to-assets ratio 
divided by the standard deviation of the return on assets, is the inverse of the probability 
that the bank losses surmount bank capital10 and measures the distance to default (Dong 
et al., 2014; Laeven and Levine, 2009). Thus, a higher Z-score indicates lower risk. Since 
Z-scores are highly skewed, we take the natural log of the Z-score (Z-score) in further 
analysis. We also use non-performing loan ratio (NPLratio), calculated as non-performing 
loans to total loans, as an alternative risk measure. 
<Insert Table 2.1 about here> 
Panel A of Table 2.1 reports the descriptive statistics for the bank performance. During 
the sample period, the average ROA and ROE are 0.01 and 0.19, respectively, which is 
comparable to 0.01 and 0.14 in Liang et al. (2013), who study a sample of 52 Chinese 
banks during the period from 2003 to 2010. The average Z-score value is 3.88. On average, 
NPLratio is 0.01, which is smaller compared to 0.03 in Dong et al. (2014) for a sample 
of Chinese commercial banks during 2003-2011. 
!*"(1	23'	456'(7589 is measured by the coefficient of variation of age (CV) calculated 
by the ratio of the standard deviation of board age to mean of board age.11  
<Insert Figure 2.1 about here> 
Figure 2.1 and Panel B of Table 2.1 show substantial board age diversity in Chinese banks. 
Our sample shows that most of the directors in Chinese banks are aged from 35 to 70, and 
therefore grew up in Mao Zedong’s or Deng Xiaoping’s era. The average age of directors 
in Chinese banks is 51.95, and the standard deviation is high at 7.99. The youngest is 29 
years old, while the oldest is 83. The average coefficient of variation of board age (CV) 
is 0.14. The majority of directors on Chinese boards appear to be in their forties (39%) 
 
10 That is the probability (–ROA < E/A), where E/A is the capital to assets ratio (equity/assets). 
11 Alternative measures of age diversity are the Blau Index (Blau) and log of the standard deviation of 
board age (LnSD). In our study, these three measures (CV, Blau and LnSD) are significantly correlated at 




and fifties (39%).  
 
< is a vector of control variables that includes four categories. First, variables on board 
characteristics include the natural logarithm of board size (Board Size), which is found to 
have a significant effect on bank performance (Adams and Mehran, 2012; Staikouras et 
al., 2007), the percentage of independent directors (Independent Directors) who may have 
strong incentives to scrutinize the management (Adam and Mehran, 2012; Erkens et al., 
2012), and a dummy variable (Duality) that equals one if the chief executive officer (CEO) 
is also the chairman. As for the board diversity, previous studies suggest that the gender 
and nationality diversities both pose significant effects on firm performance (García-
Meca et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2014; Sila et al., 2016), so the percentage of foreign directors 
(Foreign Directors) and the percentage of female directors (Female Directors) are also 
controlled in our study. 
 
Second, the ownership variables control for both the type and level of the ownership 
structure (Liang et al., 2013). We include the proportion of shares owned by the largest 
shareholder if the largest shareholder is the government or state-owned enterprises (State), 
a foreign investor (Foreign), or a private investor (Private).  
 
Some additional variables to capture bank-specific characteristics (Berger et al., 2009; 
Dong et al., 2014; García-Meca et al., 2015; Liang et al., 2013; Lin and Zhang, 2009) are 
also included. Bank size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets (Size). The 
capital ratio is measured as total equity to total assets (Capital Ratio), reflecting the bank 
capitalization. We also calculate the loan ratio as total loans to total assets (Loan Ratio), 
which is related to the banks’ credit. A dummy variable for listed banks (Listed) is equal 
to one if the bank is listed. We also include the natural logarithm of the number of years 
since the bank has been established (Bank Age) as banks with a long history tend to have 





Lastly, to account for the potential regional effects on bank performance, we follow 
previous studies (Ferri, 2009; Qian et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2012) and employ the natural 
logarithm of GDP per capita for the city (City GDP) where the bank’s headquarters are 
located. To control for macroeconomic shocks, all of our regressions contain a full set of 
year dummies. 
 
Panel D of Table 2.1 reports the summary statistics for the control variables. The average 
board size in Chinese banks is 13.77, which is comparable to that of 12.68 in the US 
(Pathan and Faff, 2013) and 12.79 in nine developed countries (García-Meca et al., 
2015).12 On average, 25.00% of directors in Chinese banks are independent directors. In 
our sample, only 4.00% of CEOs in Chinese banks have the duality position. In the 
ongoing process of privatization, only about 18.00% of the sample banks are listed on the 
stock exchange. On average, in our sample, around 18.00% of shares are owned by the 
largest shareholder if the largest shareholder is the government or a state-owned 
enterprise.  
 
A correlation matrix of main variables used in Model (1) is presented in Table 2.2. Based 
on previous study (e.g., Liu et al., 2014), a correlation of 0.7 or higher in its absolute 
value indicates a multicollinearity issue. Table 2.2 shows that the highest correlation 
coefficient is 0.675 between ROA and ROE. Since these two variables are alternative 
measures for bank performance and are not used simultaneously in one model, the high 
correlation is not an issue. With respect to other variables, there is no evidence for 
multicollinearity. 
<Insert Table 2.2 about here> 
 
12 Nine developed countries include Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, 




2.5.2.2 Board value diversity 
In order to explore the reasons why board age diversity affects bank performance, we 
introduce directors’ personal values. As discussed before, directors’ values are not directly 
observable but are assumed to be framed by their ages. To obtain the impact of value 
diversity on bank performance, we take four steps.  
 
First, we extract 17 value indicators that are related with work and business from the 
China Values Survey (2012), namely, risk, work, happiness, prudence, wealth, success, 
thoroughness, pressure, outgoing, active, creativity, helping others, finding faults, 
reserved, life satisfaction, slackness, and tension.13 Following Ahern et al. (2015), we 
rescale the responses to each question (each value indicator) into a binary variable, taking 
values of zero or one (See Appendix 2.1). For example, for the value on risk, we assess 
whether the person is risk-taking by scaling answers “Very Much Like Me” and “Like 
Me” to be one and “Somewhat Like Me”, “A Little Like Me”, and “Not At All Like Me” 
to be zero.  	 
 
Second, we apply a logit model to predict the parameters of each value specification based 
on the World Values Survey (China 2012). We follow previous economic and 
psychological literature on individuals’ values and attitudes (e.g., Clark and Oswald, 1994; 
Dolan et al., 2008; Frey and Stutzer, 2000; Shields et al., 2009) and include available key 
demographic and socio-economic variables taken from the background information 
provided in the survey, including Age, Gender, Education, Employment, and Income.  
 
The World Values Survey (China 2012) consists of the whole population of Chinese 
respondents, while our sample is only comprised of bank directors. Income and 
 
13 World Values Survey measures attitudes toward the environment, work, family, politics, national 
identity, culture, diversity, insecurity, and subjective well-beings. In the China Values Survey (2012), we 




Employment reveal the differences between directors in our sample and the individuals in 
the survey.14 Thus, we restrict the World Values Survey (China 2012) to a group of 
individuals who are employed at a high-income level. We employ propensity score 
matching analysis (See Appendix 2.2) to identify individuals in this group who have 
similar characteristics with bank directors in this restricted group.15 Next, we predict the 
parameters of value specifications based on this subgroup of matched individuals.   
 
The following logit model is used to predict personal values: 
			Pr 6"CD'-E = 1 	= H	(0J + 0;23'E+0KL1D,"85*#E + 0MN'#1'(E  +@)			   (2)                              
H is the cumulative standard logistic distribution. 	6"CD'-E equals one if the respondent 
P’s response to the question (value indicator	5) is recorded as one. 	@ denotes the random 
error, and the values are all measured by the probability of holding this value. Independent 
variables in Model (2) include Age, Education, and Gender. Age is given in years. 
Education is specified as categorical variables and is divided into three groups: university 
(university or higher), second school (specialized secondary or vocational technical 
school), and primary school (primary school or less). Gender is indicated as one for males 
and zero for females.  
 
After the estimation, we identify the value indicators that are significantly affected by age 
shown by 0;	  and keep them for later analysis. It results in keeping only six out of 
seventeen value indicators, namely, risk, prudence, wealth, success, creativity, and 
slackness (see Panel B of Appendix B). 
 
14 In the World Values Survey, individuals’ income level is scaled across nine levels (1-9). We rescale 
them into three categories: low (1-3), middle (4-6) and high (7-9). Income is consolidated from nine 
categories into three categories: high (7-9), middle (4-6), and low (1-3). Employment is denoted as one for 
those in employment and zero otherwise. In our study, we assume all directors are employed and belong to 
the high-income level. 
15 We present the detailed steps of propensity score matching in Appendix A2. Matching balance checking 
is also reported in Table A2. Additionally, the differences in means of variables between the treated and 





Third, we input bank directors’ information in our sample including age, education level, 
and gender into model (2) with the estimated parameters in the second step to predict six 
value indicators (risk, prudence, wealth, success, creativity, and slackness). Since some 
foreign directors have stayed in China for a long time, they are likely to be influenced by 
the Chinese culture and lifestyle. Then, we predict the values of the foreign directors, 
which account for less than 2% in our whole sample, using the World Values Survey 
(China 2012), as they are more likely to absorb the Chinese culture.16 
 
In the last step, we employ the following model, which is similar to Model (1), to examine 
the impacts of these value diversities on bank performance:  
!"#$	&'()*(+"#,'-,/ = α + 0	!*"(1	Q"CD'	456'(7589-,/:;+ 	<-,/:;= + >/			+ ?- + @-,/ (3)               
!*"(1	Q"CD'	456'(7589  includes six value diversities that are calculated by the 
coefficient of variation of each value indicator. From Panel C of Table 2.1, we find that 
values on risk, wealth, and slackness have higher coefficients of variation (0.09, 0.12, 
0.37, respectively) compared with the rest of the value indicators. Furthermore, if the 0 
in Model (3) is in the same sign (positive or negative) as 0 in Model (1), we can then 
conclude that age is one of the strongest predictors of value, and age diversity can affect 
bank performance via the variations in directors’ values. 
2.6 Empirical results 
2.6.1 Does age diversity affect bank performance? 
We first examine whether the age diversity affects bank performance. Table 2.2 shows 
the results of Model (1) with bank profitability and bank risk presented in columns (1) - 
(2) and (3) - (4), respectively. Consistent with H1b, age diversity has a significant and 
 




negative impact on bank profitability. Specifically, a two-standard-deviation increase in 
age diversity (CV) shrinks ROA by 12.80% and ROE by 12.75%, which is comparable 
with Hagendorff and Keasey’s (2012) study on banks and the strand of literature in non-
bank samples (Ali et al., 2014; Murray, 1989; Tarus and Aime, 2014). 
 
The results are in line with the argument based on social psychology theories that age 
diversity lessens the cohesion in the boardroom and leads to barriers such as difficult 
communications, and generates conflicts (Pelled et al., 1999; Westphal and Bednar, 2005; 
Williams and O’Reilly, 1996). Such conflicts can protract the decision-making process 
and weaken the effectiveness of the board. When the effects of conflicts in board 
communication, cooperation, and decision-making processes outweigh the benefits of 
providing comprehensive perspectives and different external information by directors at 
different ages, the role of the board as a monitor and advisor will be impeded. As a result, 
an insufficient board may subsequently weaken the bank’s profitability. However, in 
terms of risk, we do not find any significant relationship between age diversity and bank 
risk.  
<Insert Table 2.3 about here> 
With respect to other board characteristics, Duality has a significantly negative 
relationship with ROA (significance at the 10% level) and a strong positive impact on 
NPLratio (significance at the 5% level), which indicates that banks with a CEO duality 
position perform worse. In terms of board independence, the coefficient of Independent 
Directors is significantly positive on bank profitability and negative on bank credit risk, 
which is consistent with previous studies (García-Meca et al., 2015; Liang et al., 2013). 
This relationship suggests that independent directors are beneficial to Chinese banks. We 
also notice that foreign directors have a negative influence on bank performance. It might 
be because foreign directors are less familiar with Chinese governance system, 




managerial performance or challenge the managerial decisions and lead to negative firm 
outcomes (García-Meca et al., 2015 and Masulis et al., 2012). With regard to other bank 
characteristics, larger Bank Size weakens bank performance by decreasing ROE and 
augmenting non-performing loans. Private ownership harms bank performance measured 
by ROA. This might be because Chinese bureaucrats devote more efforts into the firms 
with a large portion of state shares than those with a large portion of private shares. These 
state firms, in turn, receive political supports and preferential treatments from the 
government and gain better access to resources, authorities and business connections. 
Given these facts in China, private firms perform worse than state firms (Sun et al., 2000, 
Tian and Estrin, 2008 and Yu, 2013). We also find that bank’s Capital Ratio is negatively 
related with ROE and positively related with Z-score (both at the significance level of 
1%), indicating that banks with a higher degree of capitalization have lower insolvency 
risk. 
2.6.2 Age and values 
Generational gaps are often caused by differences in values (Prasad, 1992). It appears that 
there is no consensus about how to define generations in China. Studies generally reach 
an agreement that each generation comes into existence with a particular social movement 
with a shared experience (Sun and Wang, 2010) and that most of an individual’s values 
become entrenched in one’s late-teens (Ralston et al., 1999). Based on this framework of 
value formation, in our study, we define our generation as two main groups that 
correspond to specific social and political events at the age of 18: Mao’s generation (born 
during 1931-1958) and Deng’s generation (born during 1959-1990) (See Figure 2.2).  
 
According to some specific social events, we further divide the Mao generation into the 
early Mao generation (born during 1931-1947) who experienced the Communist 
Consolidation period and the late Mao generation (born during 1948-1958) who 
underwent the Great Cultural Revolution. Similarly, we decompose the Deng generation 





Economic Reform and the late Deng generation (born during 1975-1990) who are in the 
societal transition period (Egri and Ralston, 2004; Ralston et al., 1999; Sun and Wang, 
2010). 
<Insert Figure 2.2 about here> 
Our value analysis first focuses on the logit regression of 17 value indicators based on the 
matched subgroup in the World Values Survey (China 2012). Table 2.4 shows the 
predicted parameters of different values. Six value indicators (i.e., risk, prudence, wealth, 
success, creativity, slackness) are significantly affected by age.  
<Insert Table 2.4 about here> 
<Insert Figure 2.3 about here> 
Figure 2.3 shows the changes of these six values (average probability of holding this value) 
among directors in our sample. Our results confirm the previous argument that individuals’ 
values change across age cohorts in China (Egri and Ralston, 2004; Sun and Wang, 2010). 
More specifically, directors’ values on risk, prudence, and wealth vary widely across 
generations. Compared to directors from the early Mao generation, directors from the late 
Deng generation are more creative, have greater risk appetite, appreciate wealth more, 
and pursue profit maximization, which is consistent with previous propositions by Huang 
et al. (2015) and Sun and Wang (2010). In terms of work ethics, younger directors born 
in the late Deng generation in China enjoy the feeling of being successful and yearn for 
achievement recognition, but they are less prudent and cautious than the older ones.  
2.6.3 Why does age diversity affect bank performance? 
In order to further investigate the negative relationship between age diversity and bank 
performance, we decompose age diversity into value diversity and test whether diversity 
in different values influences bank performance. Similar to age diversity, the results 




a negative impact on bank profitability, which supports H2b.  
<Insert Table 2.5 about here> 
The coefficients of directors’ diverse views on risk, prudence, and wealth impose negative 
impacts on bank profitability,17 while variations in directors’ values on creativity and 
slackness do not affect bank profitability. An increase of two standard deviations in value 
diversity on risk is associated with a decrease in ROA of 16.80% and in ROE of 18.44%. 
With regard to prudence, increases of two standard deviations exert negative impacts on 
ROA and ROE of 20.40% and 19.68%, respectively. Furthermore, increases of two 
standard deviations in directors’ value diversity of wealth reduce banks’ ROA by 15.20% 
and ROE by 16.71%. Additionally, we observe that the coefficients of directors’ diverse 
values on success affect ROE negatively at the 5% level. These results suggest that value 
diversity can trigger intragroup conflicts in the workforce and cause a negative impact on 
performance. 
 
As shown in Figure 2.3, directors’ values change with different levels across the four 
generations of Chinese bank directors. Compared with older directors, those bank 
directors growing up in Deng’s era have a greater appetite of risk and pursue profit 
maximization. We also find that directors growing up in Mao’s era are more cautious and 
they value wealth less. Taken together, the differences in directors’ personal values on 
risk, prudence, and wealth across generations are more likely to weaken the interpersonal 
relations between groups and may spark intragroup conflicts in the decision making 
process. As a result, this conflict prevents the board from functioning effectively, which 
ultimately harms bank performance. In summary, taking together the results shown in 
Tables 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5, the effect of value diversity has the same sign with that of age 
diversity on bank profitability. Thus, we conclude that age diversity may affect bank 
 
17 As directors’ values are imputed, we have also modified our approach by using bootstrapped standard 




profitability negatively via their diverse values. 
 
With respect to bank risk, Table 2.5 illustrates that directors’ diverse values fail to have 
any significant effects on the Z-score or NPLratio, indicating that the variability of 
directors’ views is unrelated with bank risk.  
2.7 Robustness  
2.7.1 Potential endogeneity concern 
A key concern for analyses of board effects on firm performance is the endogeneity 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). The relationship between board age diversity and 
performance may be biased because of the possible correlation between independent 
variables and the error term. On one side, board age diversity generates conflicts among 
the directors and harms bank performance; on the other side, banks that perform worse 
may appoint an older director who is more experienced, which may change the board age 
diversity. We partially address this reverse causality issue by employing one-year lagged 
board characteristics in our previous analysis.  
 
In this section, we employ a fixed effect instrumental variable approach using Lewbel's 
(2012) method, which includes internal and external instrumental variables. Following 
previous studies (e.g., Anderson et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2014), board diversity in a firm 
may be affected by the diversity in the same industry (size) or the diversity of local 
population. Therefore, our external instrumental variables are the median value of board 
age diversity for the banks in the same size quartile (Age Diversity Size)18 and the age 
 
18 Previous studies usually use the median value of board diversity for the firm in the same industry and 
the same size quantile as the firm. However, our study only focuses on one industry (banking), so we use 
the median value of board age diversity for the banks in the same size group. When calculating Age 




diversity of the local population at the province level  (Age Diversity Province).19 The 
economic rationale for using local population age diversity is that directors typically come 
from a firm’s local geographic area and that greater local population age diversity 
provides a larger and more age-diverse pool to source directors. 
<Insert Table 2.6 about here> 
Table 2.6 presents the results from estimating the fixed effect Model (1) using the 
instrumental variable approach. In the first column, the coefficients on two instruments, 
Age Diversity Size and Age Diversity Province are positive and significant in the first 
stage regression. This finding shows that the instrument variables are relevant. F-statistic 
also provides additional support for the joint relevance of all instruments. In the rest 
columns, the LR statistics and Hansen J statistics both show that our external instruments 
satisfy the relevance and validity criterion in all specifications. Table 2.6 reports 
consistent findings with Table 2.3. In the first two specifications of bank profitability, the 
coefficients of the board age diversity are negative and significant, which indicates that 
our main results in Model (1) are robust. 
 
In board composition research, dynamic endogeneity is also a major issue. Wintoki et al. 
(2012) argue that most of the existing studies on board structure neglect the fact that 
current board structure might be an outcome of past firm performance. Current firm 
performance may affect future board composition, and these, in turn, may affect future 
firm performance. In our study, shareholders may call for changes to the board. Replacing 
a younger director with an older one could change the age distribution on the board and, 
ultimately, affect bank performance. Thus, previous bank performance can affect the 
motivation of boards to hire new directors.  
 
 
19 We calculate the age diversity of the local population at the province level where the headquarter of the 




As a possible solution, following previous studies (Goergen et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2014; 
Wintoki et al., 2012), our empirical analysis is extended to employ the Arellano-Bond 
(1991) dynamic Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator in Model (4), which 
accounts for unobserved heterogeneity as well as the dynamic relation between board 
structure and past firm performance.  
 
!"#$	&'()*(+"#,'-,/  = α + R!"#$	&'()*(+"#,'-,/:;  + 
0!*"(1	23'	456'(7589-,/ + <-,/= + >/		+ ?- + @-,/   (4) 
All of the independent variables are assumed to be endogenous variables, except for the 
year dummies. The lags (t-3 and t-4) of dependent variables and endogenous variables, 
together with all of the lags of the exogenous variables, are instrumental variables. In 
Table 2.7, we still find significant negative effects (at the 5% level) of board age diversity 
on bank profitability. Therefore, our main results in Model (1) are robust and are not 
driven by endogeneity.  
<Insert Table 2.7 about here> 
2.7.2 Additional robustness tests 
When examining the relationship between age diversity and bank performance in Model 
(1), we use the log of the standard deviation of board age (LnSD) and the Blau index of 
board age diversity (Blau) as alternative measures of age diversity. We find a consistently 
negative relation between age diversity and bank profitability (shown in Appendix 2.4 
and 2.5). Additionally, we also followed existing studies (Bonin et al., 2005; Liang et al., 
2013) to use Net Interest Margin and Pre-Provision Profit Ratio as alternative measures 
of bank profitability. We obtain a negative effect of age diversity on bank profitability, 
which is consistent with previous findings (See Appendix 2.6). 
 
Further, we conduct an alternative approach to predict directors’ values. We construct a 
restricted group of individuals (employed and high income) in the World Values Survey 




we predict directors’ values only based on this restricted group rather than the subgroup 
of matched individuals. Additionally, some may argue that foreign directors’ values are 
affected not only by their own country but also by China. Thus, we calculate foreign 
directors’ values based on the China survey and their own country survey with equal 
weights as a robustness check in Appendix 2.7. The results are similar to our previous 
findings in Table 2.4.  
 
We also find negative relations between directors’ value diversities on risk, prudence, 
wealth, and success at one side and bank profitability at the other side. By focusing on a 
different subgroup (i.e., those employed and with high income), we also find that directors’ 
diverse views with respect to slackness has a negative effect on ROA. The results confirm 
the results from our previous analysis that directors’ value diversities have a negative 
impact on bank profitability.  
2.8 Conclusion 
This paper extends the existing literature on board diversity by providing the first 
empirical evidence regarding the effect of board age diversity on bank performance in 
China. Our results show that age diversity in Chinese banks has a significant and negative 
influence on bank profitability. Although previous studies based on resource dependence 
theory argue that a more diverse board provides more external resources and enhances 
firm performance, our study suggests that age diversity is not beneficial to Chinese banks. 
That is, age-diverse boards are more likely to suffer from communication barriers and 
generate interpersonal frictions and conflicts in the boardroom; ultimately, they may harm 
bank performance. 
 
To examine why age diversity negatively affects bank performance, we further 
decompose directors’ age diversity into their personal value diversities. Given the 




Deng’s eras experienced different historical events and cultural phenomena, which in turn 
affected their formulation of values and cognitive abilities. We find that the heterogeneity 
of directors’ views with respect to risk, prudence, and wealth negatively affects bank 
profitability. In other words, directors with diverse values on risk, prudence and wealth 
may approach decisions differently (i.e., they are more likely to slow down the decision 
process in the boardroom and create more conflicts), leading to worse bank performance. 
Thus, we conclude that the ultimate success of the board depends not only directors’ 
resources but also the interactions between them.  
 
Our findings provide useful guidance for regulators, policymakers, and bank directors 
concerning board diversity and shed light on the direction of further banking governance 
reform. In particular, our findings suggest that, in the current weak corporate governance 
system in China, an age-diverse board is not beneficial for banks. Banks with weak 
governance should look into adding directors with similar ages into their board, to lower 
the generation gap.  
 
We believe that findings from this study are relevant not only for China but also for other 
transition countries that are transforming from a centrally planned economy to a market-
based economy. For these countries, directors from different generations are more likely 
to hold heterogeneous values, as cultural change is an ingredient of economic 
development. To strive for excellence, the board should appreciate the diverse personal 
values among directors, learn to manage value differences, and utilize the benefits of 
directors’ different personal values to improve the effectiveness of the board. Managing 









Figure 2.1 Distribution of Directors’ Age in Chinese Banks from 2009-2013 
 
Source: Chinese bank annual report (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013) 
























Figure 2.2 Generation Timeline in China 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows the generation timeline in China. Mao’s era covers Communist Consolidation (1949-1965) and Great Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), while 
Deng Xiaoping initiated the Social Reform Era (1978-1992) and part of the Societal Transition Era(1993-now) (Egri and Ralston, 2004; Ralston et al., 1999; Sun and 
Wang, 2010).  Since social events at the age of 18 are far more influential than those that occur at an older age (Ghitza and Gelman, 2014), we divided different sub-




Figure 2.3 Personal Value Differences Among Directors in Chinese Banks from 2009 – 2013 
 
Source: Chinese bank annual report (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013), World Values Survey 6th Wave 
Notes: Panels A to H show directors’ personal value (mean) changes across different age groups. We define our generation groups that correspond to specific social and 
political events at the age of 18: the early Mao generation (born during 1931-1947), the late Mao generation (born during 1948-1958), the early Deng generation (born 




Table 2.1 Summary statistics 
Variables Mean Std P25 P50 P75 N 
Panel A: Bank Performance 
ROA 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 448 
ROE 0.19 0.07 0.15 0.18 0.22 448 
Z-score 3.88 0.72 3.37 3.81 4.31 447 
NPLratio 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 435 
Net Interest Margin 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 433 
Pre-Provision Profit Ratio -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 397 
Panel B: Bank Board Age Diversity 
Age diversity (CV) 0.14 0.04 0.11 0.14 0.17 450 
Age diversity (LnSD) 1.94 0.29 1.80 1.94 2.15 450 
Age diversity (Blau) 0.58 0.11 0.52 0.60 0.65 450 
Panel C: Bank Board Value Diversity 
Value diversity (risk) 0.09 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.11 302 
Value diversity (prudence) 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.06 302 
Value diversity (wealth) 0.12 0.04 0.09 0.11 0.14 302 
Value diversity (success) 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 302 
Value diversity (creativity) 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 302 
Value diversity (slackness) 0.37 0.15 0.30 0.36 0.44 302 
Panel D: Control Variables 
Board Characteristics       
Independent Directors 0.25 0.12 0.15 0.27 0.33 450 
Board Size 13.77 3.37 11.00 14.00 15.00 450 
Duality 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 450 
Foreign Directors 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 450 
Female Directors 0.11 0.10 0.00 0.09 0.17 450 
Ownership Characteristics       
State 0.18 0.19 0.00 0.12 0.21 451 
Foreign 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 451 
Private 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 451 
Bank-Specific Measures       
Capital Ratio 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.08 450 
Loan Ratio 0.46 0.11 0.40 0.48 0.54 450 
Size 18.81 1.67 17.70 18.44 19.55 450 
Bank Age             2.50 0.77 1.95 2.64 2.83 450 
Listed 0.18 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 451 
Location Effects       
City GDP 10.98 0.50 10.63 11.07 11.38 454 
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics for main variables. The sample is an unbalanced panel covering 97 banks over the period 
from 2009 to 2013. Panel A reports the summary statistics of bank performance measures. Panel B reports the descriptive statistics 
for bank board age diversities. Panel C reports the summary statistics for board value diversities. Panel D reports the summary statistics 




Table 2.2 Correlation matrix for main variables 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1 ROA 1.000                     
2 ROE 0.675 1.000                    
3 Z-score 0.072 -0.035 1.000                   
4 NPLratio -0.284 -0.227 -0.156 1.000                  
5 Age Diversity -0096 -0.171 0.208 -0.090 1.000                 
6 Board Size -0.015 -0.011 0.242 -0.075 0.029 1.000                
7 Duality -0.013 -0.039 0.030 0.015 -0.008 0.046 1.000               
8 Independent Directors -0.020 -0.043 0.310 -0.092 0.165 0.327 -0.032 1.000              
9 Foreign Directors -0.114 -0.010 0.212 -0.057 -0.131 0.262 -0.050 0.198 1.000             
10 Female Directors 0.029 0.024 0.033 -0.019 0.031 0.203 0.065 0.026 0.041 1.000            
11 State -0.228 -0.114 -0.199 -0.091 -0.055 -0.106 -0.62 0.027 0.049 0.104 1.000           
12 Foreign -0.099 -0.008 0.210 0.170 0.014 0.039 -0.062 0.172 0.468 -0.041 -0.302 1.000          
13 Private 0.069 0.060 0.015 -0.051 -0.002 0.061 -0.006 0.027 -0.031 -0.072 -0.365 -0.010 1.000         
14 Size -0.095 0.096 0.240 -0.071 -0.250 0.530 -0.070 0.386 0.369 0.142 0.255 0.073 0.063 1.000        
15 Listed -0.018 0.083 0.243 -0.060 -0.242 0.459 -0.091 0.345 0.203 0.063 0.166 -0.002 0.125 0.475 1.000       
16 Loan Ratio 0.188 -0.000 0.001 0.159 -0.160 0.169 -0.001 0.058 0.100 0.077 -0.231 0.083 0.093 0.040 0.147 1.000      
17 Capital Ratio 0.180 -0.376 0.235 -0.054 0.180 -0.035 0.027 0.078 -0.150 0.027 -0.133 -0.100 0.078 -0.269 -0.145 0.097 1.000     
18 City GDP -0.096 -0.156 0.198 -0.017 -0.060 0.241 -0.167 0.321 0.210 0.023 0.115 0.113 0.081 0.472 0.300 0.097 0.097 1.000    
19 Bank Age 0.001 0.104 0.095 0.120 -0.297 0.264 0.059 0.120 0.258 0.045 0.113 0.092 0.026 0.501 0.447 0.209 -0.194 0.256 1.000   
20 Net Interest Margin 0.058 -0.035 -0.011 0.024 -0.041 -0.064 0.500 -0.070 0.039 -0.126 -0.156 -0.055 0.138 -0.174 -0.092 0.055 0.089 -0.243 0.018 1.0000  
21 Pre-provision Profit -0.011 0.181 -0.074 -0.075 -0.72 0.064 0.043 0.096 0.014 0.016 0.251 -0.068 -0.019 0.242 0.152 -0.314 -0.121 0.164 0.267 -0.021 1.0000 
Notes: This table shows the correlation matrix of main variables. ROA is net income to total assets. ROE is net income to total equity. Z-score is measured by the return on assets plus the equity to assets ratio divided by 
the standard deviation of the return on assets. NPLratio is non-performing loans divided by total loans. Age Diversity is measured by coefficient of variation of board age (CV). Board Size is the natural log of board size. 
The dummy variable Duality is equal to one if the bank governor is also the chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. Independent Directors is the percentage of independent directors. Foreign Directors is the percentage 
of foreign directors. Female Directors is the percentage of female directors. State is the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholders if the largest shareholder is the government or a state-owned enterprise. 
Foreign is the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholders if the largest shareholder is a foreign investor. Private is the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholders if the largest shareholder is a private 
investor. Size is the natural log of total assets. Bank Age is the natural log of bank’s age. The dummy Listed equals to one if the bank is listed, and zero otherwise. City GDP is the natural log of GDP per capita of the city 
in which the bank’s headquarters is located. Net Interest Margin is measured by net interest income divided by total earning assets. The Pre-Provision Profit ratio is calculated as the difference between operating income 





Table 2.3 Relation between board age diversity and bank performance 
 Profitability Risk 
                          ROA  ROE Z-score  NPLratio 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) 
Age Diversity  -0.016**  -0.303** -0.092  0.037 
                          (0.007)  (0.129) (0.449)  (0.037) 
Board Size 0.000  0.001 -0.001  -0.000 
                          (0.000)  (0.001) (0.003)  (0.000) 
Duality                 -0.002*  -0.021 0.096  0.005** 
                          (0.001)  (0.018) (0.086)  (0.002) 
Independent Directors 0.005*  0.078 0.268*  -0.028** 
                          (0.003)  (0.055) (0.160)  (0.012) 
Foreign Directors -0.008*  -0.177** 0.630**  0.031* 
 (0.004)  (0.079) (0.309)  (0.018) 
Female Directors 0.001  0.021 0.004  -0.002 
 (0.002)  (0.058) (0.143)  (0.008) 
State 0.009  0.178 0.191  -0.041 
                          (0.006)  (0.114) (0.340)  (0.039) 
Foreign -0.000  0.206 -0.222  0.008 
                          (0.008)  (0.151) (0.467)  (0.034) 
Private -0.010**  -0.097 0.017  0.050* 
                          (0.004)  (0.080) (0.303)  (0.029) 
Size -0.001  -0.043* 0.045  0.013* 
                          (0.001)  (0.024) (0.080)  (0.007) 
Listed                  0.001  0.007 0.010  0.001 
                          (0.001)  (0.015) (0.054)  (0.005) 
Loan Ratio -0.004  -0.080 -0.235  0.027 
                          (0.004)  (0.071) (0.255)  (0.020) 
Capital Ratio                0.010  -0.591*** 2.719***  -0.010 
                          (0.010)  (0.195) (0.651)  (0.039) 
City GDP -0.002  -0.024 -0.036  0.001 
                          (0.001)  (0.025) (0.077)  (0.004) 
Bank Age             -0.000  0.012 0.030  0.013** 
                          (0.002)  (0.030) (0.080)  (0.007) 
Year Controls Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
N 349  349 349  342 
!"                       0.230  0.180 0.202  0.199 
Notes: The table presents the regression results for the effects of age diversity on bank performance (bank profitability and risk). The 
result of bank profitability measured by ROA and ROE are presented in columns (1) and (2). The results of bank risk measured by Z-
score and NPLratio are presented in columns (3) and (4). Age Diversity is measured by coefficient of variation of board age (CV). 
Board Size is the natural log of board size. The dummy variable Duality is equal to one if the bank governor is also the chairman of 
the board, and zero otherwise. Independent Directors is the percentage of independent directors. Foreign Directors is the percentage 
of foreign directors. Female Directors is the percentage of female directors. State is the percentage of shares held by the largest 
shareholders if the largest shareholder is the government or a state-owned enterprise. Foreign is the percentage of shares held by the 
largest shareholders if the largest shareholder is a foreign investor. Private is the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholders 
if the largest shareholder is a private investor. Size is the natural log of total assets. Bank Age is the natural log of bank’s age. The 
dummy Listed equals one if the bank is listed, and zero otherwise. City GDP is the natural log of GDP per capita of the city in which 
the bank’s headquarters is located. It employs the panel fixed effect estimator with lagged independent variables. Constant is included 
into the estimation but not reported. The robust error of each coefficient is shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical 






Table 2.4 Regression of prediction of values (China) 

















Age -0.030*** -0.029 0.032 0.022* -0.051*** -0.043** -0.014 -0.011  
 (0.011) (0.021) (0.020) (0.012) (0.015) (0.018) (0.014) (0.012)  
Education          
2(secondary school) 0.130 0.711 0.542 0.007 -0.211 -0.075 0.185 0.106  
 (0.315) (0.492) (0.582) (0.385) (0.419) (0.482) (0.383) (0.364)  
3(university) 0.293 0.466 1.267* -0.516 -0.772* 0.923 0.957** 0.015  
 (0.355) (0.522) (0.667) (0.399) (0.453) (0.698) (0.432) (0.398)  
Gender 0.065 0.365 -0.543 0.007 0.253 -0.212 0.002 0.156  
 (0.222) (0.363) (0.423) (0.245) (0.286) (0.395) (0.271) (0.235)  
N 374 389 393 373 375 375 320 319  
!" 0.029 0.034 0.018 0.025 0.048 0.045 0.030 0.004  


















Age -0.015 -0.033** -0.038 0.000 -0.010 -0.002 -0.050** -0.010 -0.018 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.037) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.021) (0.014) (0.012) 
Education          
2(secondary school) 0.098 0.325 0.506 0.820* 0.495 -0.341 -0.989** -0.372 0.482 
 (0.368) (0.374) (0.917) (0.427) (0.386) (0.366) (0.494) (0.376) (0.361) 
3(university) 0.748* 1.141** 0.000 0.853* 0.767* 0.179 -1.760*** -0.541 0.402 
 (0.403) (0.502) (0.000) (0.458) (0.422) (0.404) (0.583) (0.419) (0.397) 
Gender 0.274 0.345 0.832 0.319 -0.515** -0.094 0.508 -0.232 0.245 
 (0.239) (0.293) (0.843) (0.250) (0.240) (0.243) (0.377) (0.254) (0.236) 
N 308 375 259 311 314 390 328 318 321 
!" 0.030 0.065 0.056 0.018 0.023 0.009 0.054 0.008 0.024 
Notes: This table presents the results of prediction of seventeen values drawn from the World Values Survey (China). Age is given in years. Education is specified as categorical variables, divided into three groups: 
university (university or higher), second school (specialized secondary or vocational technical school), and primary school (primary school or less). Gender is indicated as zero for females and one for males. It employs 
a logit model with robust standard errors. Constant is included into the estimation but not reported. The robust error of each coefficient is shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance level at 10%, 







Table 2.5 Relation between board value diversity and bank performance 












Panel A:  Dependent variable is ROA      
ROA -0.028** -0.051** -0.019** -0.051 -0.029 -0.003 
 (0.013) (0.024) (0.009) (0.033) (0.025) (0.002) 
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 239 239 239 239 239 239 
!" 0.307 0.302 0.302 0.290 0.280 0.279 
Panel B:  Dependent variable is ROE      
ROE -0.584** -0.935** -0.397** -1.224** -0.798 -0.092 
 (0.251) (0.463) (0.185) (0.610) (0.603) (0.057) 
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 239 239 239 239 239 239 
!" 0.303 0.290 0.296 0.289 0.276 0.278 
PanelC:  Dependent variable is Z-score      
Z-score -0.312 -0.022 -0.283 0.419 -0.459 0.057 
 (0.874) (1.630) (0.672) (1.678) (2.123) (0.209) 
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 239 239 239 239 239 239 
!" 0.176 0.175 0.177 0.176 0.176 0.176 
Panel D:  Dependent variable is NPLratio     
NPLratio -0.312 -0.022 -0.283 0.419 -0.459 0.057 
 (0.874) (1.630) (0.672) (1.678) (2.123) (0.209) 
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 239 239 239 239 239 239 
!" 0.176 0.175 0.177 0.176 0.176 0.176 
Notes: This table presents the results for the effects of value diversity on bank performance. Panel A presents results for regressing ROA on various value diversities. Panel B presents results for regressing ROE on various 
value diversities. Panel C presents results for regressing Z-score on various value diversities. Panel D presents results for regressing NPLratio on various value diversities. For the sake of saving space, the estimation 
results for control variables are omitted here. Constant is included into the estimation but not reported.  The robust error of each coefficient is shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance level at 






Table 2.6 Fixed effect instrumental variable approach: relation between board age 
diversity and bank performance 
 First Stage Second Stage 
 Age Diversity Profitability Risk 
                          ROA ROE Z-score NPLratio 
                          (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Age Diversity Size              0.319*     
                          (0.163)     
Age Diversity Province                    0.024*     
                          (0.048)     
Age diversity  -0.039** -0.474* 0.407 0.106 
  (0.018) (0.286) (1.056) (0.089) 
Board Size 0.003*** 0.000** 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) 
Duality -0.012 -0.003** -0.023 0.091 0.005** 
 (0.009) (0.001) (0.016) (0.078) (0.002) 
Independent Directors 0.097*** 0.006*** 0.074* 0.316* -0.029** 
 (0.018) (0.002) (0.044) (0.161) (0.012) 
Foreign Directors -0.066* -0.012** -0.206** 0.637* 0.043* 
 (0.037) (0.006) (0.082) (0.375) (0.025) 
Female Directors 0.025 0.001 0.032 -0.000 -0.003 
 (0.019) (0.002) (0.049) (0.160) (0.010) 
State 0.008 0.007 0.161 0.117 -0.037 
 (0.013) (0.005) (0.113) (0.396) (0.032) 
Foreign 0.030 -0.002 0.197 -0.295 0.012 
 (0.043) (0.008) (0.143) (0.492) (0.033) 
Private 0.037 -0.011** -0.097 0.003 0.053** 
 (0.032) (0.005) (0.091) (0.314) (0.025) 
Size -0.007*** -0.001 -0.042** -0.008 0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.019) (0.077) (0.005) 
Listed -0.018*** -0.000 0.004 0.008 0.003 
 (0.007) (0.001) (0.018) (0.073) (0.005) 
Loan Ratio -0.071*** -0.005* -0.063 -0.275 0.029* 
 (0.020) (0.003) (0.058) (0.260) (0.017) 
Capital Ratio 0.235** 0.010 -0.805*** 1.752** -0.007 
 (0.103) (0.011) (0.225) (0.866) (0.045) 
City GDP 0.003 -0.001 -0.023 -0.025 -0.000 
 (0.005) (0.001) (0.023) (0.082) (0.004) 
Bank Age -0.004 -0.000 0.014 -0.028 0.013** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.023) (0.084) (0.006) 
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 345 345 345 345 340 
F-statistics 15.24     
LM  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen                 0.536 0.506 0.516 0.877 
Notes: This table presents the results of the fixed effect instrumental variable estimation using Lewbel's (2012) method. 
The results of first stage regression in reported in column (1). The result of bank profitability measured by ROA and 
ROE are presented in columns (2) and (3). The results of bank risk measured by Z-score and NPLratio are presented 




Age Diversity Province are two instrument variables of Age Diversity. Board Size is the natural log of board size. The 
dummy variable Duality is equal to one if the bank governor is also the chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. 
Independent Directors is the percentage of independent directors. Foreign Directors is the percentage of foreign 
directors. Female Directors is the percentage of female directors. State is the percentage of shares held by the largest 
shareholders if the largest shareholder is the government or a state-owned enterprise. Foreign is the percentage of 
shares held by the largest shareholders if the largest shareholder is a foreign investor. Private is the percentage of shares 
held by the largest shareholders if the largest shareholder is a private investor. Size is the natural log of total assets. 
Bank Age is the natural log of bank’s age. The dummy Listed equals one if the bank is listed, and zero otherwise. City 
GDP is the natural log of GDP per capita of the city in which the bank’s headquarters is located. The external 
instrumental variables are the median value of board age diversity for the bank in the same size quartile and the age 
diversity of the local population at the province level. LR statistics is the test for under-identification. Hansen test 
statistics is the test of over-identifying restrictions based on the null that instruments are valid. Constant is included 
into the estimation but not reported. The robust error of each coefficient is shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 


















































Table 2.7 System GMM estimations: relation between board age diversity and bank 
performance 
                          Profitability  Risk  
 ROA ROE  Z-score NPLratio 
                                   (1)     (2)  (3) (4) 
Lagged ROA 0.726***     
 (0.174)     
Lagged ROE  0.840***    
  (0.172)    
Lagged Z-score    0.901***  
    (0.101)  
Lagged NPLratio     0.330** 
                              (0.142) 
Age diversity -0.037 -0.726**  0.582 0.059 
 (0.028) (0.366)  (1.720) (0.095) 
Board Size 0.000 0.002  -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.005)  (0.018) (0.001) 
Duality 0.000 0.033  0.040 -0.013 
 (0.006) (0.086)  (0.285) (0.033) 
Independent Directors 0.003 -0.047  -0.027 -0.040* 
 (0.010) (0.111)  (0.540) (0.024) 
Foreign Directors 0.006 0.043  0.015 -0.016 
 (0.005) (0.067)  (0.365) (0.019) 
Female Directors 0.015 0.213  0.314 0.044 
 (0.017) (0.373)  (1.169) (0.097) 
State 0.027* 0.285  1.329 -0.083* 
 (0.015) (0.226)  (1.197) (0.043) 
Foreign 0.005 0.056  0.497* 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.077)  (0.279) (0.031) 
Private 0.000 -0.004  0.153* 0.004 
 (0.001) (0.012)  (0.082) (0.003) 
Size 0.000 0.013  -0.141 -0.007 
 (0.003) (0.027)  (0.182) (0.014) 
Listed -0.001 0.003  0.025 -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.074)  (0.380) (0.018) 
Loan Ratio 0.001 0.136  -0.118 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.088)  (0.314) (0.019) 
Capital Ratio 0.016 -1.525  5.630 0.133 
 (0.076) (0.999)  (4.839) (0.178) 
City GDP -0.003 -0.025  -0.234 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.036)  (0.164) (0.009) 
Bank Age -0.002* -0.038*  -0.127 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.022)  (0.081) (0.003) 
Year Control  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 347 347  347 341 
AR2 p-value 0.482 0.198  0.903 0.543 
Hansen p-value                0.488 0.970  0.859 0.998 
Notes: This table presents the results of the two-step system GMM estimation. The results of bank profitability measured by ROA and 
ROE are presented in columns (1) and (2). The results of bank risk measured by Z-score and NPLratio are presented in columns (3) 
and (4). Age Diversity is measured by coefficient of variation of board age (CV). Board Size is the natural log of board size. The 
dummy variable Duality is equal to one if the bank governor is also the chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. Independent 
Directors is the percentage of independent directors. Foreign Directors is the percentage of foreign directors. Female Directors is the 
percentage of female directors. State is the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholders if the largest shareholder is the 
government or a state-owned enterprise. Foreign is the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholders if the largest shareholder 
is a foreign investor. Private is the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholders if the largest shareholder is a private investor. 
Size is the natural log of total assets. Bank Age is the natural log of bank’s age. The dummy Listed equals one if the bank is listed, and 
zero otherwise. City GDP is the natural log of GDP per capita of the city in which the bank’s headquarters is located. AR2 is test for 
second order serial correlation in the first differenced residuals under the null of no serial correlation. Hansen test statistics is the test 
of over-identifying restrictions based on the null that instruments are valid. Constant is included into the estimation but not reported. 





Appendix 2.1 Questions from the World Values Survey used to identify value indicators 
 
Using this card, would you please indicate for each description whether that person is 
very much like you, like you, somewhat like you, not like you, or not at all like you? 
  
V70.  
It is important to this person think up new ideas and to be creative; to do things one’s own 
way.  
1. Very much like me  2.Like me  3.Somewhat like me  4.A little like me  5.Not like 
me  6.Not at all like me 
V71.  
It is important to this person to be rich; to have a lot of money and expensive things. 
1. Very much like me  2.Like me  3.Somewhat like me  4.A little like me  5.Not like 
me  6.Not at all like me 
V75.  
Being very successful is important to this person; to have people recognize one’s 
achievements. 
1. Very much like me  2.Like me  3.Somewhat like me  4.A little like me  5.Not like 
me  6.Not at all like me 
V76. 
 Adventure and taking risks are important to this person; to have an exciting life. 
1. Very much like me  2.Like me  3.Somewhat like me  4.A little like me  5.Not like 
me  6.Not at all like me 
V77. 
 It is important to this person to always behave properly; to avoid doing anything people 
would say is wrong. 
1. Very much like me  2.Like me  3.Somewhat like me  4.A little like me  5.Not like 
me  6.Not at all like me 
V160C  
I see myself as someone who tends to be lazy:  
1. Disagree strongly   2. Disagree a little   3. Neither agree nor disagree   4. Agree a 

































Appendix 2.2 Propensity Score Matching Analysis 
Before predicting directors’ values, we use the propensity score matching method based 
on a restricted subgroup (i.e., those employed and with high income) in the World Values 
Survey (China 2012). By employing this approach, we can identify a control sample of 
individuals in the restricted subgroup in the World Values Survey (China 2012) that show 
no significant differences in demographic and economic characteristics to bank directors 
in our treated sample. In this setup, we first employ a logit model to estimate the 
probability that an individual becomes a bank director, while controlling for the same 
demographic and socioeconomic variables in predicting values (e.g., individuals’ age, 
gender and education). Then, we use the nearest-neighbor method to match individuals 
based on the propensity scores (predicted probability of being a bank director). More 
specifically, each bank director in the treated sample is matched with an individual in the 
restricted subgroup in the World Values Survey (China 2012). We further require the 
maximum difference between the propensity score of bank directors in our sample and 
that of the matched individuals to be 0.02 in its absolute value. Finally, we obtain 397 
matched individuals in the World Values Survey (China 2012). 
 
We then test the quality of matching. The results (see Appendix 2.2) show that all of the 
differences in means for each characteristic are not statistically significant after the 
matching. In other words, the matched individuals in the control sample are 
indistinguishable to the directors in the treated sample based on their demographic and 
economic information. This allows us to predict directors’ personal values based on a 
group of matched individuals (397 matched individuals) in the restricted subgroup in the 
World Values Survey (China 2012). Additionally, all of the covariates are well balanced 
(require %bias to be less than 5%). 
 
Table A2.2 Match balance checking  
Variable Unmatched mean % reduct t-test 
matched treated control % bias |bias| t p>|t| 
Age U 53.106 39.953 132.1  24.10 0.000 
 M 52.158 52.331 -1.7 98.7 -0.46 0.649 
Gender U 0.878 0.580 71.2  13.10 0.000 
 M 0.871 0.891 -4.9 93.1 -1.29 0.197 
Middle level education U 0.027 0.510 -129.7  -26.02 0.000 
 M 0.028 0.025 1.0 99.3 0.45 0.650 
High level education U 0.965 0.309 186.8  36.85 0.000 
 M 0.963 0.969 -1.7 99.1 -0.69 0.493 
Pscore U 0.907 0.184 324.3  60.62 0.000 
 M 0.901 0.901 -0.2 99.9 -0.06 0.955 












Appendix 2.3 Variables definition 
Variables Definition 
Panel A: Bank Performance   
ROA Net income/ total assets 
ROE Net income/ total equity 
Z-score The natural log of z-score = ln((ROA+E/A)/!(#$%)) 
NPLratio Non-performing loans/ total loans 
Net Interest Margin Net interest income / total earning assets 
Pre-Provision Profit ratio (Operating income – operating expense)/ total assets 
  
Panel B: Bank Board Age Diversity  
Age diversity (CV) Coefficient of variation of board age = '( 
(age)/mean(age) 
Age diversity (LnSD) Log of the Standard deviation of board age 
Age diversity (Blau) Blau index of board age 
  
Panel C: Directors’ Personal Values 
Value Diversity (risk) Coefficient of variation of directors’ value on risk 
Value Diversity (prudence) Coefficient of variation of directors’ value on prudence 
Value Diversity (wealth) Coefficient of variation of directors’ value on wealth 
Value Diversity (success) Coefficient of variation of directors’ value on success 
Value Diversity (creativity) Coefficient of variation of directors’ value on creativity 
Value Diversity (slackness) Coefficient of variation of directors’ value on slackness 
  
Panel D: Control Variables  
Board Characteristics  
Independent Directors Percentage of independent directors 
Board Size The natural log of board size 
Duality Dummy variable equals one if bank governor is also 
chairman of the board, and zero otherwise 
Foreign Directors Percentage of foreign directors 
Female Directors Percentage of female directors 
Ownership characteristics  
State Percentage of shares held by the largest shareholders if 
the Largest shareholder is the government or a state-
owned enterprise 
Foreign Percentage of shares held by the largest shareholders if 
the Largest shareholder is a foreign investor 
Private Percentage of shares held by the largest shareholders if 
the Largest shareholder is a private investor 
Bank-Specific measures  
Capital Ratio Equity/total assets 
Loan Ratio Total loans/ total assets 
Size The natural log of total assets 
Bank Age The natural log of bank age 
Listed Dummy variable equals one if the bank has been listed 
at the end of the year, and zero otherwise 
Location effects  
City GDP The natural log of GDP per capita of city that the 














Appendix 2.4 Relation between board age diversity and bank performance: robustness 
test 
 Profitability    Risk   
                          ROA     ROE     Z-score  NPLratio    
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Age Diversity -0.003**  -0.048**  -0.022  0.011* 
 (0.001)  (0.018)  (0.058)  (0.006) 
Board Size 0.000  0.001  -0.001  -0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.000) 
Duality -0.003*  -0.021  0.096  0.005** 
 (0.001)  (0.018)  (0.087)  (0.002) 
Independent Directors 0.005*  0.078  0.269*  -0.029** 
 (0.003)  (0.052)  (0.160)  (0.011) 
Foreign Directors -0.008*  -0.178**  0.621**  0.037** 
 (0.004)  (0.076)  (0.303)  (0.018) 
Female Directors 0.001  0.020  0.004  -0.003 
 (0.002)  (0.056)  (0.143)  (0.008) 
State 0.009  0.178  0.188  -0.039 
 (0.006)  (0.113)  (0.339)  (0.038) 
Foreign -0.001  0.189  -0.233  0.014 
 (0.008)  (0.145)  (0.468)  (0.033) 
Private -0.010**  -0.101  0.012  0.052* 
 (0.004)  (0.080)  (0.303)  (0.029) 
Size -0.001  -0.042*  0.045  0.013* 
 (0.001)  (0.025)  (0.080)  (0.007) 
Listed 0.000  0.000  0.006  0.003 
 (0.001)  (0.018)  (0.055)  (0.005) 
Loan Ratio -0.004  -0.081  -0.235  0.027 
 (0.004)  (0.072)  (0.256)  (0.020) 
Capital Ratio 0.010  -0.587***  2.719***  -0.010 
 (0.010)  (0.194)  (0.652)  (0.039) 
City GDP -0.002  -0.022  -0.034  0.001 
 (0.001)  (0.025)  (0.076)  (0.004) 
Bank Age -0.000  0.013  0.030  0.013** 
 (0.002)  (0.029)  (0.080)  (0.007) 
Year Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 349  349  349  342 
#) 0.242  0.189  0.203  0.218 
Notes: This table presents the robust regression results for the effects of age diversity on bank performance (bank profitability and 
risk) in which age diversity is measured by the log of standard deviation of board age (LnSD). The left panel presents result of bank 
profitability measured by ROA and ROE. The right panel presents of bank risk measured by Z-score and NPLratio. Board Size is the 
natural log of board size. The dummy variable Duality equals one if bank governor is also chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. 
Independent Directors is the percentage of independent directors. State is the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholders if 
the largest shareholder is the government or a state-owned enterprise. Foreign is the percentage of shares held by the largest 
shareholders if the largest shareholder is a foreign investor. Private is the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholders if the 
largest shareholder is a private investor. Size is the natural log of total assets. Bank Age is the natural log of bank age. The dummy 
Listed equals one if the bank is listed at the end of the year, and zero otherwise. City GDP is the natural log of GDP per capita of city 
that the bank’s headquarter is located. It employs the panel fixed effect estimator with lagged independent variables. Constant is 
included into the estimation but not reported. The robust error of each coefficient is shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical 











Appendix 2.5 Relation between board age diversity and bank performance: robustness 
test 
 Profitability    Risk   
                          ROA     ROE     Z-score  NPLratio    
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Age Diversity  -0.006**  -0.066  0.011  0.010 
                          (0.003)  (0.043)  (0.101)  (0.007) 
Board Size 0.000  0.001  -0.001  -0.000 
                          (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.000) 
Duality                 -0.002*  -0.018  0.089  0.004** 
                          (0.001)  (0.018)  (0.088)  (0.002) 
Independent Directors 0.006**  0.067  0.322*  -0.028** 
                          (0.003)  (0.056)  (0.171)  (0.011) 
Foreign Directors -0.006*  -0.140**  0.567*  0.027* 
 (0.004)  (0.067)  (0.299)  (0.015) 
Female Directors 0.001  0.029  0.005  -0.003 
 (0.002)  (0.057)  (0.147)  (0.007) 
State -0.002  0.194  -0.310  0.011 
                          (0.007)  (0.140)  (0.470)  (0.030) 
Foreign 0.008  0.174  0.099  -0.041 
                          (0.006)  (0.112)  (0.348)  (0.039) 
Private -0.010**  -0.084  -0.015  0.050* 
                          (0.005)  (0.085)  (0.296)  (0.028) 
Size -0.001  -0.037  -0.009  0.013* 
                          (0.001)  (0.025)  (0.090)  (0.007) 
Listed                  0.001  0.018  -0.006  -0.000 
                          (0.001)  (0.013)  (0.053)  (0.005) 
Loan Ratio -0.004  -0.041  -0.278  0.025 
                          (0.004)  (0.071)  (0.285)  (0.021) 
Capital Ratio                 0.008  -0.848***  1.778**  -0.001 
                          (0.012)  (0.261)  (0.790)  (0.043) 
City GDP -0.002  -0.030  -0.018  0.002 
                          (0.001)  (0.025)  (0.076)  (0.004) 
Bank Age             -0.000  0.016  -0.030  0.013** 
                          (0.001)  (0.029)  (0.091)  (0.007) 
Year Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 349  349  349  342 
#)                       0.241  0.189  0.151  0.199 
Notes: This table presents the robustness test of regression in Model (1) in which age diversity is measured by Blau index of board 
age diversity (Blau). The left panel presents result of bank profitability measured by ROA and ROE. The right panel presents of bank 
risk measured by Z-score and NPLratio. Board Size is the natural log of board size. Duality equals one if bank governor is also 
chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. Independent Directors is the percentage of independent directors. State is the percentage 
of shares held by the largest shareholders if the largest shareholder is the government or a state-owned enterprise. Foreign is the 
percentage of shares held by the largest shareholders if the largest shareholder is a foreign investor. Private is the percentage of shares 
held by the largest shareholders if the kargest shareholder is a private investor. Size is the natural log of total assets. Bank Age is the 
natural log of bank age. Listed equals one if the bank is listed at the end of the year, and zero otherwise. City GDP is the natural log 
of GDP per capita of city that the bank’s headquarter is located. It employs the panel fixed effect estimator with lagged independent 
variables. Constant is included into the estimation but not reported. The robust error of each coefficient is shown in parentheses. *, 






Appendix 2.6 Relation between board age diversity and bank profitability: robustness test 
 Profitability 
 Net Interest Margin Pre-Povision Profit Ratio 
 (1) (2) 
Age diversity -0.028* -0.013** 
 (0.015) (0.006) 
Board Size 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Duality 0.003 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.001) 
Independent Directors 0.008 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.002) 
Foreign Directors 0.006 -0.001 
 (0.009) (0.004) 
Female Directors 0.010 0.005** 
 (0.007) (0.002) 
State -0.030* 0.001 
 (0.016) (0.006) 
Foreign -0.010 -0.001 
 (0.013) (0.006) 
Private -0.009 0.003 
 (0.011) (0.006) 
Size 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.001) 
Listed -0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
Loan Ratio -0.002 -0.005 
 (0.008) (0.004) 
Capital Ratio 0.016 -0.017 
 (0.027) (0.015) 
City GDP -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.002) 
Bank Age 0.001 -0.002* 
 (0.004) (0.001) 
Year Controls Yes Yes 
N 336 310 
R2 0.229 0.171 
Notes: This table presents the regression results for the effects of age diversity on bank profitability. The dependent variables are bank 
profitability (i.e., Net Interest Margin and Pre-Provision Profit Ratio). Age Diversity is measured by coefficient of variation of board 
age (CV). Board Size is the natural log of board size. The dummy variable Duality is equal to one if the bank governor is also the 
chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. Independent Directors is the percentage of independent directors. Foreign Directors is the 
percentage of foreign directors. Female Directors is the percentage of female directors. State is the percentage of shares held by the 
largest shareholders if the largest shareholder is the government or a state-owned enterprise. Foreign is the percentage of shares held 
by the largest shareholders if the largest shareholder is a foreign investor. Private is the percentage of shares held by the largest 
shareholders if the largest shareholder is a private investor. Size is the natural log of total assets. Bank Age is the natural log of bank’s 
age. The dummy Listed equals one if the bank is listed, and zero otherwise. City GDP is the natural log of GDP per capita of the city 
in which the bank’s headquarters is located. It employs the panel fixed effect estimator with lagged independent variables. Constant 
is included into the estimation but not reported. The robust error of each coefficient is shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 




Appendix 2.7 Relation between board value diversity and bank performance (Based on the Restricted Group) 












Panel A:  Dependent variable is ROA      
ROA -0.024** -0.047** -0.019** -0.073 -0.027 -0.004 
 (0.011) (0.022) (0.009) (0.045) (0.031) (0.003) 
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 237 237 237 237 237 237 
!" 0.299 0.294 0.295 0.286 0.274 0.279 
Panel B:  Dependent variable is ROE      
ROE -0.553** -0.983** -0.428** -1.848** -0.821 -0.129* 
 (0.232) (0.488) (0.199) (0.869) (0.751) (0.069) 
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 237 237 237 237 237 237 
!" 0.306 0.293 0.299 0.292 0.274 0.285 
PanelC:  Dependent variable is Z-score      
Z-score -0.210 0.115 -0.285 0.801 -0.896 0.034 
 (0.795) (1.741) (0.719) (2.500) (2.652) (0.242) 
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 237 237 237 237 237 237 
!" 0.167 0.166 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.166 
Panel D:  Dependent variable is NPLratio     
NPLratio 0.069 0.046 0.060* 0.054 0.042 0.027* 
 (0.042) (0.089) (0.035) (0.151) (0.128) (0.015) 
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 234 234 234 234 234 234 
!" 0.164 0.228 0.116 0.284 0.243 0.192 
Notes: This table presents the robust results for the effects of value diversity on bank performance based on the restricted group. Panel A presents results for regressing ROA on various value diversities. Panel B presents 
results for regressing ROE on various value diversities. Panel C presents results for regressing Z-score on various value diversities. Panel D presents results for regressing NPLratio on various value diversities.  For the 
sake of saving space, the estimation results for control variables are omitted here. Constant is included into the estimation but not reported. The robust error of each coefficient is shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 




Appendix 2.8 Relation between board value diversity and bank performance (Bootstrap Regression) 












Panel A:  Dependent variable is ROA      
ROA -0.029** -0.051* -0.020** -0.052 -0.030 -0.003 
 (0.013) (0.026) (0.010) (0.036) (0.028) (0.003) 
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 454 454 454 454 454 454 
!" 0.304 0.298 0.299 0.286 0.276 0.275 
Panel B:  Dependent variable is ROE      
ROE -0.651** -1.049** -0.439** -1.370** -0.848 -0.095 
 (0.276) (0.507) (0.206) (0.672) (0.660) (0.061) 
Year ad Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 454 454 454 454 454 454 
!" 0.314 0.298 0.305 0.297 0.280 0.282 
PanelC:  Dependent variable is Z-score      
Z-score -0.037 0.569 -0.122 1.183 -0.232 0.075 
 (0.965) (1.814) (0.714) (1.921) (2.179) (0.236) 
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 454 454 454 454 454 454 
!" 0.192 0.193 0.192 0.194 0.192 0.193 
Panel D:  Dependent variable is NPLratio     
NPLratio 0.082* 0.051 0.060* 0.033 0.043 0.018 
 (0.048) (0.103) (0.035) (0.115) (0.104) (0.013) 
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 454 454 454 454 454 454 
!" 0.276 0.263 0.276 0.262 0.262 0.270 
Notes: This table presents the bootstrap results for effects of value diversity on bank performance. Panel A presents results for regressing ROA on various value diversities. Panel B presents results for regressing ROE on 
various value diversities. Panel C presents results for regressing Z-score on various value diversities. Panel D presents results for regressing NPLratio on various value diversities.  For the sake of saving space, the 
estimation results for control variables are omitted here. Constant is included into the estimation but not reported. The bootstrapped standard error of each coefficient is shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical 






Chapter 3 Tournament incentives and age heterogeneity 
3.1 Introduction  
The excessive remuneration of chief executive officers (CEOs) shapes the debate over 
the workplace wage inequality. The May 2016 issue of Forbes reported that in 2015 the 
average US CEO earned 335 times the pay of an average worker.20 This huge disparity 
exists not only between CEOs and average workers, but also between CEOs and other 
executives. The Economist (Jan 25, 2016) asserts that such a pay gap can motivate non-
CEO executives to take risks and put in the hours to climb up to the position of CEO. The 
Guardian (Dec 18, 2015) criticizes that such a large pay gap produces demotivated 
employees and lowers the cohesion among workers. In particular, journalist have intense 
focus on whether the pay gap between CEOs and other executives can be justified in the 
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. 
 
This debate in the media has coincides with a large amount of research investigating the 
impact of the compensation gap between CEOs and other executives. On theory, the 
tournament view, shows that a large pay gap provides inherent incentives for non-CEO 
executives to expend more effort (e.g., Chen et al., 2011; Eriksson, 1999; Lazear and 
Rosen, 1981). This mechanism alleviates agency problems, such as managerial shirking 
and free riding, and leads to better firm performance (e.g., Chen et al., 2011; Henderson 
and Fredrikson, 2001; Kale et al., 2009; Vieito, 2012). An alternative theory, behavioural 
perspective, states that a large pay gap creates the feeling of relative deprivation among 
executive directors (Cowherd and Levine, 1992) and induces sabotage in the 
collaboration (Dye, 1984). In addition, the CEO entrenchment viewpoint argues that thae 
large pay gap increases CEO power (Lambert et al., 1993), which results in greater risk-
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taking for senior executives (Kini and Williams, 2012) and provides incentives for 
managers to commit fraud (Haß et al., 2015).  
 
Most of the recent empirical studies support the tournament theory and suggest that the 
tournament effect is often more effective in some cases when the firm has effective 
corporate governance or the CEO is near the retirement age (e.g., Kale et al., 2009; Lee 
et al., 2008). While researchers have begun to explore the tournament effect through the 
characteristic of the firm and the CEO, no previous study has investigated the effect 
through non-CEO executives. As suggested by Pissaris et al. (2015), firms need the talents, 
efforts and resources not only from CEOs, but also from non-CEO executives (who also 
occupy important positions in the top management team). In this paper, I extend the 
literature by examining the tournament effect through the personal characteristics of non-
CEO executives.  
 
Non-CEO executives can be viewed as an appropriate peer group. To compete for the 
same tournament prize (pay gap), one executive’s effort affects the behaviour of her peers 
and exerts peer pressure on them (Kandel and Lazear, 1992). I argue that the degree of 
peer competition might depend on the age heterogeneity of non-CEO executives as the 
previous studies have suggested that age is a significant determinant for a promotion in 
the workplace ( Kunze et al., 2013; Lawrence, 1988; Pritchard et al., 1984 When non-
CEO executives are of a similar age, they usually group themselves into the same social 
category, with a greater perception of fairness (Turner, 1985). At a similar stage of life, 
non-CEO executives may think that they have similar chances of a promotion, and 
therefore, compete more fervently. In an age-diverse environment, older executives 
(because of their rich experience and influence on their field) often occupy the top 
positions and have a higher chance of promotion within the company (Chen and Chung, 
2012).  The presence of seniority may lead to reduced incentives for younger executives 





younger executives are discouraged to compete with older executives unless the younger 
executives have extremely outstanding talents and managerial abilities. Therefore, the 
tournament effect becomes weaker when age gaps exist among non-CEO executives, but 
this effect is stronger when non-CEO executives are of a similar age. 
 
This study contributes to tournament literature in two ways. First, I provide a new insight 
into the tournament effect by introducing the interaction of non-CEO executives. Previous 
studies on executive compensation explore the link between pay gap and firm 
performance only through industry environment (Siegel and Hambrick, 2005), ownership 
structure (Hu et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2008) and CEOs’ background (Kale et al., 2009; 
Zalewska, 2014). In contrast, this study focuses on a new channel, the age heterogeneity 
of non-CEO executives, and investigates how it affects the tournament effect. 
 
Second, this study also contributes to the compensation literature by linking society 
hierarchy to tournament incentives and providing empirical evidence on the hierarchy 
issue in China. Given the large population and limited resources in China, competition is 
strong, especially among similar-aged peers as they seek to acquire the same resources 
simultaneously (Liu and Lafreniere, 2014). Particular to Chinese culture, there is a high 
value placed on seniority. Based on the Five Code of Ethics by Confucian, there is an age 
hierarchical structure of human relationship. Elderly people usually enjoy the high status 
and the most valuable resources (Bond and Hwang, 1986). 
  
The estimation sample is collected from CSMAR and consists of 18,898 firm-year 
observations, encompassing 2,600 Chinese listed firms from 2005 to 2015. I first 
document a significant and positive relationship between executive compensation gap 
and firm performance, which is consistent with the implication of the tournament theory. 
The larger pay gap acts as the tournament incentive which motivates the non-CEO 




non-CEO executives leads to higher firm output and better performance. To further 
investigate this relationship, I estimate whether the tournament effect can be affected by 
the age heterogeneity of non-CEO executives. The empirical findings suggest that when 
non-CEO executives come from three or more age cohorts, the tournament effect 
becomes weaker. This is because the presence of seniority discourages young executives 
to compete as fervently. Furthermore, when the non-CEO executives are from the same 
age cohort, the age similarity heightens peer competition among those non-CEO 
executives and enhances the tournament effects. In addition, I find that the impact of age 
heterogeneity on the tournament effect is more pronounced at state firms than at private 
firms. This is because in China the importance of seniority is overemphasized in state 
firms. This analysis is robust to several alternative measures of tournament incentives, 
age heterogeneity and firm performance.  
 
The findings from this study are relevant not only for China but also for other countries 
in which seniority is highly valued. I provide interdisciplinary implications for corporate 
governance and human resource management. The tournament effect is an important 
incentive mechanism to motivate non-CEO executives at firms. Furthermore, the 
psychological composition of non-CEO executives is important to the effectiveness of 
the tournament incentives. Thus, the sociological values of executives should be taken 
into account in the setting of internal pay structure. Additionally, companies should learn 
to manage the generational gaps in non-CEO executives and utilize the benefits of the 
gaps to have a better understanding of optimal executive composition. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, I discuss the literature about the 
tournament incentives, age similarity and firm performance. Section 3.3 describes the 
sample composition and methodology. In Section 3.4, I discuss the empirical results. 




3.2 Literature review 
3.2.1 Tournament incentives and firm performance 
CEOs’ high salary continues to shoot upwards, widening the pay gap between CEOs and 
other senior executives. This large CEO pay gap cannot be completely explained by 
conventional marginal product argument (O’Reilly et al., 1988). In a competitive market, 
all the executives are paid at the value of their marginal products. When a non-CEO 
executive is promoted to the position of CEO, his/her salary is likely to double or triple. 
However, it is difficult to state that this executive’s managerial skills have simultaneously 
doubled or tripled in that one-day period.  
 
To address this puzzle, Lazear and Rosen (1981) propose tournament theory in the context 
of prize. Similar to a golf game, tournament participants compete with each other and are 
paid based on their rank in the competition. What matters in the tournament is not the 
absolute performance of the player, but player performance compared to other 
competitors. Thus there are typical winners and losers in the tournament. Non-CEO 
executives aspiring to the position of CEO also can be viewed as competing in a 
tournament (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). The tournament prize (i.e., pay gap between CEO 
and other executives) is fixed in advance and is paid based on non-CEO executives’ 
relative performance. The winner of the tournament is promoted to the position of CEO 
and receives the prize, equivalent to the pay gap. The possibility of attaining this high 
status provides irresistible incentives for non-CEO executives to expend more efforts. 
These higher efforts can increase each executive’ chance of winning the prize. 
 
When the supervision is reliable and the monitoring costs are low, paying the executives 
at the value of their marginal product is an optimal remuneration scheme (Henderson and 
Fredrikson, 2001). It is relatively easy for the firm to make promotion based on executives’ 
marginal product. However, in reality, the monitoring is always costly and unreliable in 




(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In this case, the absolute performance-based contract is not 
optimal because managers are more likely to manipulate the output when the performance 
is unobservable. In the agency framework, rank order tournament incentives is preferable 
because it can alleviate the agency problem (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). Large prizes 
provide contestants with stronger incentives to perform better than other competitors. As 
a result, the interests of managers and shareholders tend to align under the tournament 
competition, which ultimately improves firm performance. Additionally, Becker and 
Huselid (1992) also argue that compensations based on marginal product or absolute 
performance are difficult to measure precisely, while rank order rewards seem to be more 
feasible and simpler with lower associated information costs.  
 
The efficiency of the tournament structure has been criticized by a number of studies. It 
has been found that the executives engaged in the tournament may collude with others to 
reduce their efforts and increase their utilities at the same time (Dye, 1984). Based on the 
entrenchment argument, a large pay gap between the CEO and other executives increases 
the power of CEO (Lambert et al., 1993) and results in agency problems. Entrenched 
CEOs can increase their ability to set their own pay and expropriate shareholders’ wealth 
(Bebchuk et al., 2011; Kale et al., 2009). In addition, from a behavioural perspective, 
lower level managers are also found to experience a feeling of relative deprivation due to 
the large pay gap (Cowherd and Levine, 1992). People often compare outputs with 
superiors’ outputs, ignoring the input differences between themselves and superiors 
(Martin, 1979). Given the fact that the inputs are difficult to measure, CEO pay gaps may 
be perceived as unfair even though CEOs contribute more inputs than other executives. 
As a result, the feeling of deprivation discourages coordination and invites sabotage in 
the group (Lazear, 1989).  
 
The empirical literature provides mixed findings regarding the effect of the pay gap 




(1981), tournament incentives result in higher equilibrium levels of effort and therefore 
deliver better firm performance. The existing studies that support the tournament theory 
mainly come from US. Lee et al. (2008) document a positive relationship between firm 
performance and the pay disparity among the top five highest paid executives. More 
specifically, the tournament incentives are enhanced in firms with high agency costs 
related to managerial discretion and with effective corporate governance (i.e., high level 
of board independence). Similarly, findings by Kale et al. (2009) also support the 
effectiveness of tournament incentives. The pay gap between CEO and vice presidents 
(VPs) is associated with better firm performance. These studies also provide evidence 
that the tournament incentives are conditioned on the probability of promotion. When the 
acting CEO is near his/her retirement age, the tournament incentive becomes stronger, 
while the tournament effect diminishes when the firm receives a new and outsider CEO. 
Additionally, Mobbs and Raheja (2012) add to the empirical evidence by showing that 
maintaining the tournament-incentive promotion scheme is more valuable when the 
human capital for the CEO position is not firm-specific.  
 
Several studies find that the tournament theory fits well with Chinese firms. A larger pay 
gap is positively associated with better firm performance. More specifically, the positive 
tournament effect is stronger for Chinese firms with greater managerial power, as 
measured by CEO tenure and ownership of the largest shareholder (Lin and Lu, 2009). 
Chen et al. (2011) and Kato and Long (2011) both find that state ownership reduces the 
tournament incentive for other senior executives. The positive relationship between pay 
gap and firm performance is stronger for non-state firms. Similarly, Hu et al. (2013) 
document that pay dispersion provides incentives for the executives to work harder and 
produce better firm performance, especially at privately controlled firms. Furthermore, 
the CEOs’ political connection exerts an impairment effect which weakens the 





However, some studies fail to reach a consistent conclusion regarding the implications of 
tournament theory. In the US, Bebchuk et al. (2011) find that CEO pay slices, which 
reflect the CEO centrality, are associated with the agency problem. Therefore, the pay 
dispersion among executives lowers firm performance. Zalewska (2014) utilizes a sample 
of UK firms and finds that the higher remuneration disparity in UK boards is associated 
with worse firm performance. Furthermore, this negative link is sensitive to the 
composition of boards by nationality. Regarding the Chinese studies, Lin et al. (2013) 
find that the tournament theory only works well for firms in specific industries, such as 
firms in the non-high-tech sector. This is because high-tech firms demand effective 
cooperation to deal with their uncertain and competitive business environment. The pay 
disparity disables coordination at the top management level and poses a negative 
influence on firm performance.  
 
Overall, the tournament theory provides a solid theoretical foundation for the positive 
role of pay disparity among executives. Larger pay gap can reduce the monitoring costs 
and provide strong incentives to better align the interests between managers and 
shareholders. Furthermore, most of the empirical studies in US and China provide 
consistent results indicating that tournament incentives motivate executives to expend 
optimal effort to secure their promotion and thereby ultimately increases firm 
performance. Based on prior research, I test the following hypothesis: 
H1: The pay gap between executives is positively associated with firm performance. 
 
Although there are several works on tournament incentives in China, this study differs 
significantly in methodology and structure. To estimate the first hypothesis, I employ a 
more comprehensive dataset which covers each individual executive’s compensation 
information, while the previous studies only have remuneration data for the CEO, the 
total for the three highest paid directors in total and remaining management team, or the 




Long, 2011; Lin and Lu, 2009).  
3.2.2 Peer effect, age and seniority  
Peer effect exists when a person’s behaviour is affected by her interaction with peers who 
have similar status (Winston and Zimmerman, 2004). A broad literature seeks to 
investigate the importance of peer group influence in determining the behaviour or 
performance of the individual in the group. Most of these studies focus on the peer effect 
on teenagers’ behaviours (Gaviria and Raphael, 2001), education achievement (Hanushek 
et al., 2003), workers’ ability and wage (Chan et al., 2014; Mas and Moretti, 2009) and 
firms’ strategies and behaviours (e.g., Francis et al., 2016; Kaustia and Rantala, 2015; 
Leary and Roberts, 2014). In the workplace, incentives embedded in the compensation 
exert an influence on the interaction of employees, such as helping, competing with or 
sabotaging their peers (e.g., Itoh 1991; Kandel and Lazear, 1992; Lazear 1989; Siemsen 
et al., 2007). Non-CEO executives can be viewed as a peer group. To compete for the 
same tournament prize, one non-CEO executive’s effort can affect the behaviour of 
his/her peers and exert peer pressure on them.  
 
Liu and Lafreniere (2014) argue that the competition among peers is inevitable because 
they seek to acquire the same resources. This is especially true for similar-aged peers who 
often need the same resources at simultaneously to develop themselves successfully. Thus, 
the degree of competition might depend on an individual’s characteristics, particularly 
their age. At the group level, age is a salient variable of social categorization. Same-aged 
individuals attract each other and usually group together (Lawrence, 1988). This can be 
explained by the social category theory (Turner, 1985) and similarity-attraction theory 
(Byrne, 1971). Individuals born in the same age group are more likely to develop value 
similarities. Furthermore, higher demographic similarity leads to a greater perception of 
fairness (Tajfel, 1970). Under the tournament promotion system, non-CEO executives of 
a similar age might consider themselves to be the same from social category and have 




Thus, non-CEO executive are more likely to compete aggressively with their similar-aged 
peers.  
 
At many workplaces, employees come from different age cohorts. In an age-diverse team 
where there are relatively senior/older individuals, the age discrimination is likely to exist, 
which produces the feeling of “collective relative deprivation” (Snape and Redman, 
2003). For example, younger employees might have an impression that members in their 
age group are constantly disadvantaged due to their young age while other senior or older 
groups are favoured (Kunze et al., 2013). The feeling of relative deprivation reduces the 
competition and leads to the perception of unfairness.  
 
Furthermore, Lawrence (1984) argues that there is a clear expectation that specific 
positions should be held by individuals of a specific age group across the corporate 
hierarchy. This is because age conveys information of an individual’s cumulative human 
capital, such as their education, experience and intellectual ability (e.g., Child, 1974; 
Medawar, 1952; Rhodes, 1983). In this case, career opportunities might be heavily age-
biased at firms with heterogeneous age composition (Kunze et al., 2013). Usually, the 
supervisors and employees at the higher ranks of the corporate ladder are older than those 
at the lower levels. This phenomenon is quite common in countries which are influenced 
by Confucianism. In these countries, seniority is highly valued and the elderly are 
traditionally considered to be the locus of wisdom, authority and power. In Chinese 
society, the ethical morality of respect for seniority is the product of Confucianism dating 
back to antiquity. The senior people enjoy power not only in the household but also in 
politics and organizations (Chen and Chung, 2012). Compared with younger people, older 
individuals are generally believed to possess a richer experience, vaster knowledge and 





3.2.3 Tournament incentives, age heterogeneity and performance 
Compared with existing studies on the relationship between pay gap and firm 
performance, our study takes the research a step further by exploring the tournament 
effect through the personal characteristics of non-CEO executives. More specifically, I 
add to the existing tournament literature by investigating whether the age heterogeneity 
of non-CEO executives changes tournament effects at Chinese firms. On the basis of 
social categorization theory, higher age similarity among non-CEO executives leads to 
group integration and greater perception of fairness. Grounded in the peer effect argument, 
peer competition is heightened in similar-aged peer group. Under the tournament 
promotion system, non-CEO executives of similar ages think that they have similar 
chances to win the prize and compete more. In this way, I expect the peer competition 
among non-CEO executives of a similar age to enhance the tournament effect in the firm.  
In relation to the age discrimination and seniority arguments, older non-CEO executives 
are generally more experienced, possess greater vast knowledge and have greater 
influence in their field when compared to younger executives. Therefore, ceteris paribus, 
I would expect elderly non-CEO executives to be more likely to get promoted at Chinese 
firms. Younger executives have a relatively lower chance for promotion unless they have 
extremely outstanding talent and competence. Seniority might lead to reduced incentives 
for young non-CEO executives to compete with senior executives. Thereby younger 
executives might devote less effort in their work, which would ultimately weaken the 
tournament effect for the firm. Consequently, I pose the following hypothesis: 
H2: The positive tournament effect is weaker in firms with a higher level of age diversity 
among non-CEO executives. 
3.3 Sample selection and research design 
3.3.1 Sample and data sources 
The data is obtained from the China Securities Market and Accounting Research 




promulgated the Rules No. 2 on Contents and Format of Information Disclosure by 
Companies Offering Securities according to which listed firms are required to disclose 
the remuneration for individual executives, directors and supervisors. In response to the 
code, most companies complied from 2002 onwards by disclosing the aggregated 
compensation of the top three executives only. The remuneration disclosure protocol 
improved again after 2005 when companies began reporting the payment of individual 
executives. This is the main consideration why this sample period starts from 2005. 
 
The original CSMAR database reports 1,342 companies being listed on the Shanghai or 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in 2005, which increased to 2,690 companies by 2015. 
Following the previous studies (Chen et al., 2011; Hu et al., 2013; Lin et al., 2013), I 
apply a number of screenings. First, I exclude financial firms due to their unique 
accounting characteristics. Second, CEO is defined as the person who is the chief 
executive officer or general manager after which all other executives are classified as 
non-CEO executives. Then only companies that have an identifiable CEO and at least 
three non-CEO executives with the disclosed remuneration and demographic information 
(e.g., age and gender) for each are included (Kale et al., 2009). I further excluded 
companies which have less than two observations. After the filtering procedures, the final 
estimation sample consists of 18,898 firm–year observations.  
3.3.2 Model specification  
I hypothesize (H1) the positive effect from pay disparity on firm performance. To test this 
hypothesis, I employ the following model (1): 
!"#$	&'#()#$*+,'-.= / +	1&*2	3*4-.56 + 7-.568 +	9. +	:- + ;-.     (1) 
                  
where " is the firm identifier and t is the year. The key interest of coefficient, 1, captures 
the influence of gap disparity between CEO and other executives (&*2	3*4) on firm 
performance. Year and firm fixed effects are denoted by 9 and :, respectively. Finally, 





To further explore the relationship between the pay gap and firm performance, we then 
test H2 which links the age heterogeneity of non-CEO executives to the tournament 
effects at the firm. We extend model (1) and estimate the following specification: 
!"#$	&'#()#$*+,'-. = / +	1&*2	3*4-.56 + <=>'	?'@'#)>+'"@2-.56 +
A&*2	3*4-.56 	∗ =>'	?'@'#)>'+'"@2-.56 + 7-.568 +	9. +	:- + ;-.   (2) 
                                                
Model (2) includes the age heterogeneity of non-CEO executives and its interaction term 
with the pay gap. The coefficient of the interaction variable A	in model (2) captures the 
effect of age heterogeneity of non-CEO executives and the pay gap on firm performance. 
Both model (1) and (2) are estimated by fixed-effects (FE) estimator with robust standard 
errors. All right hand side variables are lagged to reduce simultaneity concerns. 
3.3.3 Variable description 
3.3.3.1 Pay gap 
Following Bognanno (2001), Eriksson (1999) and Kale et al. (2009), the main tournament 
measure is the gap between the compensation of CEO and the median value of 
compensation of non-CEO executive.21  In this study, I use total cash remuneration 
because Chinese listed firms only disclose the total cash payment without dividing it into 
salary and bonus. Then I apply the logarithmic transformation of the pay gap as follows, 
log	(&*2	3*46)= log (Compensation of CEO	– Median value of compensation of non-
CEO executives) 
 
Additionally, given the fact that the CEO is not the highest paid executive in some cases, 
I construct another tournament measure based on executives’ payment rank order. Similar 
 
21 There are some cases in which the CEO is not the highest paid executive in the firm and the CEO’s 
remuneration is less than the median compensation of non-CEO executives, which results in negative pay 
gap. To address this issue, we follow Hartman (1984), Cassou (1997) and Kale et al. (2009) to add the 





to Chen et al. (2011), I employ the remuneration difference between highest paid 
executive and second highest paid executive.  
			log	(	&*2	3*4I)	= log (Compensation of highest paid executive − compensation of 
second highest paid executive) 
3.3.3.2 Age heterogeneity of non-CEO executives 
Previous studies on heterogeneity or dispersion usually use the coefficient of variation, 
standard deviation and Blau index. I employ a different method to measure the age 
heterogeneity of non-CEO executives. As mentioned before, a cohort of individuals of a 
similar age is more likely to group themselves together due to their similar life experience. 
I rely on the age cohort composition to construct the age heterogeneity measure. There is 
no consensus about how to define generations in China. Studies generally reach an 
agreement that each generation comes into existence with a particular social movement 
with a shared experience (Sun and Wang, 2010) and that most of an individual’s values 
become entrenched in one’s late-teens (Ralston et al., 1999). According to this framework, 
the cohorts are defined as four groups that correspond to specific social and political 
events at the age of 18 based on executives’ birth year: 1926 – 1947 cohort (the 
Communist Consolidation generation), 1947 – 1958 cohort (the Cultural Revolution 
generation), 1958 – 1974 cohort (the Social Reform generation) and 1974 – 1992 cohort 
(the Societal generation) (Egri and Ralston, 2004; Ralston et al., 1999).  
 
To measure the age dispersion, I first calculate the number of cohorts among non-CEO 
executives. In this way, I construct three dummy variables. 1 Cohort equals to one if the 
non-CEO executives are in the same age cohort and zero otherwise. 2 Cohorts equals to 
one if the non-CEO executives are from any two different age cohorts and zero otherwise. 
3+ Cohorts equals to one if the non-CEO executives are from any three or more different 
age cohorts and zero otherwise. The larger the number of cohorts, the higher the age 
heterogeneity level is.  




using a dummy variable which equals to one if the age difference between the oldest non-
CEO executive and the youngest one is less than 20 years (Age Similarity (<20)) and zero 
otherwise.22 Furthermore, the logarithm of standard deviation of non-CEO executives’ 
age (Log (Age Sd)) is employed as an alternative measure of age heterogeneity. 
3.3.3.3 Firm performance and control variables 
I employ three measures to proxy firm performance. Return on Assets (ROA) is the ratio 
of firm’s net income to total assets. Returns on Equity (ROE) is defined as firm’s net 
income divided by book value of total equity. Additionally, Chen et al. (2011) find that 
pay disparity between top three executives has impact on earnings per share (EPS) at 
Chinese firms. Lastly, we include EPS as a proxy of firm performance.  
 
Control variables (Vector X) are grouped into four categories. First, three variables on 
board characteristics include the natural logarithm of board size (Board Size), which is 
found to have a significant effect on firm performance (Yermack, 1996), the percentage 
of independent directors (Independent Director) who may have strong incentives to 
scrutinize the management (Chen et al., 2011; Zalewska, 2014), and a dummy variable 
(Duality), which equals one if the chief executive officer (CEO) is also the chairman. 
Second, I control for executive-specific characteristics, that is, the percentage of female 
executives (Female Executives) in this study. Since I need to measure the age 
heterogeneity in non-CEO executives in model (2), the natural logarithm of CEO age 
(CEO Age) and the average age of non-CEO executives (Executives Age) are also 
included. Third, I employ the ownership control variables as ownership structure is 
related to firm performance (Himmelberg et al., 1999; McConnell and Servaes, 1990). 
The proportions of shares owned by state-owned enterprises/ central/local governments 
(State), a foreign investor (Foreign), or a private investor (Private) are included. Fourth, 
 





some firm-specific characteristics are also included. Firm size (Size) is measured by the 
natural logarithm of total assets. I also calculate the leverage of the firm (Leverage), 
defined as the ratio of debt to total assets. The natural logarithm of the number of years 
since the firm has been listed is also included (List Age). 
3.3.4 Descriptive statistics 
The sample includes complete compensation information for 155,906 individual 
executives and 18,898 firm-year observations over an 11-year period. Table 3.1 presents 
descriptive statistics for the main variables in this sample. More specifically, Panel A 
reports firm performance measures. Similar to other studies on China (e.g., Chen et al., 
2011; Hu et al., 2013; Lin and Lu, 2009), ROA and ROE are on average 0.05 and 0.08, 
respectively. The average value of EPS is 0.36. Moreover, all of these performance 
measures are positively correlated.  
<Insert Table 3.1 about here> 
Panel B focuses on the measure of the tournament incentive. This sample is consistent 
with the tournament theory in that the remuneration of CEOs is greater than that of 
median non-CEO executives, with an average gap of 196.60 thousand CNY (30.24 
thousand USD), which is slightly lower than the figures shown in the study of Hu et al. 
(2013) who subtract CEO’s remuneration from the median payment of the top five 
executives at a Chinese firms. The pay gap has a large spread with 37,483 thousand CNY 
(2,753.86 thousand USD) as the maximum value. Furthermore, the average pay gap at 
Chinese listed firms has an upward trend increasing from 79.73 thousand CNY (9.73 
thousand USD) in 2005 to 273.53 thousand CNY (43.91 thousand USD) in 2015 (more 
than quadrupled). With respect to the alternative tournament measure, I also note that the 
pay gap between the highest paid executive and second highest paid executive is 157.79 
thousand CNY (24.25 thousand USD) on average. This compensation disparity between 
CEO and other executives at lower level in the corporate is also in line with the Chinese 
culture of high power distance (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2001). In China, the power 




disparity acceptable in the workplace. 
 
Panel C presents the age characteristics of non-CEO executives. After dividing all non-
CEO executives into four different cohorts based on their birth year, I find that non-CEO 
executives who are from any two different cohorts account for more than half of the whole 
sample. Figure 1 shows that one cohort composition remains stable at around 20 percent. 
While the percentage of non-CEO executive with three or more age cohorts fluctuates 
between 20% and 30% from 2005 to 2015. Additionally, the age spread in non-CEO 
executives is less than 20 years for 68% of all observations. 
<Insert Figure 3.1 about here> 
Panel D reports control variables. In China, the average board size is nine, and on average 
37% of the directors are identified as independent directors. This is similar to Hu et al. 
(2013) and satisfies the requirement of CSRC that more than one third of the board should 
be comprised of independent directors. Turning to executives, female executives account 
for 14% of the total number of directors. On average, 21% of the CEOs also hold the dual 
position of chairman. The average age of non-CEO executives is 46.48, ranging from 
33.42 to 60.63, while CEOs have an average age of 47.92. With regard to ownership 
structure, the state ownership control is at 11%. Furthermore, on average, the leverage is 
around 0.45 which is comparable with that shown as 0.46 in Hu et al. (2013). When 
looking at the firms’ listed history, I find that in this sample the firms’ average listed age 
is around nine years. 
3.4 Empirical analysis 
3.4.1 Tournament incentives and firm performance 
The first hypothesis (H1) predicts that the pay gap between CEOs and non-CEO 
executives serves as a tournament incentive and increases firm performance. Table 3.2 
reports the fixed effects regression results. The first three columns (1) – (3) present the 




(&*2	3*46)). In the columns (4) – (6), Log (&*2	3*46) is replaced with Log (&*2	3*4I), 
the pay difference between the highest and the second highest paid executive. Consistent 
with the hypothesis, these two measures of tournament prize are positively and 
significantly associated with firm performance in all specifications. More particularly, a 
10% increase in executive pay gap (Log (&*2	3*46)) results in 0.18 percent point, 0.43 
percent point and 1.54 CNY (0.22 USD) increase in ROA, ROE and EPS, respectively. 
When I use the second measure Log (&*2	3*4I), the magnitude of change for firm 
performance is slightly smaller. A 10% rise in the pay disparity improves ROA by 0.01 
percent point, ROE by 0.02 percent point and EPS by 0.07 CNY (0.01 USD). These results 
support the tournament theory. The huge pay gap between the CEO and executive at lower 
levels serves as an efficient incentive, which motivates non-CEO executives to expend 
substantial effort to win the chance of promotion, and consequently this leads to better 
firm performance.  
<Insert Table 3.2 about here> 
With respect to the control variables, ownership structure plays an important role. Similar 
to Chen et al. (2011) and Kato and Long (2011), the state ownership is associated with 
better firm performance in all specifications at the 1% level. In other words, the political 
connection really of a Chinese firm greatly influnences performance. Firms in which the 
controlling shareholder is a private investor perform better as well, but foreign ownership 
fails to have any influence on firm performance. The degree of leverage is positively 
related with firm performance in all specifications. Furthermore, firms with larger size 
show worse levels of ROA and ROE. In terms of EPS, I find that the length of listed years 
exerts significant and negative influence on EPS at the 1% level.    
3.4.2 Age heterogeneity, tournament incentives and firm performance 
In this section, I test the second hypothesis of whether the age heterogeneity of non-CEO 
executives can affect the relationship between the pay gap and firm performance. Pay gap 
measures are interacted with age variables in Table 3.3. Interaction terms with Log 




following three columns.  
<Insert Table 3.3 about here> 
I focus on the coefficients of the interaction terms which are the basis of the inferences. 
In the first three specifications, the estimated coefficients of the interaction between pay 
gap and the number of age cohorts are all significant and negative. Furthermore, the 
negative effect increases with the number of age cohorts in non-CEO executives, 
indicating that the number of age cohorts among non-CEO executives matters for 
tournament effects. More specifically, when the non-CEO executives come from any two 
different age cohorts, the positive relation between the executive pay gap on performance 
becomes weaker than those from one age cohort. The coefficients of the interaction term 
are significant at the 1% level for both ROA and ROE and the 5% level for the EPS 
specifications. Turning to the interaction term of pay gap with any three and four different 
age cohorts (3+ Cohorts), the tournament effect becomes much weaker compared with 
larger magnitude of coefficients for the first three specifications being significant at the 
1% level. Thus, the larger the number of age cohorts among non-CEO executives, the 
weaker the tournament effect is.  
 
Similar to the first three specifications, the coefficients of the interaction of Log 
(&*2	3*4I ) with the cohort variable (3+ Cohorts) in the next three columns are 
significant and negative at the 5% level for both ROA and EPS and at the 1% level for 
ROE. This means that the tournament effect becomes much weaker when the non-CEO 
executives come from three or four generations compared to those from one generation. 
Therefore, there provides additional evidence to support the H2 that the tournament effect 
is weaker when the non-CEO executives have heterogeneous ages. 
 
 The results shown in Table 3.3 are consistent with the seniority argument. Previous 
studies suggest that seniority is highly valued in China. Senior people usually enjoy high 




reputation in their field (Chen and Chung, 2012; Mishra and Jhunjhunwala, 2013). The 
results suggest that seniority reduces the incentives for younger non-CEO executives and 
discourages them to compete with older ones. As a result, younger executives expend less 
effort to compete for the position of CEO due to their lower chance of winning the prize 
of promotion. 
<Insert Table 3.4 about here> 
In Table 3.4, I estimate the interaction term of pay gap with cohort measures separately. 
The results of age measure (1 Cohort) are reported in the first three columns. I then 
replace 1 Cohort with 3+ Cohorts in the next three columns. In Panel A of Table 3.4, the 
estimated coefficients of the interaction of Log (&*2	3*46) with age measure (1 Cohort) 
are all significant and positive at the 1% level for ROA and ROE and the 5% level for 
EPS. This indicates that the tournament effect becomes stronger when the non-CEO 
executives come from one generation, which is consistent with the hypothesis H2. The 
results confirm the peer effect argument which implies that the competition among 
similar-aged peers is fiercer. An executives’ effort impacts the well-being of his similar-
aged peers and exerts pressure on them. To compete for the same tournament prize, the 
peer pressure among these similar-aged executives stimulates the competition and 
motivate them to expend more efforts in their quest for promotion.  
 
In the next three specifications, the coefficients of interactions are all negative and 
significant at the 5% level for ROA and EPS and the 1% level for ROE. This suggests that 
the tournament effect becomes weaker when the non-CEO executives are from three or 
more different generations. This result offers additional supports for the hypothesis H2 
that the tournament effect diminishes when the ages of non-CEO executives are 
heterogeneous. In Panel B, I replace the tournament measure Log (&*2	3*46) with Log 
(&*2	3*4I ). Consistent with Panel A, the interaction terms with 3+ Cohorts are 
significant and positive at the 1% significance level in all specifications, indicating 




find significant and positive coefficient when the firm performance is measured by ROE, 
which suggests stronger tournament effect. 
3.4.3 Does the impact of age diversity on tournament effect vary by ownership? 
As an important ethical philosophy, Confucianism has been deeply rooted in the Chinese 
society. Based on the Confucian teaching of Five Code of Ethics, the seniority is one of 
the most important rules for human relationship. In recent years, the Chinese Community 
Party has paid special emphasis on the important role of Confucianism in the new age of 
reform (Du, 2015) and made seniority one of the most discernible factors for nominating 
government candidates in China (Chen and Chung, 2002). Anecdotal evidence shows that 
elderly people play an important role in Chinese politics. For example, according to the 
BBC (October 25, 2017), the age of the Chinese top leaders in the Politburo’s Standing 
Committee averages at 62.85, ranging from 60 to 67. This phenomenon of seniority has 
extended from politics to the workplace, especially state firms where executives are 
promoted within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and government. The recent press 
(People.cn, Oct 2016) criticizes that state firms should eradicate the idea of seniority as a 
basis for promotion, and instead promote the younger candidates who are talented and 
competent. We therefore compare moderate effect of age diversity in state firms and non-
state firms.  
<Insert Table 3.5 about here> 
We focus the analysis on two sub-groups: state firms, where the controlling 
shareholder is the state-owned enterprise or governments, and non-state firms, where the 
controlling shareholder is the non-state-owned domestic legal persons or foreign legal 
persons. Table 3.5 shows that the coefficients of the interaction terms for 3+ Cohorts are 
negative and significant for state firms in ROE and EPS specifications at the 5% level and 
in ROA specification at the 1% level. In columns (4) to (6), the coefficient of the 
interaction term for 3+ Cohorts is significant and negative only when the firm 
performance is measured by ROA. The results confirm our argument that the negative 




state firms due to the outmoded practice of seniority is overstressed at governments and 
state firms.  
3.5 Robustness checks 
3.5.1 Instrument variables approach 
In this section, we consider the concern that the relationship between compensation gap 
and performance may be biased because of the possible correlation between independent 
variables and the error term. Executives’ pay gap might act as a tournament incentive to 
motivate them and consequently improve firm performance. Alternatively, firms that 
perform better may compensate their CEOs more than other subordinates, widening the 
remuneration gap. To address the potential endogeneity problem, we employ a fixed 
effect instrumental variable approach using Lewbel's (2012) method, which includes 
internal and external instrumental variables. Following Kale et al. (2009), our main 
instrumental variable is the median value of compensation gap for the firm in the same 
industry and the same size group as the firm.23 The rationale is based on Murphy (1999) 
who argues that there are variations in compensation level and structure according to 
different industries and firm size. Furthermore, we also follow Kale et al. (2009) and Hu 
et al. (2013) to include the number of non-CEO executives (No. of non-CEO Executives) 
and introduce a new CEO dummy (New CEO) as instruments for compensation gap. 
 
Tables 3.6a/3.6b presents the results from estimating the fixed effect model (2) using the 
instrument variable approach. In Table 3.6a, the coefficients on instruments, Median 
Industry Values, No. of non-CEO Executives and New CEO are statistically significant in 
the first stage regression. In addition, the F-statistics for all specifications in the first stage 
are all greater than 10, indicating the joint relevance of all instruments. In Table 3.6b, the 
LM statistics and Hansen J statistics both show that these three instruments in our study 
 
23 When calculating the industry-level median value, we exclude that specific firm and only focus on 





satisfy the relevance and validity criterion in all specifications. Consistent with our main 
results in Table 3, the coefficients of interaction terms are negative (significance at the 1% 
level) and the magnitude of the coefficients become larger with 3+ Cohorts. This 
indicates that the main results are robust. 
<Insert Table 3.6a about here> 
<Insert Table 3.6b about here> 
3.5.2 Performance persistence 
Performance persistence is often a focus of corporate governance research (e.g., Georgen 
et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2014; Sila et al., 2016). The previous realization of dependent 
variables might affect the current level of some of the independent variables. In this study, 
current compensation disparity between executives may be the result of past firm 
performance. It may be the case that firms with better past performance reward the CEO 
with higher remuneration, widening the pay gap at the top level. To address this issue, we 
follow Wintoki et al. (2012) to employ Dynamic Panel Data Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) model (Arellano and Bond, 1991), which accounts for unobserved 
heterogeneity as well as dynamic relation between pay gap and firm performance.  
 
!"#$	&'#()#$*+,'-.= / + <!"#$	&'#()#$*+,'-.56 +	1&*2	3*4-. + 7-.8 +	9. +
	:- + ;-.     (3) 
 
All the independent variables are assumed to be endogenous except year dummies. The 
instruments used in the GMM estimation include the lagged difference (t-2) of 
endogenous variables and dependent variables for level equations and the lagged levels 
(t-2 to t-4) of endogenous variables and dependent variables for difference equations. 
Table 3.6, similar to previous results, reports significant negative effects of age 
heterogeneity on tournament. However, all specifications pass the test for second-order 
serial correlation, while fail to pass Hansen test of over-identification.  




3.5.3 Alternative measures of tournament incentive and age heterogeneity 
I re-estimate previous analysis using several alternative measures of tournament 
incentives and age heterogeneity. With respect to the alternative tournament measures, I 
use the logarithm of standard deviation of executives’ pay (Log (Pay Sd)) and the 
compensation gap between the CEO and the mean value of other executives (Log 
(&*2	3*4K )) in Table 3.9. I find that Log (&*2	3*4K ) is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level in the first two specifications. When replacing Log (&*2	3*4K) 
with  Log (Pay Sd), the positive relationship between pay gap and firm performance still 
holds for the last three specifications. These results are similar to the previous findings 
and support H1 that the pay gap acts as a tournament incentive to motivate executives 
and increases firm performance. 
<Insert Table 3.9 about here> 
Following Goergen et al. (2015), I replace the cohort composition measures with the age 
similarity measure (Age Similarity (<20)) in Table 3.10. The coefficients of interaction 
terms are positive and statistically significant when the pay gap is measure by Log 
(&*2	3*4I). When Log (&*2	3*4I) is the pay disparity measure, interaction terms are 
positive and significant in two of three specifications (ROA and ROE). Consistent with 
previous results, this table provides additional evidence to support H2 that peer pressure 
stimulates the competition among non-CEO executives who are from the same age cohort 
and enhances the tournament effects.  
<Insert Table 3.10 about here> 
Furthermore, I employ the logarithm of the standard deviation of non-CEO executives’ 
age (Log (Age Sd)) as another alternative measure and present the results in Table 3.11. 
Similar to previous results, the interaction terms are statistically significant and negative 
in the first and the last two specifications. This indicates that non-CEO executives with 
mixed ages weaken the positive relationship between the pay gap between executives and 
firm performance, which is consistent with hypothesis (H2).  





The motivation of this study is to examine whether the tournament theory is applicable 
to Chinese firms. Based on Lazear and Rosen (1981), executives aspiring for the position 
of CEO can be viewed as competing in a tournament. The prize in the rank order 
tournament induces these executives to expend effort to obtain the prize and to get 
promoted to the position of CEO. Using the comprehensive data of Chinese listed firms 
from 2005 to 2015, I find that the tournament prize, measured as the pay difference 
between the CEO and the median value of non-CEO executives, is associated with better 
firm performance.  
 
I then investigate the effectiveness of tournament incentives through the channel of non-
CEO executives. The empirical findings show that the the tournament effects are affected 
by age heterogeneity of non-CEO executives. The tournament effect is weaker for firms 
in which the non-CEO executives come from different age cohorts. In Chinese society, 
senior people are highly valued because they are regarded as the locus of knowledge, 
power and authority. The presence of seniority reduces the incentives for younger 
executives to compete with senior executives. As a result, age heterogeneity among non-
CEO executives weakens the tournament effect. However, the positive relationship 
between the pay gap and firm performance becomes stronger when the non-CEO 
executives are from the same age cohort. Non-CEO executives perceive a similar 
probability of promotion when facing similar-aged peers and therefore compete more 
fervently with them. In this way, the heightened peer competition motivates non-CEO 
executives to expend more effort and ultimately strengthen the tournament effect for this 
group. Overall, the characteristics of non-CEO executives plays an important role in 
determining the impact of tournament effects at Chinese firms. 
 
The results remain robust following a variety of robustness checks. To address the 




approach and dynamic system GMM estimator are employed. With these two estimations, 
I obtain consistent results indicating that a larger CEO pay gap is associated with better 
firm performance. Further, I find that the impact of age heterogeneity on the tournament 
effect is more pronounced at state firms than at private firms, as the importance of 
seniority for promotion is overemphasized at state firms. I also use several alternative 
measures of pay gap, age heterogeneity of non-CEO executives and firm performance 
and I find similar levels of significance and results. 
 
These findings provide useful guidance for Chinese policymakers, regulators and 
corporate decision makers concerning executive compensation. This study finds that the 
rank order tournament is an important incentive mechanism for motivating executives of 
Chinese firms. This study provides interdisciplinary evidence that the age composition 
among non-CEO executives is significant on its impact on firm performance. The 
findings contain implications that firms should consider adding executives with similar 












Figure 3.1 Percentage of firms with non-CEO executive from different cohort 
composition 
 
Source: CSMAR (2005-2015) 
Notes: This figure reports the percentage of firms with non-CEO executives from 
different cohort composition in China from 2005 to 2015. In this study, executives are 
divided into four cohorts based on their birth year: 1926-1947 cohort, 1948-1958 cohort, 
1959-1974 cohort and 1975-1992 cohort. 1 Cohort means that non-CEO executives are 
from the same cohorts. 2 Cohorts means that non-CEO executives come from any two 
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Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Var Mean Std P25 Median P75 N 
Panel A: Firm performance 
ROA 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.08 18,885 
ROE 0.08 0.11 0.03 0.08 0.13 18,897 
EPS 0.36 0.46 0.09 0.27 0.54 18,898 
Panel B: Tournament incentives (000s CNY) 
&*2	3*46 196.60 509.07 40.00 102.00 220.85 18,898 
&*2	3*4I 157.79 422.60 19.10 60.10 150.00 18,898 
&*2	3*4K 187.38 477.80 36.30 103.64 214.95 18,898 
Log (Pay Sd)  4.57 1.01 3.96 4.60 5.20 18,898 
Panel C: Age difference in non-CEO executives 
1 Cohort 0.19 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 18,898 
2 Cohorts 0.57 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00 18,898 
3+ Cohorts 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 18,898 
Age Similarity (<20) 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00 1.00 18,898 
Log (Age Sd) 1.75 0.46 1.51 1.80 2.06 18,898 
Panel D: Other characteristics 
State 0.11 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.14 18,898 
Foreign 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 18,898 
Private 0.10 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.12 18,898 
Executives 6.98 2.75 5.00 7.00 8.00 18,898 
Independent Director 0.37 0.05 0.33 0.33 0.40 18,898 
Duality 0.21 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 18,898 
Executive Age 46.48 3.66 44.00 46.50 49.00 18,898 
CEO Age 47.92 6.46 44.00 48.00 52.00 18,898 
Female Executive 0.14 0.15 0.00 0.13 0.22 18,898 
Board Size 2.18 0.20 2.08 2.20 2.20 18,799 
Leverage 0.45 0.21 0.28 0.45 0.61 18,898 
Firm Size 21.80 1.29 20.91 21.63 22.46 18,898 
List Age 8.95 5.98 3.60 8.52 13.69 18,898 
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics on key variables. The sample is an unbalanced panel covering18,898 













Table 3.2 Pay gap and firm performance 
 Log (&*2	3*46) Log (&*2	3*4I) 
                          ROA ROE EPS ROA ROE EPS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log(&*2	3*46) 0.018*** 0.043*** 0.154*    
 (0.006) (0.013) (0.084)    
Log(&*2	3*4I)    0.001*** 0.002** 0.007** 
    (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) 
Duality 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.016) (0.002) (0.004) (0.017) 
Independent  -0.005 -0.014 -0.031 0.000 -0.000 0.079 
Director (0.014) (0.032) (0.130) (0.015) (0.033) (0.122) 
State 0.019*** 0.048*** 0.106*** 0.019*** 0.047*** 0.116*** 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.035) (0.003) (0.008) (0.038) 
Private 0.014*** 0.037*** 0.120*** 0.016*** 0.040*** 0.126*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.029) (0.004) (0.008) (0.030) 
Foreign 0.007 0.015 0.019 0.010 0.021 0.021 
 (0.010) (0.021) (0.080) (0.010) (0.021) (0.081) 
Female  -0.002 -0.008 -0.007 -0.002 -0.007 0.022 
Executive (0.005) (0.012) (0.045) (0.006) (0.012) (0.045) 
Board Size -0.007 -0.020* -0.073 -0.006 -0.014 -0.037 
 (0.005) (0.012) (0.051) (0.005) (0.011) (0.048) 
CEO Age -0.005 -0.011 -0.059 -0.006 -0.011 -0.056 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.046) (0.006) (0.013) (0.049) 
Executive Age -0.006 -0.041 -0.074 -0.005 -0.037 -0.037 
 (0.013) (0.028) (0.107) (0.014) (0.029) (0.113) 
Leverage 0.031*** 0.109*** 0.101** 0.033*** 0.114*** 0.118** 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.050) (0.006) (0.013) (0.052) 
List Age -0.001 0.000 -0.054*** -0.001 -0.000 -0.057*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) 
Firm Size -0.014*** -0.032*** -0.028* -0.014*** -0.031*** -0.027* 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.015) (0.002) (0.004) (0.016) 
       
N 15269 15276 15276 13599 13606 13606 
R2 0.066 0.067 0.051 0.067 0.066 0.050 
Notes: The table presents the results of fixed effect regression of pay gap on firm performance. The sample period is from 2005 to 
2015. The dependent variables are firm performance measured by ROA, ROE and EPS. Columns (1) to (3) present the results of 
Log(&*2	3*46), measured by the compensation difference between CEO and the median value of the non-CEO executives. Columns 
(4) to (6) present the results of Log(Gap2), measured by the pay difference between highest paid executive and second highest paid 
executive. All the control variables are defined in Appendix 3.1. All the independent variables are one year lagged. Year dummies and 
constant are included into the estimation but not reported. The robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 






Table 3.3 Age heterogeneity, pay gap and firm performance 
 Log (&*2	3*46) Log (&*2	3*4I) 
                          ROA ROE EPS ROA ROE EPS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log (&*2	3*46) 0.052*** 0.127*** 0.462***    
                          (0.011) (0.028) (0.129)    
Log (&*2	3*4I)    0.002*** 0.005*** 0.016*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) 
2 Cohorts          0.286*** 0.690*** 2.052* 0.003 0.011 0.022 
                          (0.093) (0.229) (1.055) (0.004) (0.008) (0.031) 
3+ Cohorts       0.404*** 0.971*** 4.325*** 0.010** 0.025*** 0.079** 
                          (0.097) (0.249) (1.426) (0.004) (0.009) (0.037) 
Interaction of Log (Pay Gap) with    
2 Cohorts          -0.036*** -0.086*** -0.257* -0.001 -0.002 -0.006 
                          (0.012) (0.029) (0.132) (0.001) (0.002) (0.007) 
3+ Cohorts       -0.051*** -0.122*** -0.543*** -0.002*** -0.006*** -0.022*** 
                          (0.012) (0.031) (0.179) (0.001) (0.002) (0.008) 
Reported controls       
Executive age                -0.008 -0.046 -0.081 -0.006 -0.040 -0.034 
                          (0.013) (0.028) (0.107) (0.014) (0.030) (0.114) 
Duality 0.001 0.000 0.005 -0.000 -0.002 -0.006 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.016) (0.002) (0.004) (0.017) 
Independent  -0.003 -0.011 -0.020 0.001 0.001 0.086 
Director (0.014) (0.032) (0.130) (0.015) (0.033) (0.122) 
State 0.019*** 0.048*** 0.108*** 0.019*** 0.048*** 0.118*** 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.035) (0.003) (0.008) (0.038) 
Private 0.014*** 0.037*** 0.122*** 0.016*** 0.040*** 0.125*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.029) (0.004) (0.008) (0.030) 
Foreign 0.007 0.015 0.018 0.010 0.021 0.021 
 (0.010) (0.021) (0.080) (0.010) (0.021) (0.081) 
Female  -0.002 -0.009 -0.011 -0.002 -0.007 0.021 
Executive (0.005) (0.012) (0.045) (0.006) (0.012) (0.045) 
Board Size -0.007 -0.019* -0.073 -0.006 -0.014 -0.037 
 (0.005) (0.012) (0.051) (0.005) (0.011) (0.048) 
CEO Age -0.005 -0.010 -0.060 -0.006 -0.012 -0.063 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.046) (0.006) (0.013) (0.049) 
Leverage 0.031*** 0.110*** 0.103** 0.033*** 0.114*** 0.120** 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.050) (0.006) (0.013) (0.052) 
List Age -0.001 0.000 -0.054*** -0.001 -0.000 -0.058*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) 
Firm Size -0.014*** -0.033*** -0.031** -0.014*** -0.032*** -0.028* 
                          (0.002) (0.004) (0.015) (0.002) (0.004) (0.016) 
N                         15269 15276 15276 13599 13606 13606 
R2                       0.068 0.068 0.054 0.068 0.067 0.051 
Notes: The table presents the results of age heterogeneity and pay gap on firm performance. Firm performance is measured by ROA, ROE and EPS. 
Columns (1) to (3) present the results of Log (&*2	3*46). The interaction terms represent the interaction of Log (&*2	3*46) with 2 Cohorts and 3+ 
Cohorts. 2 Cohorts equals one if the non-CEO executives come from any two different cohorts (generations) and zero otherwise. 3+ Cohorts equals one 
if the non-CEO executives come from any three or four different cohorts (generations) and zero otherwise. Columns (4) to (6) present the results of Log 
(&*2	3*4I). The interaction terms represent the interaction of Log (&*2	3*46) with 2 Cohorts and 3+ Cohorts. All the control variables are defined in 
Appendix 3.1. All the independent variables are one year lagged. Year dummies and constant are included into the estimation but not reported. The robust 




Table 3.4 Age heterogeneity, pay gap and firm performance (1/3+ Cohorts) 
 1 Cohort  3+ Cohorts 
                          ROA ROE EPS  ROA ROE EPS 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: &*2	3*46 is the pay gap measure 
Log(&*2	3*46) 0.012* 0.029** 0.106  0.027*** 0.062*** 0.189** 
                          (0.006) (0.013) (0.087)  (0.009) (0.019) (0.093) 
1 Cohort        -0.317*** -0.772*** -2.720**     
                          (0.090) (0.228) (1.091)     
3+ Cohorts     0.248** 0.405* 1.053 
     (0.114) (0.237) (0.985) 
Interaction of Log (Pay Gap) with     
1 Cohort        0.040*** 0.097*** 0.341**     
                          (0.011) (0.029) (0.137)     
3+ Cohorts  -0.031** -0.051* -0.133 
  (0.014) (0.030) (0.124) 
N                         15269 15276 15276  15,271 15,278 15,278 
R2                       0.067 0.068 0.052  0.067 0.067 0.053 
Panel B: &*2	3*4I is the pay gap measure     
Log(&*2	3*4I) 0.001** 0.001 0.005  0.001*** 0.003*** 0.011*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.004)  (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) 
1 Cohort        -0.005 -0.015* -0.038     
                          (0.003) (0.008) (0.030)     
3+ Cohorts     0.007** 0.016** 0.062** 
     (0.003) (0.006) (0.029) 
Interaction of Log (Pay Gap) with     
1 Cohort        0.001 0.003** 0.010     
                          (0.001) (0.002) (0.007)     
3+ Cohorts     -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.017*** 
     (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) 
N                         13,599 13,606 13,606  13,599 13,606 13,606 
R2 0.067 0.066 0.050  0.068 0.067 0.051 
Notes: The table presents the results of pay gap on firm performance with interaction terms. The sample period is from 
2005 to 2015. The dependent variables are firm performance measured by ROA, ROE and EPS. In Panel A, the 
tournament incentive is measured by Log (&*2	3*46), measured by the compensation difference between CEO and the 
median value of the non-CEO executives. In Panel B, he tournament incentive is measured by Log (&*2	3*4I), 
measured by the compensation difference between highest paid executives and second highest paid executives. 
Columns (1) to (3) present the results of the interaction of Log (&*2	3*46) with 1 Cohort. 1 Cohort equals one if the 
non-CEO executives come from one cohort (generation) and zero otherwise. Columns (4) to (6) present the results of 
the interaction of Log(&*2	3*46) with 3+ Cohorts. 3+ Cohorts equals one if the non-CEO executives come from one 
cohort (generation) and zero otherwise. All the control variables are defined in Appendix 3.1. All the independent 
variables are one year lagged. Year dummies and constant are included into the estimation but not reported. The robust 







Table 3.5 Age diversity, pay gap and firm performance (subgroup: state-owned vs non-state-
owned) 
 State firms Private firms 
                          ROA ROE EPS ROA ROE EPS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log(&*2	3*46) 0.097*** 0.195*** 0.695** 0.033*** 0.082*** 0.229* 
                          (0.029) (0.064) (0.282) (0.013) (0.028) (0.117) 
2 Cohorts          0.511** 0.870 3.166 0.191* 0.464** 0.573 
                          (0.249) (0.605) (2.558) (0.105) (0.234) (0.956) 
3+ Cohorts       0.619** 1.248** 5.794** 0.269** 0.514** 0.862 
                          (0.242) (0.557) (2.499) (0.114) (0.261) (1.123) 
Interaction of Log (Pay Gap) with    
2 Cohorts          -0.065** -0.111 -0.398 -0.024* -0.057* -0.071 
                          (0.031) (0.076) (0.322) (0.013) (0.029) (0.120) 
3+ Cohorts       -0.079*** -0.158** -0.727** -0.033** -0.064* -0.109 
                          (0.030) (0.070) (0.314) (0.014) (0.033) (0.141) 
Reported controls    
Executive age                -0.000 -0.088 -0.078 0.002 -0.009 -0.014 
                          (0.024) (0.060) (0.217) (0.013) (0.033) (0.097) 
Duality -0.005 -0.017 -0.056 0.001 -0.001 0.015 
 (0.005) (0.012) (0.040) (0.002) (0.006) (0.017) 
Independent  0.018 0.048 -0.028 -0.000 0.004 0.034 
Director (0.027) (0.073) (0.286) (0.018) (0.046) (0.132) 
State 0.018** 0.045** 0.140* 0.017*** 0.051*** 0.111*** 
 (0.008) (0.020) (0.084) (0.004) (0.011) (0.035) 
Private 0.019* 0.039 0.045 0.013*** 0.035*** 0.120*** 
 (0.010) (0.026) (0.092) (0.004) (0.009) (0.030) 
Foreign -0.078** -0.171* -0.389 0.001 0.000 -0.048 
 (0.036) (0.101) (0.516) (0.010) (0.024) (0.076) 
Female  0.009 0.007 -0.007 -0.005 -0.014 -0.014 
Executive (0.011) (0.031) (0.103) (0.006) (0.014) (0.041) 
Board Size -0.012 -0.044 -0.262** -0.006 -0.015 -0.046 
 (0.011) (0.031) (0.117) (0.006) (0.016) (0.047) 
CEO Age 0.010 0.028 -0.019 0.002 0.017 -0.039 
 (0.012) (0.030) (0.112) (0.006) (0.016) (0.044) 
Leverage 0.029** 0.064** 0.125 0.039*** 0.112*** 0.142*** 
 (0.011) (0.032) (0.103) (0.007) (0.020) (0.054) 
List Age -0.001 -0.000 -0.035** -0.002* -0.002 -0.066*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.015) (0.001) (0.002) (0.007) 
Firm Size -0.015*** -0.031*** -0.072** -0.013*** -0.027*** -0.024 
                          (0.003) (0.008) (0.028) (0.002) (0.006) (0.018) 
N                         3,842 3,842 3,842 11,606 11,606 11,606 
R2                       0.066 0.051 0.054 0.067 0.053 0.067 
Notes: The table presents the results of fixed effect regression of pay gap on firm performance with interaction terms for state firms 
and private firms. The sample period is from 2005 to 2015. The dependent variables are firm performance measured by ROA, ROE 
and EPS. Columns (1) to (3) present the results of state firms), The interaction terms represent the interaction of Log(&*2	3*46) with 
2 Cohorts and 3+ Cohorts. 2 Cohorts equals one if the non-CEO executives come from any two different cohorts (generations) and 
zero otherwise. 3+ Cohorts equals one if the non-CEO executives come from any three or four different cohorts (generations) and 
zero otherwise. Columns (4) to (6) present the results of private firms. The interaction terms represent the interaction of Log (&*2	3*46) 
with 2 Cohorts and 3+ Cohorts. All the control variables are defined in Appendix 3.1. All the independent variables are one year 
lagged. Year dummies and constant are included into the estimation but not reported. The robust standard errors are reported in 





Table 3.6a Age heterogeneity, pay gap and performance (Fe instrument variable approach: 
first stage) 
                          &*2	3*46  &*2	3*46* 
2 Cohorts  
&*2	3*46* 
3 Cohorts   
&*2	3*4I  &*2	3*4I* 
2 Cohorts  
&*2	3*4I* 
3 Cohorts   
2 Cohorts          1.111*** 7.342*** -0.008 -0.010 3.947*** 0.102 
                          (0.248) (0.220) (0.168) (0.227) (0.190) (0.131) 
3+ Cohorts       0.133 -0.858*** 7.263*** -0.163 0.322 3.551*** 
                          (0.276) (0.244) (0.187) (0.295) (0.246) (0.170) 
Executive age                -0.066*** -0.033* -0.025* 0.243 0.373 -0.311 
                          (0.020) (0.018) (0.013) (0.346) (0.290) (0.200) 
Duality 0.007** 0.001 0.003 0.192*** 0.038 0.068** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.052) (0.043) (0.030) 
Independent Director -0.013 -0.018 0.023 0.286 0.133 0.369* 
 (0.022) (0.019) (0.015) (0.379) (0.317) (0.219) 
State 0.017*** 0.012** 0.005 0.016 -0.041 0.044 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.100) (0.083) (0.057) 
Private 0.002 -0.004 0.007* -0.093 0.016 -0.071 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.102) (0.086) (0.059) 
Foreign 0.009 0.009 -0.000 -0.008 0.032 -0.057 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.132) (0.110) (0.076) 
Female Executive 0.067*** 0.043*** 0.016** 0.048 0.204 -0.208** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.158) (0.132) (0.091) 
Board Size -0.015 0.005 -0.017 0.005 -0.066 0.085 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.011) (0.289) (0.242) (0.167) 
CEO Age 0.038*** 0.032*** -0.001 0.145 0.066 -0.020 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.154) (0.129) (0.089) 
Leverage -0.029*** -0.015** -0.007 -0.433*** -0.253** -0.004 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.147) (0.123) (0.085) 
List Age -0.007*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.022 0.008 -0.044*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.024) (0.020) (0.014) 
Firm Size 0.019*** 0.012*** -0.000 0.259*** 0.135*** 0.014 
                          (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.040) (0.034) (0.023) 
Log(&*2	3*46)(Median 
Industry)        
0.117*** -0.081*** -0.008    
                          (0.028) (0.025) (0.019)    
New CEO                 -0.024*** 0.003 -0.001 -0.197** 0.083 0.014 
                          (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.078) (0.065) (0.045) 
No. of non-CEO 
executives               
-0.023*** -0.008 -0.002 -0.319*** -0.108 0.011 
                          (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.103) (0.086) (0.059) 
Log(&*2	3*46)(Median 
Industry)* 2 Cohorts                     




                          (0.031) (0.028) (0.021)    
Log(&*2	3*46)(Median 
Industry)*  3 Cohorts                      
-0.017 0.111*** 0.086***    
                          (0.035) (0.031) (0.024)    
No. of non-CEO 
executives* 2 Cohorts                      
0.010* 0.005 -0.002 0.052 -0.081 -0.043 
                          (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.109) (0.091) (0.063) 
No. of non-CEO 
executives * 3 Cohorts                      
0.010 -0.016** 0.019*** 0.180 -0.156 0.178** 
                          (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.137) (0.115) (0.079) 
New CEO * 2 Cohorts                     -0.006 -0.037*** 0.002 0.184** -0.134* -0.001 
                          (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.088) (0.074) (0.051) 
New CEO * 3 Cohorts                      -0.007 0.001 -0.037*** 0.272*** -0.049 0.003 
                          (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.101) (0.085) (0.058) 
Log(&*2	3*4I)(Median 
Industry)         
   0.022* -0.059*** -0.010 
                            (0.027) (0.023) (0.016) 
Log(&*2	3*4I)(Median 
Industry)* 2 Cohorts                     
   -0.006 0.107*** -0.004 
                            (0.031) (0.026) (0.018) 
Log(&*2	3*4I)(Median 
Industry)* 3 Cohorts                     
   -0.026 -0.002 0.077*** 
                            (0.035) (0.030) (0.020) 
N                         12,664 12,664 12,664 10,868 10,868 10,868 
Notes: The table presents the results of impact of age heterogeneity on the relationship between pay gap on firm performance using 
the fixed effect instrument variable approach (first stage). The dependent variables are firm performance measured by ROA, ROE and 
EPS in columns (1) to (3). Columns (1) to (3) present the results of Log (&*2	3*46), measured by the compensation difference between 
CEO and the median value of the non-CEO executives, and two interaction terms, namely Log (&*2	3*46)* 2 Cohorts and Log 
(&*2	3*46)* 3 Cohorts. Columns (4) to (6) present the results of Log (&*2	3*4I), measured by the measured by the pay difference 
between highest paid executive and second highest paid executive, and two interaction terms, namely Log (&*2	3*4I)* 2 Cohorts 
and Log (&*2	3*4I)* 3 Cohorts. Instrument variables for Log (&*2	3*46) are the median value of compensation gap (&*2	3*46) for 
the firm in the same industry and belongs to the same size quartile as the firm, the number of non-CEO executives (Executives) and a 
dummy variable (New CEO) that equals one if the CEO is a new CEO and zero otherwise. All the control variables are defined in 
Appendix A. All the control variables are defined in Appendix A. Year dummies and constant are included into the estimation but not 
reported. F-statistics reports the joint relevance of all instruments in the first stage. The robust errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, 



















Table 3.6b Age heterogeneity, pay gap and performance (Fe instrument variable approach: 
second stage) 
 Log(&*2	3*46) Log(&*2	3*4I) 
                          ROA ROE EPS ROA ROE EPS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log(&*2	3*46) 0.042*** 0.117*** 0.624***    
                          (0.010) (0.029) (0.201)    
Log(&*2	3*4I)    0.001* 0.004** 0.015** 
    (0.001) (0.002) (0.007) 
2 Cohorts          0.229*** 0.598*** 2.100 0.002 0.009 -0.001 
                          (0.086) (0.230) (1.652) (0.003) (0.008) (0.037) 
3+ Cohorts       0.314*** 0.877*** 6.800*** 0.009** 0.024** 0.084** 
                          (0.097) (0.267) (2.410) (0.004) (0.010) (0.043) 
Interaction of Log (Pay Gap) with    
2 Cohorts          -0.029*** -0.075*** -0.263 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 
                          (0.011) (0.029) (0.208) (0.001) (0.002) (0.009) 
3+ Cohorts       -0.039*** -0.109*** -0.853*** -0.002* -0.005** -0.022** 
                          (0.012) (0.034) (0.303) (0.001) (0.002) (0.010) 
Reported controls       
Executive age                -0.003 -0.040 -0.087 0.003 -0.026 -0.038 
                          (0.011) (0.025) (0.108) (0.013) (0.028) (0.120) 
Duality 0.002 0.001 0.007 0.002 0.001 0.005 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.017) (0.002) (0.004) (0.018) 
Independent 
Director 
-0.000 -0.006 0.156 0.007 0.016 0.140 
 (0.013) (0.030) (0.162) (0.014) (0.031) (0.118) 
State 0.016*** 0.042*** 0.063* 0.017*** 0.043*** 0.106*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.037) (0.003) (0.008) (0.036) 
Private 0.012*** 0.031*** 0.107*** 0.014*** 0.035*** 0.114*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.030) (0.003) (0.007) (0.033) 
Foreign -0.005 -0.015 -0.048 -0.004 -0.011 -0.006 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.046) (0.005) (0.011) (0.045) 
Female Executive -0.002 -0.006 -0.061 -0.006 -0.014 -0.064 
 (0.005) (0.012) (0.045) (0.006) (0.013) (0.050) 
Board Size 0.013 0.027 0.049 0.013 0.029 0.066 
 (0.010) (0.020) (0.092) (0.011) (0.023) (0.100) 
CEO Age -0.002 -0.005 0.022 -0.001 -0.007 0.024 
 (0.005) (0.011) (0.044) (0.005) (0.012) (0.046) 
Leverage 0.037*** 0.127*** 0.120** 0.038*** 0.126*** 0.169*** 
 (0.006) (0.013) (0.061) (0.006) (0.013) (0.063) 
List Age -0.001* -0.000 -0.059*** -0.001** -0.000 -0.063*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) 
Firm Size -0.016*** -0.037*** -0.038** -0.015*** -0.033*** -0.035** 
                          (0.002) (0.004) (0.017) (0.002) (0.004) (0.018) 
N 12657 12664 12664 10861 10868 10868 
LR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen                0.217 0.169 0.315 0.324 0.270 0.120 
Notes: The table presents the results of impact of age heterogeneity on the relationship between pay gap on firm performance using the fixed effect 
instrument variable approach. The dependent variables are firm performance measured by ROA, ROE and EPS in columns (1) to (3). Columns (1) to (3) 




Instrument variables for Log ((&*2	3*46) are the median value of compensation gap ((&*2	3*46) for the firm in the same industry and belongs to the 
same size quartile as the firm, the number of non-CEO executives (Executives) and a dummy variable (New CEO) that equals one if the CEO is a new 
CEO and zero otherwise. Columns (4) to (6) present the results of Log (&*2	3*4I), measured by the pay difference between highest paid executive and 
second highest paid executive. Instrument variables for Log (&*2	3*4I) are the median value of compensation gap (&*2	3*4I) for the firm in the same 
industry and belongs to the same size quartile as the firm, the number of non-CEO executives (Executives) and a dummy variable (New CEO) that equals 
one if the CEO is a new CEO and zero otherwise. All the control variables are defined in Appendix A. All the control variables are defined in Appendix 
A. All the independent variables are one year lagged. Year dummies and constant are included into the estimation but not reported.  The robust errors 
are shown in parentheses. LM is the p-value of LM underidentification test. Hansen J is the p-value of Hansen’s J test of overidentifying restrictions. *, 









































Table 3.7 Age heterogeneity, pay gap and firm performance (System GMM) 
 Log (&*2	3*46)  Log (&*2	3*4I) 
                          ROA ROE EPS  ROA ROE EPS 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
L.ROA 0.385***    0.362***   
 (0.024)    (0.026)   
L.ROE  0.320***    0.310***  
  (0.023)    (0.026)  
L.EPS   0.584***    0.557*** 
   (0.030)    (0.032) 
Log((Pay	Gap6) 0.511*** 0.830*** 2.964**     
 (0.132) (0.269) (1.183)     
Log((Pay	GapI)     0.009 0.031** 0.116*** 
     (0.006) (0.014) (0.043) 
2 Cohorts          4.341*** 6.661*** 24.473**  0.022 0.095 0.456** 
                          (1.243) (2.532) (10.520)  (0.028) (0.069) (0.218) 
3+ Cohorts       4.497*** 6.669*** 23.904**  0.031 0.168** 0.701*** 
                          (1.150) (2.409) (10.868)  (0.033) (0.078) (0.246) 
Interaction of Log (Pay Gap) with 
2 Cohorts          -0.543*** -0.831*** -3.064**  -0.004 -0.019 -0.092* 
                          (0.156) (0.318) (1.319)  (0.006) (0.016) (0.050) 
3+ Cohorts       -0.562*** -0.832*** -2.990**  -0.006 -0.035** -0.150*** 
                          (0.144) (0.302) (1.362)  (0.007) (0.017) (0.055) 
Reported controls        
Executive Age 0.054 0.100 0.390  0.037 0.062 0.340 
 (0.043) (0.091) (0.310)  (0.042) (0.095) (0.334) 
Duality -0.011 -0.019 -0.060  0.001 0.010 -0.008 
 (0.007) (0.016) (0.052)  (0.007) (0.014) (0.047) 
Independent  0.008 0.004 0.333  0.005 -0.052 0.104 
Director (0.065) (0.130) (0.473)  (0.059) (0.128) (0.434) 
State -0.009 -0.024 0.002  -0.009 -0.025 -0.044 
 (0.007) (0.015) (0.054)  (0.007) (0.017) (0.063) 
Private -0.005 0.005 0.037  -0.009 -0.007 -0.014 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.052)  (0.007) (0.014) (0.054) 
Foreign -0.008 -0.017 -0.014  -0.012 -0.019 -0.014 
 (0.013) (0.027) (0.095)  (0.014) (0.026) (0.100) 
Female Executive 0.019 0.011 0.059  -0.002 -0.034 -0.068 
 (0.017) (0.036) (0.116)  (0.017) (0.036) (0.121) 
Board Size 0.016 -0.004 0.015  0.019 0.013 0.050 
 (0.020) (0.045) (0.158)  (0.019) (0.041) (0.150) 
CEO Age 0.035** 0.093** 0.118  0.023 0.069* 0.071 
 (0.017) (0.038) (0.125)  (0.018) (0.040) (0.136) 
Leverage 0.009 0.009 -0.107  0.007 0.001 -0.027 
 (0.014) (0.030) (0.108)  (0.015) (0.031) (0.122) 
List Age -0.000 -0.003 -0.008  0.001 0.005 0.005 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.013)  (0.002) (0.004) (0.014) 
Firm Size -0.011** -0.012 0.018  -0.009* -0.014 -0.000 




        
AR(2) 0.825 0.379 0.349  0.844 0.403 0.109 
Hansen P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 15288 15299 15300  13684 13695 13696 
Notes: The table presents the system GMM results of impact of age heterogeneity on the relationship between pay gap on firm 
performance. The sample period is from 2005 to 2015. The dependent variables are firm performance measured by ROA, ROE and 
EPS. Columns (1) to (3) present the results of Log (&*2	3*46), measured by the compensation difference between CEO and the 
median value of the non-CEO executives. Columns (4) to (6) present the results of Log (&*2	3*4I), measured by the pay difference 
between highest paid executive and second highest paid executive. The GMM style variables are the respective dependent variables 
as well as Duality, Independent Director, State, Private, Foreign, Female Executive, Board Size, Executive, Leverage, Listed, Firm 
Size. The IV style variables are year dummies. AR (2) is test for the second order serial correlation. The Hansen test of over-
identification is based on the null that all instruments are valid. Constant is included into the estimation but not reported. The robust 






































Table 3.8 Pay gap and firm performance (Robustness) 
 Log (&*2	3*4K)  Log (&*2	QR) 
                          ROA ROE EPS  ROA ROE EPS 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Log(&*2	3*4K) 0.016*** 0.039*** 0.138     
 (0.006) (0.014) (0.089)     
Log(&*2	QR)     0.004*** 0.009*** 0.041*** 
     (0.001) (0.002) (0.008) 
Duality 0.000 -0.000 0.005  0.001 0.001 0.010 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.016)  (0.002) (0.004) (0.016) 
Independent  -0.005 -0.015 -0.031  -0.007 -0.020 -0.054 
Director (0.014) (0.032) (0.130)  (0.014) (0.032) (0.129) 
State 0.019*** 0.048*** 0.107***  0.019*** 0.048*** 0.108*** 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.035)  (0.003) (0.008) (0.035) 
Private 0.014*** 0.037*** 0.120***  0.014*** 0.037*** 0.119*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.029)  (0.003) (0.007) (0.029) 
Foreign 0.006 0.015 0.018  0.005 0.012 0.004 
 (0.010) (0.021) (0.080)  (0.010) (0.021) (0.080) 
Female  -0.003 -0.008 -0.004  -0.003 -0.008 -0.006 
Executive (0.005) (0.012) (0.045)  (0.005) (0.012) (0.045) 
Board Size -0.007 -0.020* -0.074  -0.007 -0.021* -0.077 
 (0.005) (0.012) (0.051)  (0.005) (0.012) (0.051) 
CEO Age -0.005 -0.010 -0.057  -0.004 -0.009 -0.054 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.046)  (0.005) (0.012) (0.045) 
Executive Age -0.007 -0.041 -0.073  -0.008 -0.043 -0.080 
 (0.013) (0.028) (0.107)  (0.013) (0.028) (0.106) 
Leverage 0.030*** 0.109*** 0.102**  0.031*** 0.111*** 0.112** 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.049)  (0.006) (0.012) (0.049) 
List Age -0.001 0.000 -0.054***  -0.001 0.000 -0.055*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.006)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) 
Firm Size -0.013*** -0.032*** -0.028*  -0.014*** -0.033*** -0.035** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.015)  (0.002) (0.004) (0.015) 
N 15,269 15,276 15,276  15,269 15,276 15,276 
R2 0.066 0.066 0.051  0.068 0.068 0.055 
Notes: The table presents the robust results of pay gap on firm performance. The sample period is from 2005 to 2015. The dependent 
variables are firm performance measured by ROA, ROE and EPS. Columns (1) to (3) present the results of Log (Pay Sd), measured 
by the logarithm of the standard deviation of executives’ compensation. Columns (4) to (6) present the results of Log (&*2	3*4K), 
measured by the pay difference between CEO and mean value of non-CEO executive. All the control variables are defined in Appendix 
3.1. All the independent variables are one year lagged. Year dummies and constant are included into the estimation but not reported. 














Table 3.9 Age heterogeneity, pay gap and firm performance: robustness (age 
similarity) 
 Log(&*2	3*46)  Log(&*2	3*4I) 
                          ROA ROE EPS  ROA ROE EPS 
Log(&*2	3*46) 0.008 0.024 0.060     
 (0.008) (0.016) (0.121)     
Log(&*2	3*4I)     0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
     (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) 
Age Similarity (<20) -0.134** -0.267* -1.311  -0.003 -0.011* -0.032 
 (0.067) (0.142) (0.909)  (0.003) (0.006) (0.027) 
Interaction of Log (Pay Gap) with     
Age Similarity (<20) 0.017** 0.033* 0.165  0.001* 0.003** 0.012* 
 (0.008) (0.018) (0.114)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) 
Reported controls     
Executive Age -0.006 -0.042 -0.066  -0.003 -0.035 -0.017 
 (0.013) (0.028) (0.108)  (0.014) (0.030) (0.114) 
Duality 0.000 0.000 0.004  -0.000 -0.002 -0.006 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.016)  (0.002) (0.004) (0.017) 
Independent  -0.005 -0.014 -0.030  0.001 0.001 0.083 
Director (0.014) (0.032) (0.130)  (0.015) (0.033) (0.122) 
State 0.019*** 0.048*** 0.107***  0.019*** 0.048*** 0.118*** 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.035)  (0.003) (0.008) (0.038) 
Private 0.014*** 0.037*** 0.119***  0.016*** 0.039*** 0.124*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.029)  (0.004) (0.008) (0.030) 
Foreign 0.007 0.015 0.022  0.010 0.022 0.023 
 (0.010) (0.021) (0.079)  (0.010) (0.021) (0.081) 
Female Executive -0.002 -0.008 -0.009  -0.002 -0.007 0.022 
 (0.005) (0.012) (0.045)  (0.006) (0.012) (0.045) 
Board Size -0.007 -0.020* -0.074  -0.006 -0.014 -0.038 
 (0.005) (0.012) (0.051)  (0.005) (0.011) (0.048) 
CEO Age -0.005 -0.010 -0.060  -0.007 -0.012 -0.064 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.046)  (0.006) (0.013) (0.049) 
Leverage 0.031*** 0.110*** 0.103**  0.033*** 0.114*** 0.120** 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.050)  (0.006) (0.013) (0.052) 
List Age -0.001 0.000 -0.054***  -0.001 -0.000 -0.058*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.006)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) 
Firm Size -0.014*** -0.032*** -0.029*  -0.014*** -0.031*** -0.027* 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.015)  (0.002) (0.004) (0.016) 
        
N 15,269 15,276 15,276  13599 13606 13606 
R2 0.067 0.067 0.052  0.067 0.067 0.051 
Notes: The table presents the robust results of pay gap on firm performance with interaction terms. The sample period is from 2005 
to 2015. The dependent variables are firm performance measured by ROA, ROE and EPS. The left panel presents the results of 
Log(&*2	3*46), measured by the compensation difference between CEO and the median value of the non-CEO executives. The 
interaction terms represent the interaction of Log (&*2	3*46) with Age Similarity (<20). Age Similarity (< 20) is a dummy variable 
which equals one if the age spread between the non-CEO executives are less than 20 years. The right panel presents the results of 
Log(&*2	3*4I), measured by the pay difference between highest paid executive and second highest paid executive. The interaction 
terms represent the interaction of Log(&*2	3*46) with Age Similarity (<20). All the control variables are defined in Appendix 3.1. 
All the independent variables are one year lagged. Year dummies and constant are included into the estimation but not reported. The 





Table 3.10 Age heterogeneity, pay gap and firm performance: robustness(SD) 
 Log(&*2	3*46) Log(&*2	3*4I) 
                          ROA ROE EPS ROA ROE EPS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log(&*2	3*46) 0.058*** 0.137*** 0.539**    
 (0.020) (0.044) (0.238)    
Log(&*2	3*4I)    0.003** 0.007*** 0.025** 
    (0.001) (0.003) (0.011) 
Log (Age Sd) 0.185** 0.431** 1.733 0.004 0.016** 0.045* 
 (0.083) (0.186) (1.068) (0.003) (0.007) (0.027) 
Interaction of Log (Gap) with    
Log (Age Sd) -0.023** -0.053** -0.216 -0.001 -0.003** -0.010* 
  (0.010) (0.023) (0.134) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) 
Reported controls    
Executive Age                -0.007 -0.048* -0.088 -0.003 -0.039 -0.035 
                          (0.013) (0.029) (0.109) (0.014) (0.030) (0.115) 
Duality 0.001 0.001 0.006 -0.000 -0.001 -0.005 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.016) (0.002) (0.004) (0.017) 
Independent  -0.004 -0.013 -0.029 0.001 0.001 0.084 
Director (0.014) (0.032) (0.130) (0.015) (0.033) (0.122) 
State 0.019*** 0.048*** 0.107*** 0.019*** 0.047*** 0.117*** 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.035) (0.003) (0.008) (0.038) 
Private 0.014*** 0.037*** 0.119*** 0.016*** 0.039*** 0.125*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.029) (0.004) (0.008) (0.030) 
Foreign 0.007 0.016 0.022 0.010 0.022 0.022 
 (0.010) (0.021) (0.080) (0.010) (0.021) (0.081) 
Female  -0.002 -0.008 -0.007 -0.002 -0.007 0.022 
Executive (0.005) (0.012) (0.045) (0.006) (0.012) (0.045) 
Board Size -0.007 -0.020* -0.072 -0.006 -0.014 -0.036 
 (0.005) (0.012) (0.052) (0.005) (0.011) (0.049) 
CEO Age -0.005 -0.008 -0.054 -0.006 -0.010 -0.057 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.046) (0.006) (0.013) (0.050) 
Leverage 0.031*** 0.110*** 0.102** 0.033*** 0.114*** 0.120** 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.050) (0.006) (0.013) (0.052) 
List Age -0.001 0.000 -0.054*** -0.001 -0.000 -0.057*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) 
Firm Size -0.014*** -0.032*** -0.029* -0.014*** -0.032*** -0.028* 
                          (0.002) (0.004) (0.015) (0.002) (0.004) (0.016) 
N                         15264 15271 15271 13594 13601 13601 
R2 0.067 0.067 0.052 0.067 0.067 0.050 
Notes: The table presents the robust results of pay gap on firm performance with interaction terms. The sample period is from 2005 
to 2015. The dependent variables are firm performance measured by ROA, ROE and EPS. Columns (1) to (3) present the results of 
Log (&*2	3*46), measured by the compensation difference between CEO and the median value of the non-CEO executives. Columns 
(4) to (6) present the results of Log (&*2	3*4I), measured by the compensation difference between highest and second highest non-
CEO executives. The interaction terms represent the interaction of Log (&*2	3*46) with Log (Age Sd), measured as the logarithm of 
the standard deviation of executives’ ages. The right panel presents the results of Log(&*2	3*4I), measured by the pay difference 
between highest paid executive and second highest paid executive. The interaction terms represent the interaction of Log(&*2	3*4I) 
with Log (Age Sd). All the control variables are defined in Appendix 3.1. the independent variables are one year lagged. Year dummies 
and constant are included into the estimation but not reported. The robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** 






Appendix 3.1 Variables definition 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: Firm performance 
ROA Net income/ total assets 
ROE Net income/ book value of total equity 
EPS (Net income - dividends on preferred stock)/average outstanding 
shares 
Panel B: Tournament incentives (000s CNY) 
&*2	3*46 Compensation of CEO - median value of compensation of non-
CEO executives 
&*2	3*4I Compensation of highest paid executive- compensation of second 
highest paid executive 
&*2	3*4K Compensation of CEO - mean value of compensation of non-CEO 
executives 
Log (Pay Sd)  Log of standard deviation of executives’ compensation 
Panel C: Age difference in non-CEO executives 
1 Cohort Dummy variable equals 1 if non-CEO executives come from the 
same cohort (generation) and 0 otherwise 
2 Cohorts Dummy variable equals 1 if non-CEO executives come from any 
two different cohorts (generations) and 0 otherwise 
3+ Cohorts Dummy variable equals 1 if non-CEO executives come from any 
three or four cohorts (generations) and 0 otherwise 
Age Similarity (<20) Dummy variable equals 1 if the age spread in non-CEO executives 
is less than 20 years and 0 otherwise 
Log (Age Sd) Log of standard deviation of executives’ age 
Panel D: Other characteristics 
State Percentage of shares held by the government or state-owned 
enterprise 
Foreign Percentage of shares held by the foreign investor 
Private Percentage of shares held by the private investor 
Executives Number of non-CEO executives 
Independent director Percentage of independent directors 
Duality Dummy variable equals 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the 
board and 0 otherwise 
Executive Age Average age of non-CEO executives 
Female executive Percentage of female executives 
Board size The natural log of board size 
Leverage Total debt/total assets 
Firm size Log of total assets 






Chapter 4 Cost of debt, excessive risk taking and board 
characteristics: insights from state-owned firms 
4.1 Introduction 
Issues relating to debt financing and state ownership have received considerable attention 
from the financial media. An article in Economist (Dec, 2016) contends that with the 
government on their side, state firms usually borrow cheaply. Borrowing cost only tells 
half of the story. Given the implicit guarantees on debt by the government, financial media 
have started to concern about the potential risk problems in state firms. A recent article in 
the Financial Times (July, 2017) asserts that Chinese state firms have experienced a 
borrowing binge and accumulated excessive debt due to the generous lending terms 
provided by the bank, which leads to mounting risks. Therefore, the other half of the story 
is about the excessive risk taking in state firms’ debt financing decisions. 
 
The debate in the media has triggered a growing body of research exploring the issue of 
debt financing in state firms. The literature suggests that the implication of state 
ownership is ambiguous. On the one side, with the implicit guarantees against debt default 
by the government (Borisova and Megginson, 2011) and the soft budget constraints 
(Kornai, 1979, 1980), state firms usually borrow at a more favourable rate than private 
peers (Sanchez-Ballesta and Garcia-Meca, 2011), have a higher level of leverage 
(Dewentwe and Malatesta, 2001) and hold less cash in hand (Borisova and Megginson, 
2011). On the other side, given the non-profit-maximizing social and political goals 
(Shileifer and Vishny, 1993) as well as discouraged monitoring and increased moral 
hazard (Borisova et al., 2012; Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001), state ownership could 
increase the cost of debt (Borisova et al., 2015). Lacking the effective monitoring, 
managers in state firms are more likely to entrench themselves. They prefer less leverage 




to increase the flexibility to expropriate the shareholders’ value (Jensen, 1986).  
 
Given these conflicting arguments regarding the effect of state ownership on the levels of 
cost of debt, leverage and cash holdings, in this paper, I examine another concern about 
the issue of debt financing in state firms, namely the extent to which the state firms take 
excessive risk in their debt financing decision compared to private firms. To address this 
issue, I carefully construct the predicted risk indicators and then identify the presence and 
magnitude of excess risk in state firms. In addition, since state firms are generally 
believed to have more severe agency problems and to be less efficient than private firms 
(Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001), I also consider whether board characteristics affect this 
excessive risk-taking behaviour in debt financing in state firms. 
 
Prior studies suggest that board independence, which provides effective monitoring and 
control of management (Fama and Jensen, 1983), can signal a high quality of board and 
hence reduce the cost of debt and cash holdings and increase the leverage (Anderson et 
al., 2014; Fields et al., 2012; Kuan et al., 2011). In terms of board size, larger boards can 
bring more valuable resources to the firm (Dalton et al., 1999) and improve the 
information quality in the board, which can lead to lower borrowing cost and fewer loan 
covenants (Fields et al., 2012). To date, however, studies on board characteristics and cost 
of debt, leverage and cash holdings have largely focused on developed countries. To shed 
light on this issue in emerging market in which the state ownership tends to dominate the 
economy, China is chosen as an example in this study. 
 
China, the largest emerging economy, provides an excellent setting to explore the impact 
of board of directors on excessive risk-taking in debt financing decisions in state firms. 
First, unlike western firms, Chinese firms normally have a concentrated ownership with 
a large government stake. In 2005, the government initiated a split share reform in which 




However, despite the reform, the government still imposes tight controls on listed firms. 
Second, debt financing is an important finance source for Chinese listed firms (Shailer 
and Wang, 2014). Since the bond market is underdeveloped in China (Ayyagari et al., 
2010), Chinese firms rely heavily on bank loans for external financing. In China, the 
banking sector is dominated by state-owned banks which favour state firms (Dong et al., 
2016). By the end of 2015, debts held by Chinese state firms accounted for around 60% 
of all corporate debt. Third, Chinese firms are characterised as having weak governance 
and poor investor protection. In past years, the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
has enacted a series of governance reforms in order to improve the corporate governance 
of listed firms in which the board of directors is placed as the key element. Under these 
deepening reform of the corporate governance, it is worth estimating the effectiveness of 
boards of directors in Chinese firms, especially state-owned firms which have more 
complicated agency problems. 
 
To study the issue of the cost of debt and excessive risk taking in debt financing decisions 
in Chinese state firms, I examine a sample of 19,046 firm-year observations over the 
period from 2002 to 2015, pertaining to 2,294 Chinese firms. In this paper, I follow Gao 
et al. (2013) in constructing the measures of excess risk indicators, namely, excess 
leverage and excess cash holdings.24 The results first show that state-owned firms have 
a lower cost of debt than private firms due to implicit guarantees by the government. Then 
I find that state firms tend to take excessive risks in debt financing decisions. On average, 
there is greater evidence of positive excess leverage and negative excess cash holdings in 
state firms, which indicates that state-owned firms have more leverage and less cash 
holdings than they would have were they a private firm. This is because the government 
can relax the budge constraint of state firms through better access to credit and implicit 
 
24 Following Bradley and Chen (2015), corporate policies such as leverage and cash holdings can 





guarantees against debt default. As a result, state firms are expected to borrow more 
regardless of potential default problems. Further, the government support could also 
reduce the precautionary incentives for holding cash in state firms. 
 
Given the lower cost of debt, excessive leverage and less cash holdings in state firms, I 
take a step further to estimate whether board characteristics could affect excessive risk 
taking in state firms. I find that the proportion of independent directors is negatively 
associated with the excess cost of debt but positively related to excess leverage. This is 
because board independence signals an effective monitoring board, which reduces the 
risk premium required by the creditor. Then, state firms with board independence are 
likely to have a lower cost of debt and hence to become excessively leveraged. In other 
words, board independence could encourage the risk-taking in state-owned firms, which 
suggests that independent directors benefit shareholders at the expense of debtholders. 
Additionally, board size has positive impacts on excess cost of debt, leverage and cash 
holdings. This is because a larger board has less effective monitoring due to the free rider 
problem and is more likely to generate conflicts in the boardroom. Therefore, creditors 
may require a higher risk premium, resulting in a higher cost of debt. Additionally, since 
the manager of state firms are more likely to hoard more cash to increase the opportunities 
to expropriate shareholders’ values, a larger board with less effective monitoring in state 
firms can further increase the level of cash holdings, exceeding the target value. In terms 
of leverage, a larger board can improve information quality by providing valuable and 
comprehensive resources to the board, signalling a higher board quality and receiving 
fewer loan covenants. Therefore, larger board in state firms can lead to excessive leverage. 
 
This study contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, our work provides a 
new perspective on studying debt financing in state firms. Previous studies have usually 
focused on the effect of state ownership on the level of cost of debt, the level of leverage 




Dewentwe and Malatesta, 2001; Shailer and Wang, 2014). In contrast, this study predicts 
the leverage, cash holdings and cost of debt that state firms should have and then studies 
the excess leverage, excess cash holdings and excess cost of debt in state-owned firms. 
By doing this, excessive risk taking in the debt financing decision in state-owned firms 
compared to private firms is identified. Second, to the best of my knowledge, this is the 
first empirical study to provide a comprehensive perspective on the relationship between 
board characteristics and excessive managerial risk only in state firms that have a severe 
agency problem and appear to be inefficient.  
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the literature on state 
ownership, the cost of debt, leverage and cash holdings and hypothesis development. 
Section 4.3 introduces the institutional background. Section 4.4 describes the data 
collection procedure and methodology. Section 4.5 presents the main results and is 
followed by a series of robustness tests in Section 4.6. Section 4.7 offers a summary and 
draws the conclusions. 
4.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
4.2.1 State ownership and cost of debt 
Past years saw a flood of literature on debt as a mechanism for solving the agency problem 
based on the “control hypothesis” (Jensen, 1986). Debt is not only associated with a 
particular pattern of cash flows, but is defined as the ability of creditors to exercise their 
control (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). An essential feature of debt is that a failure by the 
borrower might trigger the transfer of some control rights to the lender. Given the fact 
that debt could force the firm to pay out the excessive cash flow, it might prevent the 
managers from managerial discretion (Jensen, 1986). Therefore, debt is the remedy 
against the agency cost, resulting from conflicts of interest between shareholders and 





In terms of debt financing, there is a growing research investigating the influence of state 
ownership on the cost of debt. The literature provides us with mixed results, either 
positive or negative. On the one side, government ownership can lower the cost of debt. 
From the political perspective, governments usually impose implicit guarantees against 
firms’ debt default and it is less likely that the government will allow the failure of the 
firm. However, if a state-owned firm were to face the bankruptcy, debtholders expect that 
the government will prop up the firm and satisfy their claims (Borisova and Megginson, 
2011). These implicit guarantees are likely to reduce the perceived default risk of state-
owned firms, which further decrease the risk premiums required by the investors. As a 
result, state-owned firms are likely to have a lower cost of debt. Most empirical studies 
support this argument. Sanchez-Ballesta and Garcia-Meca (2011) focus on Spanish firms 
over the period 1999-2002 and document a lower cost of borrowing in firms with state 
ownership. This is because these firms benefit from easier financing condition through 
the state financial agency and are backed up by governments, which reduces the perceived 
probability of debt default. Similarly, Shailer and Wang (2014) emphasize that 
government ownership signals an implicit guarantee on corporate debt as well as a 
substitute for weak internal governance system and find that companies under 
government control generally have a lower cost of debt than private peers in China. 
 
On the other side, government ownership can increase the cost of debt. Governments 
direct firms to pursue social and political goals, such as excessive employment, domestic 
investment, wealth redistribution and low unemployment (Shileifer and Vishny, 1993; 
Borisova et al., 2015), at the expense of profit maximization. Since profitability can affect 
the firm’s ability to repay its loans, these political objectives might lower firm 
performance, resulting in higher cost of debt. Additionally, as discussed in Borisova et al. 
(2012), firms with ownership by central and local governments are characterized by 
worse corporate governance. From the perspective of agency theory, the government 




the residual cash flow claims of state firms are not readily transferable, which might 
impair the residual claimant incentives for monitoring the management (Dewenter and 
Malatesta, 2001). Governments might also lack the skill to supervise the management as 
state firms are under the pressure to hire politically connected people rather than the best 
qualified (Krueger, 1990). In addition, the implicit guarantees by the government could 
limit other stakeholders’ monitoring as they believe that the government will prop up the 
firm if necessary. In line with this, Borisova et al. (2015) also find that state ownership 
can increase moral hazard for managers and provide inefficient monitoring, which results 
in higher cost of debt. 
 
As we mentioned earlier, Chinese state firms receive preferential treatments from the 
government and have better access to capital and resources. In China, the banking system 
is dominated by the state-owned banks which favour state firms (Chen et al., 2011). When 
making decisions, state-owned banks might perceive state firms as lower risk taking while 
consider private firms with high risks. Private banks might focus more on the political 
aspect of the firm than on the profitability. This is because private banks can build up 
political connections with government by providing favourable loan terms to state firms 
(Butler et al., 2009). Therefore, Chinese state-owned firms are usually given more 
generous lending terms, such as fewer covenants, less collateral and a lower cost of debt 
by the creditors (Brandt and Li, 2003). Hence, given the unique financial system and 
prevalence of state ownership in China, we hypothesize the following: 
H1: State firms have a lower cost of debt than private peers. 
4.2.2 State ownership and leverage 
There are two factors militating towards a greater use of debt by state firms. Due to 
implicit government guarantees, state firms usually have better access to debt, and borrow 
at a favourable rate (Dewentwe and Malatesta, 2001). If any investment or project fails, 
the government will try to rescue the company in case of bankruptcy, otherwise, the 




et al. (2012) also find that firms have higher level of leverage after a politician join the 
board of directors. Thus, state firms are usually more leveraged than private peers. In 
empirical studies, Dewentwe and Malatesta (2001) compare profitability, leverage and 
labour intensity of state-owned firms and private firms in Europe. They find that the 
leverage of state-owned firms exceeds that of private firms due to the government 
guarantee. Additionally, the agency problem between shareholders and managers is 
augmented in firms with a higher level of state ownership (ownership concentration) 
because there is a large segregation between cash flow rights and control rights (Du and 
Dai, 2005). While the ultimate owner of state firms is the state, the voting rights belong 
to government bureaucrats whose remuneration is normally not directly linked to the 
performance of the firm that they monitor. As a result, the government is not motivated 
to supervise and control a firm’s management efficiently. Therefore, state-owned firms 
usually use a higher level of debt as a monitoring channel. 
 
On the contrary, since governments have less incentives to monitor and control 
management, managers might take the opportunity to control the firm and tunnel 
resources from the firm. These managers tend to avoid debt to preserve their managerial 
opportunism (Berger et al., 1997). This is because debt is regarded as a disciplinary tool, 
which can constrain excessive spending and impose debt covenants. Additionally, these 
managers might prefer less leverage due to a desire to reduce firm risk in order to protect 
their undiversified human capital (Fama, 1980).  
 
Given the implicit and explicit guarantees of government, state firms enjoy a better access 
to debt and are expected to take excess leverage. From the agency perspective, there are 
conflicting arguments. On the one side, characterized with poor governance, state firms 
usually more debt as an effective governance mechanism to discipline managers. On the 
other side, managers of state firms might prefer less debt to pursue personal managerial 




managers can be hired and fired at the will of the government, which makes the manager 
entrenchment less likely an issue. Further, Chinese state firms receive preferential 
treatments and great support from the government and state-owned banks. Hence, I 
hypothesize that: 
H2a: State firms are more likely to take excess leverage than they should have. 
4.2.3 State ownership and cash holding 
The efficient management of liquidity is essential to a firm’s business. The finance and 
economics literature have identified precautionary and agency problem motives that bring 
firms to hold cash. Keynes (1936) proposes the precautionary motives for cash holdings 
that cash is held as a buffer to hedge unexpected adverse cash flow shocks. Based on this 
perspective, the prior literature suggests that firms with higher cash flow volatility and 
poor access to external finance tend to hold more cash (e.g., Acharya et al., 2007; Bates 
et al., 2009; Han and Qiu, 2007; Mclean, 2011). Additionally, when the financial distress 
is costlier, firms with better investment opportunities are likely to hold more cash (Opler 
et al., 1999). As the cash is held for precautionary purpose, state ownership could have a 
different influence on a firm’s cash holdings. Based on the soft budget constraints (Kornai, 
1979, 1980), government can relax the budget constraints of state firms through 
government subsidies, tax concessions, better access to credit and other indirect supports. 
This preferential access to credit can enable the state-owned firms to obtain more external 
financing. Further, Borisova and Megginson (2011) also argue that the government will 
prop up state-owned firms if necessary, which leads to lower probability of bankruptcy. 
Overall, given the soft budget constraints, state ownership can improve the access to 
finance and provide implicit guarantees against default, which might in turn decease the 
precautionary motive for holding cash. Similarly, Meggionson et al., (2014) find that the 
higher level of state ownership in Chinese privatized firms leads to a strong soft budget 
constraint effect. A decrease in state ownership results in an increase in cash holdings. 
 




managers are more likely to retain more cash in hand rather than increasing the pay-out 
of cash to shareholders (Jensen, 1986). In the presence of managerial discretion, it is 
easier for managers to accumulate more cash to pursue their private interests at the 
expense of shareholders. Several empirical studies have found evidence supporting the 
agency-based motive for holding cash (e.g., Dittmar et al., 2003; Dittmar and Mhrt-Smith, 
2007; Jiang and Lei, 2016; Pinkowitz et al., 2006). In state firms, governments usually 
impose social and political goal, thus the evaluation of the managers might be based on 
the achievements of political goals rather than profit maximization (Shileifer and Vishny, 
1993). Furthermore, governments lack the incentives or skilled people to monitor and 
supervise the management of state firms. Thus, state-owned firms are characterized by 
lower governance quality (Borisova et al., 2012). Given the severe agency problem, 
managers might hold more cash to increase the flexibility to expropriate shareholders’ 
value based on the flexibility hypothesis (Harford et al., 2008; Jensen, 1986). 
 
As we mentioned earlier, Chinese state firms enjoy a preferential status as the government 
provides great support and guarantee for them. With the better access to credit, the 
precautionary motive should be lower for Chinese state-owned firms. In addition, the 
government poses a tight control on the management and can fire the manager in Chinese 
state firms at their will. Therefore, manager entrenchment is less likely an issue. Given 
these facts, we hence address the following hypothesis: 
H2b: State firms are more likely to hold less cash than they should have. 
4.2.4 State ownership, board characteristics and excessive risk   
In state firms, the separation of ownership and control leads to conflicts between 
shareholders and managers. Further, the ownership concentration can also turn the agency 
problem into conflicts between the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. 
However, it is difficult to address the agency problem in state-owned firms as there is one 
more type of agency problem between the state and the controlling owner (Ding et al., 





and to be more inefficient than private firms. Based on agency theory, the board of 
directors is an important internal mechanism to mitigate the agency problem (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). I expect that the board of director play a significant role in controlling 
agency problems in state-owned firms. 
4.2.4.1 Board independence 
It is generally believed that independent directors in the boardroom provide effective 
monitoring and control of firm management (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Additionally, due 
to the reputational concerns as professional referees (Fama, 1980), they contribute their 
expertise and resources to the firm, which can reduce the managerial shirking and 
expropriation of shareholders’ value, as well as increasing firm transparency (Armstrong 
et al., 2014; Byrd and Hickman, 1992).  
 
These monitoring functions performed by independent directors can also signal a high 
quality board. Effective monitoring board might cause debtholders to have a great faith 
in internal governance and thus provide better borrowing terms, such as lower cost of 
debt. In line with this, Anderson et al. (2004) and Fields et al. (2012) both document a 
negative relationship between cost of debt and board independence in US firms. Likewise, 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) also observe that board independence can increase the 
credit rating and translate into significant debt cost saving for US firms. Further, based 
on the flexibility hypothesis, entrenched managers value future flexibility more than 
current overinvestment (Harford et al., 2008). As a result, they are more likely to hold 
large cash reserves when there is less effective monitoring of management. Therefore, 
board independence, which indicates effective board monitoring, can reduce the cash 
holding in firms. Similarly, Kuan et al. (2011) support the flexibility hypothesis, 
documenting a negative relationship between corporate governance (board independence) 
and cash holding in family-controlled firms in Taiwan.  
 




against debt, which could have more generous borrowing terms provided by the creditor. 
On the other side, state-owned firms have more severe agency problems. Managers of 
state firms are more likely to have significant control rights as state-owned firms lack 
effective monitoring mechanisms. As a result, managers in state-owned firms might have 
more incentives to reserve a large cash holding. Since higher proportion of independent 
directors can alleviate the agency problem and signal a high quality board with effective 
monitoring, I expect that board independence can further reduce cost of debt, increase 
leverage and reduce the cash holding in state-owned firms. Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
H3: Board independence is positively related to excess leverage, but negatively 
related to excess cash holdings and an excess cost of debt in state firms. 
4.2.4.2 Board size 
Board size is believed to play an important role in directors’ ability to monitor and control 
the management. Previous literature has identified two strands of argument regarding the 
role of board size. On the one side, resource dependency theory suggests that the board 
of directors is the provider of advice and counsel, legitimacy and communication 
channels (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Large board is beneficial to the firm as it brings a 
large pool of critical resources and expertise into the firm, which can increase information 
quality and create an effective external linkage (Dalton et al., 1999).   
 
On the other side, Jensen (1993) argues that large boards that have more than seven or 
eight directors tend to function less effectively but are more controllable for CEOs. 
Additionally, as the board becomes larger, the monitoring offered by the directors might 
become less effective because of the free rider problem (Raheja, 2005). Similarly, 
Eisenberg et al. (1997) also state that small boards can monitor managers more effectively, 
while large boards are often unwieldy. Based on some social psychology theories, a large 
board with different perspectives and cognitive abilities may generate conflicts among 
different groups of directors (Williams and O’Reilly, 1996). The benefits of monitoring 




making processes (Yermark, 1996). 
 
Literature on board size and debt policy or cash holdings is scarce. Anderson et al. (2004) 
focus on US firms and find that large boards could increase the level of managerial 
monitoring and reduce the cost of debt financing. Similarly, Fields et al. (2012) find that 
firms with a higher board quality (larger board) are more likely to borrow at lower interest 
rate and have fewer loan covenants. So far, no previous studies have investigated the 
impact of board size on cost of debt, leverage and cash holdings in state-owned firms. 
Under the pressure to hire politically connected people rather than the best qualified, state 
firms might lack the skill to advise and monitor the management and have more severe 
agency problems, such as increased moral hazard and inefficient monitoring. Since board 
size can be seen as a “double-edged sword”, the effect of board size on excess leverage 
and on excess cash holdings becomes a matter of empirical investigation in Chinese state 
firms. Thus, I hypothesize that: 
H4a: Board size is positively related to excess leverage, but negatively related to 
excess cash holdings and excess cost of debt in state firms. 
H4b: Board size is negatively related to excess leverage, but positively related to 
excess cash holdings and excess cost of debt in state firms. 
4.3 Institutional background 
It is of importance for firms to get access to finance in transition economies. In China, 
the financial system mainly consists of the banking sector and anequity market. In 1990 
and 1991, the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange were 
established, providing a new channel for Chinese firms to access the capital. The stock 
market initially aimed to push through the enterprise reform, involving the partial 
privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). A major feature of the reform is the 
state’s retention of a controlling stake in listed firms. This controlling shareholding is 




In 2005, the split-share structure reform began. The reform allowed non-tradable state 
shares to be exchanged for tradable private shares. This reform was completed in 2007, 
resulting in increased proportion of tradable shares and decreased state-owned shares. 
However, despite the reform, the government still has tight controls over Chinese listed 
firms. 
 
However, the Chinese banking system appears to be much larger than its equity market 
and dominates the financial system. The Chinese banking sector has experienced a series 
of reforms over the last forty years and has surpassed that of the Eurozone to become the 
world’s largest by size. At the end of 2015, there were RMB 99.3 trillion (USD 15.18 
trillion) bank loans, about 9 times the size of the corporate bond market (China Banking 
Regulatory Commission, 2015). This suggests that Chinese firms rely heavily on the bank 
loans for their external financing. In China, the banking system is still dominated by state-
owned banks which favour state-owned companies (Chen et al., 2011; Cull and Xu, 2000). 
State-owned firms are usually given more generous lending terms, such as fewer 
covenants, less collateral and a lower cost of debt by the creditors (Brandt and Li, 2003). 
An article in Reuters (May 10, 2016) contends that debt owned by state-owned firms in 
China is higher than any other rated nation. In addition, Chinese state firms have been 
experiencing rising leverage and shrinking profits. 
 
Furthermore, Chinese firms have experienced deep reform in corporate governance in 
recent years. The Corporate Law requires firms to establish a two-tire board structure, 
including a board of directors and a supervisory board. As the Company Law does not 
subject supervisors to any legal liability, the supervisory board, so far, seems to be more 
decorative and is regarded as a “nominal organ” in China. China Securities Regulatory 
Committee issued a series of guidance on corporate governance, especially on board of 
directors, since 2003 stating that boards should consist of one-third of independent 




owned firms, the appointment of directors and top management is influenced by the 
government. Thus, it could be the case that some directors and top executives are 
politically-connected with limited business skills. As a result, state-owned firms are 
usually characterized by severe agency problems. 
 
 4.4 Data and methodology 
4.4.1 Data and sample selection 
The data are mainly obtained from the China Securities Market and Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) database and WIND database. In 2002, Chinese Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) and the State Economic and Trade Commission jointly promulgated 
Corporate Governance Principles for Chinese Listed Companies. The guidance 
strengthened the disclosure requirement of corporate governance for listed firms, 
including directors’ information and ownership structure. Therefore, I choose 2002 as the 
sample beginning year. 
 
The initial sample starts with all Chinese firms listed on either Shanghai Stock Exchange 
or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange between 2002 and 2015. I then apply a number of 
screenings. First, following the convention in the literature, I exclude financial firms 
which have unique accounting characteristics. Second, I only retain firms that disclose 
available information on debt financing, ownership structure and directors’ characteristics 
(e.g., age and gender). Third, I further exclude companies that fail to have at least two 
observations during the study period. After the filtering procedures, the final sample 
consists of 19,046 firm-year observations, pertaining to 2,294 firms. 
4.4.2 Model specification 
4.4.2.1 Cost of debt and excess risk taking in state firms 




peers and whether the lower borrowing cost in state firms induces excessive risk-taking 
in debt financing decisions. In this study, following Wang et al., (2008), a state-owned 
firm is defined as a firm whose largest shareholder is the government or state-owned 
enterprise. The main challenge is to construct the measure of the excessive risk in state-
owned firms. Since more leveraged firms are riskier and firms with a higher level of cash 
are expected to reduce the perceived risk as they are more likely to service their debts, 
(Bradley and Chen, 2015; Bliss and Gul, 2012), I follow Gao et al. (2013) to construct 
the measure of excess leverage, excess cash holdings and excess cost of debt in state-
owned firms. To obtain the excess risk, I proceed in two steps, as shown below. 
 
First, I employ the propensity score matching method to identify a sample of private firms 
that show no significant differences in financial information and corporate governance 
characteristics to state-owned firms. In this setup, I first assign the treatment condition – 
inclusion in the group of state-owned companies in a particular year. Then I employ a 
logit model to estimate the probability that a firm becomes a state-owned company on a 
comprehensive range of variables, including board level characteristics (e.g., Duality, 
Independent director, Board size, Director age, Female) and firm-level characteristics 
(e.g., Size, ROA, Cash flow, Current ratio, Sale growth, Listed, Book to market ratio).25 
In addition, I also control for year fixed effects and industry fixed effects. Next, I construct 
matched sample based on probability (i.e., the propensity score) of being a state-owned 
company estimated from the logit model. I adopt the one-to-one nearest neighbor 
approach to match each state-owned company in the treated sub-sample with a private 
firm in the control sub-sample based on the predicted propensity score.26 Furthermore, I 
require the maximum difference between the propensity score of each state-owned firm 
 
25 Following Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), I include all available variables that not only affect the status 
of state-owned company but also our outcome variable, cost of debt. 
26 For robustness check, I also employ other matching methods, including five to one nearest matching, 




and that of the matched peer to be less than 0.005 in absolute value.27 Finally, I obtain 
2,191 observations from the treated sub-sample (state firms) and 2,141 observations from 
the control sub-sample (private firms). After the matching, I conduct several diagnostic 
tests to check the matching balance (See Appendix 4.1). The results suggest that the 
balancing property is satisfied for the matched sample of state-owned and private firms. 
 
Second, I apply each individual state-owned firm characteristics to the regression models 
(1), (2) and (3) estimated using only the matched private firm sub-sample and obtain the 
predicted leverage, cash holdings and cost of debt for each individual state-owned firm. 
Therefore, excess leverage, excess cash holdings and excess cost of debt are the difference 
between a firm’s actual leverage, cash holdings and cost of debt and predicted leverage 
cash holdings and cost of debt.  
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Where " is the firm identifier and t is the year. Models (1), (2) and (3) are all estimated 
by the fixed-effects estimator, which is justified using the Hausman Test. :  is an 
individual-specific effect, which varies across firms, and 9. is the year fixed effect. ; 
denotes to the error term, which varies both among banks and periods of time. All of the 
independent variables are one-year lagged. Vectors	7, [	*+U	^	consist of different firm 
level control variables based on previous studies.28 The reported standard errors are 
adjusted for potential heteroscedasticity.  
 
 
27 Our results remain robust when I change the maximum difference in propensity score to 0.01 and 
0.001. 
28 Vector X and Z includes Duality, Independent Directors, Board size, Lnage, Female, Leverage, Book to 
market, Cash flow, Current ratio, Size, ROA, Sale growth and Listed. Vector Y includes Duality, 
Independent Directors, Board size, Lnage, Female, Book to market, Cash flow, Current ratio, Size, ROA, 




4.4.2.2 Board characteristics and excessive risks in state-owned companies 
To estimate the impacts of board characteristics on excessive risk in state-owned 
companies, I employ the following model (4) specified as: 
ef,'TT	#"Tg	"+U",*@)#T-,. = α +	 1hi)*#U	,ℎ*#*,@'#"T@",Th,-,.56	
h
6
+	7-,.568 + 9.		+ :- 
+ ;-,.                                                4 
Similar to models (1), (2) and (3), model (4) is estimated by the fixed-effects estimator, 
which is also justified using the Hausman Test. : is an individual-specific effect, which 
varies across firms, and 9. is the year fixed effect. ; denotes to the error term, which 
varies both among banks and periods of time. ef,'TT	#"Tg	"+U",*@)#T is captured by 
the excess leverage, excess cash holdings and excess cost of debt. 
i)*#U	,ℎ*#*,@'#"T@",T  includes a vector of board variables. The key interest of 
coefficient 1h  captures the impact of board characteristics on excessive risk-taking 
behavior.  
4.4.3 Variables description 
4.4.3.1 Excess leverage, excess cash holdings and excess cost of debt 
In most existing studies (Anderson et al., 2003; Borisova et al., 2015; Chakravarty. and 
Rutherford, 2017), the cost of debt is defined as the spread between the corporate bond 
yield and a benchmark. However, since the corporate bond market is underdeveloped in 
China and other emerging economies, we follow Kim et al. (2011), Ma et al. (2017) and 
Sanchez-Ballesta and Garcia-Meca (2011) to measure cost of debt as interest expenses 
for the year divided by the average short-term and long-term debt during the year (Cost 
of debt). Following Dong et al. (2010) and Halling et al. (2017), I measure leverage as 
the ratio of debt to total assets (Leverage). Additionally, cash holdings is cash and cash 
equivalents scaled by assets (Cash holdings) (Jiang and Lie, 2016; Gao et al., 2013). In 
this paper, excessive risk indicators in state firms are defined as follow: 
Excess leverage = Actual leverage – Predicted leverage 




Excess cost of debt = Actual cost of debt – Predicted cost of debt 
4.4.3.2 Board characteristics variables 
Following the existing literature (e.g., Anderson et al., 2004; Liang et al., 2013), I focus 
on board independence and board size. Board independence is measured by the faction 
of independent directors (Independent director) who have strong incentives to monitor 
the management (Liu et al., 2015). For consistency with previous studies, Board size is 
the natural log of the total number of directors on the board. Additionally, I also include 
other board level variables that might affect the outcome. The dual position of the 
chairman of the firm and the CEO of the firm is captured by a dummy variable Duality. 
With respect to directors’ characteristics, Director age is the natural log of the average 
age of all directors. I also include the percentage of female directors (Female director) 
who are more diligent monitors than male directors (Adams and Ferreira., 2009). 
4.4.3.3 Control variables 
Based on prior research (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003; Bliss and Gul, 2012; Chakravarty, S. 
and Rutherford, 2017; Ma et al., 2017), a set of control variables that might affect the cost 
of debt, leverage and cash holdings is included.29 Since large firms are associated with 
lower cost of debt and are perceived as less risky because of increased asset 
diversification and greater financial strength (Zou and Adam,2008), I control for firm size 
which is measured as the natural log of the total number of employees (Size). ROA is the 
net income divided by the total assets, reflecting how efficiently the firm produces profits 
through the given assets and their ability to repay debt. Cash flow is the ratio of the net 
operating cash flow scaled by total assets. Book to market ratio (BM) is generally 
regarded as the measure for the growth prospects of the firm. Current ratio is the defined 
as current assets to current liabilities, reflecting the firm’s ability to meet its obligation 
and being negatively related to cost of debt. Sales growth is defined as the change in sales 
 
29 Models (1) and (2) include three separate sets of control variables that might affect the cost of debt, 




revenue from the previous year scaled by sales revenue in the previous year. Tangibility 
is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. I also control for list age (List), the natural 
log of the total listed years of the firm. 
4.4.4.4 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.1 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis, broken 
down by all firms, state-owned firms and private firms. On average, state-owned firms 
pay a significantly lower cost of debt (0.500 percentage points lower) than private firms, 
which is in line with previous studies (e.g., Shailer and Wang, 2015). State-owned firms 
are more leveraged than private firms, indicating that state-owned firms prefer a risker 
capital structure. The average leverage ratio of state-owned firms is 0.262 which is 
significantly higher than that of private firms (0.232). I also find that state-owned 
companies tend to hold less cash (3.000 percentage points lower) than private firms on 
average.  
<Insert Table 4.1 about here> 
With respect to board characteristics, CEO duality occurs in nearly 20.1% of the state-
owned firms and 23.8% of private firms. Around 34.4% of independent directors are 
serving on the board in state-owned firms, while the figure is 36.3% in private firms. The 
results are comparable to Shailer and Wang (2015) who find that state-owned firms have 
less CEO duality and independent directors. State-owned companies, on average, have a 
significantly larger board size than private peers, which is similar to Jiang and Zeng 
(2014). I also observe that the average age of directors of state-owned firms is 48.075 
which is similar to that of private firms (48.424). The average ratio of female directors is 
15.7% in state-owned firms, which is around 5.4% lower than that of private firms.  
 
In terms of financial variables, the average cash flow ratio is 0.049 in state-owned 
companies, while the figure is 0.038 in private firms. In line with previous studies (e.g., 
Shailer and Wang, 2015), state-owned firms, on average, are significantly larger than 





state-owned companies are less profitable with a lower average ROA (0.025), which is 
comparable to the figure in Jiang and Zeng (2014). This might imply that government 
impose some non-profit-maximizing social and political objectives on state-owned firms. 
I also find that state-owned firms have a lower average current ratio but a higher sales 
growth than private peers. Additionally, on average state-owned firms have been listed 
for nearly 8.943 years, while the figure is significantly larger (9.709 years) in private 
firms. 
4.5 Empirical analysis 
4.5.1 Cost of debt in state-firms 
In the first part of the analysis, we examine whether state-owned firms have lower of cost 
of debt by employing the propensity score matching method. Table 4.2 reports the results 
of propensity score matching estimation. The first is the one-to-one nearest neighbor 
matching estimator. A significant difference in cost of debt between state-owned firms 
and matched private firms is found. Consistent with H1, state-owned companies’ lower 
cost of debt, at 3.7 percentage points less than private peers, which is also comparable 
with the study on Chinese firms by Shailer and Wang (2015) and the strand of literature 
in non-China samples (Borisova and Megginson, 2011; Sanchez-Ballesta and Garcia-
Meca, 2011). 
<Insert Table 4.2 about here> 
The result is in line with the government guarantee argument and preferential treatment 
argument. First, from the political perspective, governments usually impose explicit and 
implicit guarantees against the debt default of the firms and it is less likely that the 
government will allow the firm to fail. However, if a state-owned firm were to face 
bankruptcy, debtholders would expect that the government will prop up the firm and 
satisfy their claims (Borisova and Megginson, 2011). These implicit guarantees are likely 
to reduce the perceived default risk of state-owned firms, which further decrease the risk 




a lower cost of debt (Borisova et al., 2015; Borisova and Megginson, 2011; Faccio et al., 
2006; Sanchez-Ballesta and Garcia-Meca, 2011). Second, since the corporate bond 
market is underdeveloped in China, firms tend to rely on bank loans. Although the 
Chinese banks claim that all borrowers are treated equally if they have the same level of 
credibility, in fact, state-owned firms usually receive more generous borrowing terms, 
such as large share of credits and a lower cost of debt, by large state banks (Dong et al., 
2016). This can be explained by the special bank-firm relationship in China, whereby 
state-owned banks used to have a closer relationship with state-owned firms (Allen et al., 
2005). 
 
Additionally, I also employ other alternative matching estimators. In Table 4.4, the second 
one is a five-to-one nearest neighbor method (i.e., we select five matches for each state-
owned firm). The third matching algorithm utilizes all the potential matches and uses 
kernel weighting according to the distance between the propensity score of the treated 
subject and that of the matching observation (Heckman et al., 1998). The last method is 
radius matching which matches all the available comparison observations that lie within 
the caliper (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). Table 4.4 shows that the results remain the same 
when the other three matching estimators are applied. In detail, a significantly lower cost 
of debt is apparent in state-owned firms than private firms. 
4.5.2 Do state-owned firms take excessive risks in debt financing decisions? 
Given the lower borrowing costs, I aim to estimate whether state firms take excess risk 
in the debt financing decisions. After propensity score matching, we obtain a matched 
sample of state-owned and private firms. I use this matched private firm sample to 
estimate the excessive risk in state-owned companies. Table 4.5 reports the estimated 
coefficients of cost of debt, leverage and cash holding based on the sub-sample of 
matched private firms in columns (1) to (3), respectively. Based on the coefficient 
estimates in Table 4.3, I predict the cost of debt, leverage and cash holding for each state-




debt of state-owned firms, as shown in Table 4.4 and Figure 4.2. 
<Insert Table 4.3 about here> 
<Insert Table 4.4 about here> 
<Insert Figure 4.2 about here> 
The results show that state firms are more likely to take excessive risks in debt financing 
decisions. On average, more than half of the state-owned companies have positive excess 
leverage, negative excess cash holdings and a negative excess cost of debt, which 
supports hypotheses H2a and H2b. More specifically, the average excess cost of debt, 
excess leverage and excess cash holdings are -0.002, 0.019 and -0.016, respectively. This 
suggests that more than half of state-owned companies tend to have lower cost of debt, 
higher leverage and less cash holding than they would have were they a private firm.  
 
The results support the government implicit guarantee and soft budget constraints 
argument. Government ownership can offer an implicit guarantee against the debt default 
of the firm. Compared to private firms, state-owned firms usually pursue social and 
political goals at the expense of profit, such as maintaining excessive employment, 
promoting domestic investments and developing key industries that are beneficial to 
society. Given these political factors, governments are unwilling to allow state-owned 
firms to fail. Therefore, such implicit guarantees by the governments improve the access 
to finance and facilitate state firms borrowing, regardless of default. Additionally, the 
government can relax the budge constraint of state firms through government subsidies, 
tax concession, better access to credit and other indirect methods, as well as reducing the 
precautionary motive for holding cash in state firms. 
4.5.3 Board characteristics and excessive risk in state-owned companies 
Given the excessive risk-taking in the debt financing decisions in state-owned firms, I 
further estimate whether the board characteristics might affect the excess leverage, excess 
cash holdings and excess cost of debt for state firms in Table 4.5. 




In line with the hypothesis H2, the Independent director imposes a negative impact on 
the excess cost of debt but positive effects on excess leverage. In particular, one 
percentage point increase in the percentage of independent directors can lead to a decrease 
in the excess cost of debt by approximately 0.024 percentage points but it can increase 
the excess leverage by around 0.103 percentage points. In other words, state firms with 
more independent directors are more likely to have a lower level of cost of debt and a 
higher level of leverage compared to otherwise similar private peers. This is comparable 
with previous studies (e.g., Anderson et al., 2004; Bradley and Chen, 2015; Fields et al., 
2012; Rahaman and Zaman, 2012). Independent directors can provide the best monitoring 
and control of firm management (Fama and Jesen, 1983). Creditors might benefit from 
the monitoring functions of independent directors, such as alleviating the managerial 
shirking and improving the transparency, which, in turn, reduces the firms’ cost of 
borrowing (Lorca et al., 2011). Therefore, in state-owned firms which already have an 
implicit guarantee on debt from the government, board independence can further lower 
their cost of debt financing. However, higher board independence encourages excessive 
managerial risk-taking, suggesting that in state-owned firms, independent directors act in 
the interests of shareholders (the government). 
 
With respect to board size, the coefficients are significant and positive in columns (1), (2) 
and (3). In detail, a one percentage point increase in board size can augment Excess cost 
of debt, Excess leverage and Excess cash holding by 0.012 percentage points, 0.034 
percentage points and 0.023 percentage points, respectively. I can find that state firms 
with larger boards tend to have higher borrowing cost. This is partially in line with 
previous studies (Lorca et al., 2010). Large boards have difficulties in coordinating all the 
directors, which might lead to free-rider problems (Jensen, 1993). Thus, large boards are 
less effective because the benefits of monitoring capacities could be offset by the 
incremental cost of communication and problems in the decision-making process 





Additionally, state firms with larger boards are more likely to have a lower level of 
leverage, which indicates that board size can reduce excessive managerial risk-taking in 
state firms. Due to the increased cost of debt, state-firms with large board size might hold 
more cash in hand to buffer the uncertainty and reduce the probability of default. In this 
way, a large board is beneficial to debtholders in state firms. However, the positive 
coefficient of Board size on Excess leverage indicates that state firms tend to take 
excessive managerial risks in the form of excessive leverage when they have a large group 
of directors, which is in contrast to the findings of previous studies. This might be due to 
the fact that in state firms, smaller boards are more likely to choose a lower leverage ratio 
in order to alleviate the negative effect associated with debt on risky investment.  
 
With respect to other board variables, Director age poses negative effects on the Excess 
cost of debt, Excess leverage and Excess cash holding in all specifications (significance 
level at 1% level). Female is positively related to leverage deviation, which suggests that 
state firms with higher percentage of female directors tend to take excessive risk. In terms 
of other firm characteristics, Leverage decreases the deviation in cost of debt 
(significance at 10% level) and cash holding (significance at 1% level). Size and the age 
of being listed (List) both have a negative effect on the deviation of cash holding, 
suggesting a higher level of managerial risk-taking. However, Cash flow can increase the 
cash holding difference at the 1% significance level. Additionally, ROA, Cash flow and 
Current ratio all pose a negative influence on leverage deviation but Book to market ratio 
exerts a positive impact. 
4.6. Robustness 
To re-estimate the relationship between board characteristics and excessive risk-taking in 
debt financing decisions in model (4), we employ the alternative measures of excess risk 




we use the difference between the natural logarithm of actual cost of debt, actual leverage 
and actual cash holding and the natural logarithm of their predicted values. Table 4.6 
shows the results of the robustness check. In line with the main results in Table 4.5, the 
percentage of independent directors is negatively related to the excess cost of debt but 
positively associated with excess leverage. Additionally, I also find a consistently positive 
relationship between board size and the excess cost of debt.  
<Insert Table 4.6 about here> 
4.7 Conclusion 
This paper extends the existing literature on debt financing and state ownership by 
providing the first empirical evidence regarding the impact of board characteristics on 
excessive risk taking in debt financing decisions in state firms. To address the issue of 
excessive risk, I follow Gao et al. (2013) to predict the leverage, cash holdings and cost 
of debt for state-owned firms and then define the excess leverage, excess cash holdings 
and excess cost of debt as the difference between their actual values and predicted values. 
 
The results show that state firms have a lower cost of debt due to the implicit government 
guarantees. I also find that state firms tend to take excessive risks in debt financing 
decisions. In particular, there is much evidence of excess leverage, cash holding shortfall 
and a lower cost of debt in state firms compared to otherwise similar private firms. 
Although governments direct state firms to pursue non-profit-maximizing social and 
political goals, this study suggests that the implicit guarantees play a significant role in 
Chinese state firms. With the government standing on their side, state firms have more 
favorable borrowing rate and then have excessive leverage. Furthermore, the implicit 
government guarantee can also decrease the precautionary motive for state firms to hold 
more cash. 
 




further to estimate whether board characteristics can have influence on excessive risk in 
state firms. The results show that the proportion of independent directors is negatively 
associated with the excess cost of debt but positively related to excess leverage. However, 
board size has a positive impact on excess cost of debt, excess leverage and excess cash 
holdings. I can interpret the results from the agency perspective and implicit guarantee 
arguments. First, board independence signals an effective monitoring board, which 
reduces the risk premium required by the creditor. In addition, state firms with board 
independence can have a lower cost of debt and hence become excessively leveraged. 
Second, a larger board tend to have less effective monitoring due to the free rider problem 
and is more likely to generate conflicts in the boardroom. Therefore, creditors may require 
higher risk premium, resulting in higher cost of debt. Additionally, the state firms have 
inefficient monitoring as the managers are more likely to be politically appointed rather 
than best qualified. Thus, a larger board with less effective monitoring in state firms can 
weaken the agency problem and further increase the level of cash holding to exceed the 
target value. In terms of leverage, a larger board can improve the information quality by 
providing valuable and comprehensive resources for the board, signalling a higher board 
quality and receiving fewer loan covenants. Therefore, a larger board in state firms can 
lead to excessive leverage. 
 
These findings provide useful guidance for regulators, policymakers, and directors 
concerning debt financing and cash policies and shed light on the direction of further 
corporate governance reform. In particular, the findings suggest that, state firms receive 
more preferential treatments than private firms due to implicit guarantees. By 
highlighting the benefits of government control in Chinese firms, the results also suggest 
that state firms take excessive managerial risk and board characteristics can further 
increase the excessive risk. Under the current weak corporate governance system in China, 





Figure 4.1 Matching quality 
 













Figure 4.2 Distribution of difference in cost of debt, leverage and cash holding 
 
Notes: This figure shows distribution of excess cost of debt, excess leverage and excess cash holdings 














Table 4.1 Summary statistics 





Mean Std Mean Std 
Ln(cost of debt) -2.968 0.517 -2.927 0.568 -0.041*** 
Leverage 0.262 0.163 0.232 0.161 0.030*** 
Cash holding 0.146 0.098 0.162 0.109 -0.016*** 
Duality 0.201 0.401 0.238 0.426 -0.037*** 
Independent director 0.344 0.057 0.363 0.051 -0.020*** 
Board size 2.254 0.190 2.180 0.175 0.074*** 
Director age 3.871 0.068 3.878 0.067 -0.007*** 
Female 0.157 0.134 0.212 0.158 -0.055*** 
Size 7.702 1.257 7.501 1.209 0.201*** 
ROA 0.025 0.055 0.030 0.054 -0.005*** 
Cash flow 0.049 0.070 0.038 0.070 0.011*** 
Current ratio 1.396 0.935 1.735 1.277 -0.340*** 
Sale growth 0.202 0.397 0.170 0.395 0.032*** 
List 2.014 0.648 2.033 0.750 -0.019* 
Book to market 1.153 0.812 0.934 0.762 0.218*** 
Notes: This table compares descriptive statistics for key variables between state firms and private firms. The sample is an unbalanced 


























Table 4.2 Average treatment effect for the treated (ATT) 
Matching algorithms Difference of ATT S.E. T-value 
One-to-one Nearest Neighbour matching -0.037 0.017 -2.23 
Five-to-one Nearest Neighbour matching -0.038 0.014 -2.61 
Kernel matching -0.031 0.014 -2.21 
Radius matching -0.030 0.013 -2.21 






































Table 4.3 prediction of parameters based on matched private firms 
                          Cost of debt Leverage Cash holdings 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Duality                   -0.001 -0.004 -0.006 
                          (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) 
Independent director      0.072 0.018 -0.027 
                          (0.062) (0.118) (0.069) 
Board size                -0.014 0.007 -0.027 
                          (0.011) (0.034) (0.029) 
Director age              0.018 0.014 0.066 
                          (0.032) (0.088) (0.069) 
Female                    -0.012 -0.058 -0.001 
                          (0.012) (0.038) (0.030) 
Size                      0.003 0.039*** 0.004 
                          (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) 
ROA                       0.016 -0.260*** 0.223*** 
                          (0.016) (0.045) (0.044) 
Cash flow                 -0.007*** -0.037*** 0.050*** 
                          (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) 
Current ratio             0.000 0.008 0.007 
                          (0.002) (0.007) (0.005) 
Sales growth              -0.047** -0.251*** 0.090* 
                          (0.020) (0.063) (0.051) 
List                      0.002 0.012 0.001 
                          (0.002) (0.010) (0.006) 
Book to market            -0.025** 0.045* -0.010 
                          (0.011) (0.027) (0.025) 
Leverage                  -0.078***  0.030 
                          (0.013)  (0.032) 
Tangibility               -0.082  
                           (0.091)  
N                         1,950 1,950 1,926 
r2                        0.147 0.245 0.244 
Notes: This table reports the regression results of prediction of cost of debt, leverage and cash holdings based on the matched private 
firms. The results of cost of debt, leverage and cash holdings are presented in columns (1) to (3), respectively. Board Size is the natural 
log of board size. The dummy variable Duality is equal to one if the bank governor is also the chairman of the board, and zero 
otherwise. Independent directors is the percentage of independent directors. Female is the percentage of female directors. Director 
age is the natural log of average age of the board. ROA is the net income divided by the total assets. Cash flow is the ratio of net 
operating cash flow scaled by total assets. Book to market ratio (BM) is book value of the firm to the market value of the firm. Current 
ratio is the defined as the current assets to its current liability. Sales growth is defined as the change in sales revenue from previous 
year scaled by sales revenue in the previous year. List is the natural log of the total listed years of the firm. Tangibility is the ratio of 
tangible assets to total assets. It employs the panel fixed effect estimator with lagged independent variables. Constant and year 
dummies are included into the estimation but not reported. The robust error of each coefficient is shown in parentheses. *, **, *** 











Table 4.4 Summary statistics of excess cost of debt, leverage and cash holdings 
 Excess cost of debt Excess leverage Excess cash holdings 
 Positive Negative Total Positive Negative Total Positive Negative Total 
Mean 0.020 -0.022 -0.002 0.129 -0.100 0.019 0.068 -0.057 -0.006 
Min 0.000 -0.076 -0.076 0.000 -0.250 -0.250 0.000 -0.166 -0.166 
Max 0.141 -0.000 0.141 0.141 -0.000 0.393 0.268 -0.000 0.268 
N 2,585 2,861 5,446 2,910 2,707 5,617 2,208 3,192 5,400 
Notes: This table presents the descriptive statistics regarding excess cost of debt, excess leverage and excess cash holdings in state-
owned firms over the period from 2002 to 2015. The table provides the mean, minimum and maximum values of positive, negative 




































Table 4.5 Excess risk and board characteristics in state-owned companies 
                          Excess cost of debt Excess leverage Excess cash holdings 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Independent director      -0.024** 0.103** -0.014 
                          (0.011) (0.046) (0.029) 
Board size                0.012*** 0.034* 0.023* 
                          (0.004) (0.020) (0.013) 
Duality                   0.000 -0.002 0.004 
                          (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) 
Director age              -0.026* -0.118* -0.079* 
                          (0.015) (0.065) (0.042) 
Female                    0.009 0.051** -0.011 
                          (0.007) (0.025) (0.017) 
Size                      0.000 -0.001 -0.006** 
                          (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) 
ROA                       -0.010 -0.087* -0.001 
                          (0.012) (0.046) (0.032) 
Cash flow                 0.007 -0.185*** 0.093*** 
                          (0.008) (0.028) (0.021) 
Current ratio             -0.003** -0.008** 0.004 
                          (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) 
Sales growth              -0.001 0.002 0.001 
                          (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) 
List                      0.019*** -0.016 -0.023*** 
                          (0.003) (0.011) (0.008) 
Book to market            0.002** 0.030*** 0.000 
                          (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) 
Leverage                  -0.013*  -0.072*** 
                          (0.007)  (0.017) 
Tangibility               0.010  
                           (0.061)  
N                         4,038 4,136 3,996 
r2                        0.066 0.116 0.087 
Notes: This table reports the regression results of the effects of board characteristics on excessive managerial risk in state firms. The 
results of the excessive risk indicators measured by the deviation in cost of debt, leverage and cash holdings are presented in columns 
(1) to (3), respectively. Board Size is the natural log of board size. The dummy variable Duality is equal to one if the bank governor 
is also the chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. Independent directors is the percentage of independent directors. Female is the 
percentage of female directors. Director age is the natural log of average age of the board. ROA is the net income divided by the total 
assets. Cash flow is the ratio of net operating cash flow scaled by total assets. Book to market ratio (BM) is book value of the firm to 
the market value of the firm. Current ratio is the defined as the current assets to its current liability. Sales growth is defined as the 
change in sales revenue from previous year scaled by sales revenue in the previous year. List is the natural log of the total listed years 
of the firm. Tangibility is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. It employs the panel fixed effect estimator with lagged independent 
variables. Constant and year dummies are included into the estimation but not reported. The robust error of each coefficient is shown 













Table 4.6 Excess risk and board characteristics in state-owned companies: 
robustness 
 Excess cost of debt Excess leverage Excess cash holdings 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Independent director      -0.517** 0.468* -0.060 
                          (0.230) (0.277) (0.248) 
Board size                0.172** 0.108 0.204* 
                          (0.080) (0.124) (0.105) 
Duality                   0.015 -0.056 0.038 
                          (0.028) (0.040) (0.028) 
Director age              -0.502* -0.742 -0.578* 
                          (0.303) (0.504) (0.323) 
Female                    0.169 0.179 -0.154 
                          (0.121) (0.185) (0.132) 
Size                      0.022 0.026 -0.058** 
                          (0.027) (0.038) (0.023) 
ROA                       -0.177 -0.482 0.196 
                          (0.218) (0.312) (0.274) 
Cash flow                 0.141 -1.078*** 0.596*** 
                          (0.173) (0.183) (0.148) 
Current ratio             -0.053** -0.103*** 0.031 
                          (0.021) (0.027) (0.023) 
Sales growth              -0.023 -0.017 0.014 
                          (0.019) (0.027) (0.020) 
List                      0.358*** -0.084 -0.197*** 
                          (0.051) (0.075) (0.053) 
Book to market            0.036* 0.130*** -0.002 
                          (0.019) (0.027) (0.020) 
Leverage                  0.044  -0.573*** 
                          (0.139)  (0.131) 
Tangibility                0.102  
                           (0.434)  
N                         4,033 4,107 3,979 
r2                        0.065 0.080 0.078 
Notes: This table reports the robust regression results of the effects of board characteristics on excessive managerial risk in state firms 
where the excess values is calculated by the log difference between the predicted value and actual value. The results of the excessive 
risk indicators measured by the deviation in cost of debt, leverage and cash holdings are presented in columns (1) to (3), respectively. 
Board Size is the natural log of board size. The dummy variable Duality is equal to one if the bank governor is also the chairman of 
the board, and zero otherwise. Independent directors is the percentage of independent directors. Female is the percentage of female 
directors. Director age is the natural log of average age of the board. ROA is the net income divided by the total assets. Cash flow is 
the ratio of net operating cash flow scaled by total assets. Book to market ratio (BM) is book value of the firm to the market value of 
the firm. Current ratio is the defined as the current assets to its current liability. Sales growth is defined as the change in sales revenue 
from previous year scaled by sales revenue in the previous year. List is the natural log of the total listed years of the firm. Tangibility 
is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. It employs the panel fixed effect estimator with lagged independent variables. Constant 
and year dummies are included into the estimation but not reported. The robust error of each coefficient is shown in parentheses. *, 









Appendix 4.1 Matching quality  
After the matching, we conduct the diagnostic tests to check the matching balance. First, 
we re-estimate the logit model for the matched sample. The results are shown in column 
(2) of Appendix 4.1a. All the coefficients are not statistically significant, which indicates 
that there are no distinguishable trends in cost of debt. Additionally, the magnitudes of all 
the coefficients in column (2) are smaller than those in column (1). This suggest that the 
propensity matching rules out the observable difference other than the difference in 
ownership. Second, we compare the state-owned firms and matched private firms by 
testing the difference in each observable characteristics. The reports are presented in 
Appendix 4.1b. None of the difference in the mean of the observable variables is 
statistically significant, suggesting that the state-owned firms are indistinguishable to 
matched private firms other than the ownership structure. Third, since the treated and 
matched control subjects with the same propensity score should have identical 
distribution (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983), we also plot the density estimates for the 
distribution of matched and unmatched sample in Figure 4.1. The overlapped propensity 
score indicates that the balancing property is satisfied for our matched sample of state-


















Appendix 4.1a Probability of being a state-owned company 
                              Being a state-owned company    
 Pre-match Post-match 
 (1) (2) 
Duality -0.272*** 0.031 
 (0.086) (0.108) 
Independent director -0.300 0.153 
 (0.776) (0.897) 
Board size 0.510** -0.094 
 (0.241) (0.271) 
Director age 4.772*** -0.346 
 (0.682) (0.774) 
Female -0.458 -0.108 
 (0.285) (0.329) 
Size 0.166*** -0.023 
 (0.041) (0.044) 
ROA -0.275 -0.320 
 (0.650) (0.764) 
Cash flow -0.633 -0.042 
 (0.422) (0.559) 
Current ratio 0.086** -0.005 
 (0.040) (0.049) 
Sale growth 0.144** 0.016 
 (0.068) (0.083) 
List 0.342*** -0.043 
 (0.066) (0.073) 
Book to market 0.068 0.055 
 (0.055) (0.065) 
Year dummy Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes 
N 13,202 4,327 
Notes: This table reports the regression results of the logit model where the dependent variable is the probability of being a state-
owned firm. Column (1) presents the results before the matching while column (2) shows the results after the matching. Board Size is 
the natural log of board size. The dummy variable Duality is equal to one if the bank governor is also the chairman of the board, and 
zero otherwise. Independent directors is the percentage of independent directors. Female is the percentage of female directors. Director 
age is the natural log of average age of the board. ROA is the net income divided by the total assets. Cash flow is the ratio of net 
operating cash flow scaled by total assets. Book to market ratio (BM) is book value of the firm to the market value of the firm. Current 
ratio is the defined as the current assets to its current liability. Sales growth is defined as the change in sales revenue from previous 
year scaled by sales revenue in the previous year. List is the natural log of the total listed years of the firm. The robust error of each 











Appendix 4.1b Difference in board and firm characteristics after the matching 
Variables State-owned firms Matched private firms Difference t-stat 
Mean Std N Mean Std N 
Duality 0.181 0.385 2,141 0.186 0.389 2,191 -0.005 0.700 
Independent director 0.349 0.053 2,141 0.349 0.054 2,191 -0.000 0.930 
Board size 2.233 0.186 2,141 2.230 0.180 2,191 0.004 0.517 
Director age 3.869 0.071 2,141 3.868 0.067 2,191 0.001 0.731 
Female 0.170 0.139 2,141 0.169 0.138 2,191 0.000 0.993 
Size 7.654 1.241 2,141 7.625 1.251 2,191 0.029 0.442 
ROA 0.027 0.056 2,141 0.026 0.051 2,191 0.001 0.520 
Cash flow 0.045 0.067 2,141 0.044 0.068 2,191 0.001 0.799 
Current ratio 1.415 1.015 2,141 1.410 0.903 2,191 0.005 0.865 
Sale growth 0.200 0.391 2,141 0.201 0.399 2,191 -0.001 0.921 
List 2.077 0.655 2,141 2.070 0.694 2,191 0.007 0.718 
Book to market 1.130 0.799 2,141 1.149 0.819 2,191 -0.019 0.437 




























Chapter 5 Conclusion 
5.1 Overview of main finding 
This thesis extends extant research on the role of board of directors to China. It fills the 
gaps in the existing literature relating to: 1) board age diversity, 2) executives’ 
competition and tournament incentives, and 3) board characteristic and excessive risk in 
debt financing. In particular, the issues of how age diversity matters in banks, how 
executives’ age composition matters in the tournament competition, and how board 
characteristics matter in excessive risk-taking in state-owned firms have been addressed 
and been thoroughly explored. To this end, this thesis contributes significantly to studies 
on board of directors.  
 
Chapter 2 studies the effect of board age diversity on bank profitability and risk by 
employing a sample of 97 Chinese banks over the period from 2009 to 2013. The result 
first shows that board age diversity in Chinese banks has a significant impact on bank 
profitability. To further examine why age diversity negatively affects bank performance, 
directors’ age diversity is then decomposed into their personal value diversity. The 
heterogeneity of directors’ values with respect to risk, prudence and wealth is found to be 
negatively related to bank profitability. These results suggest that directors of different 
ages are likely to hold diverse values on risk, prudence and wealth, and to approach 
decisions differently. This, in turn, can slow down the decision process in the board room 
and generate more conflicts among the directors, leading to worse bank performance. 
 
Chapter 3 investigates the role of age heterogeneity of non-CEO executives in the 
relationship between tournament incentives and firm performance. Using data on Chinese 
firms listed on either the Shanghai Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
between 2005 and 2015, I first find that a large pay gap between CEOs and non-CEO 




effectiveness of tournament incentives through the age heterogeneity of non-CEO 
executives. The results show that the tournament effect is weaker in firms where the non-
CEO executives are from different age cohorts (three or more). This suggests that 
seniority, which is highly valued in China, provides reduced incentives for younger 
executives and discourages them from competing with senior executives. This 
discouragement is then likely to weaken the tournament effect. However, the positive link 
between pay gap and firm performance becomes stronger when the executives are of a 
similar age. This could be explained by the peer effect argument. That is, non-CEO 
executives usually perceive that they have the similar probability of promotion with 
similar-aged peers and then compete more fervently. In this way, increased peer 
competition motivates non-CEO executives to expend more effort and ultimately 
strengthen the tournament effect. 
 
Chapter 4 investigates the impact of board characteristics on excessive risk-taking on debt 
financing decisions in state firms by utilizing a sample of Chinese listed firms over the 
period from 2002 to 2015. First, state firms are found to have lower costs of debt than 
private firms. Second, state firms tend to take excessive risk in debt financing. In 
particular, more than half of the state firms have excess leverage and cash shortfall, as 
well as lower cost of debt compared to otherwise similar private firms due to implicit 
government guarantees and soft budget constraint argument. Third, board characteristics 
could affect the excessive risk taking in state firms. Specifically, the proportion of 
independent directors is negatively associated with excess cost of debt but positively 
related to excess leverage. This suggests that board independence signals an effective 
monitoring board that reduces the risk premium required by the creditor. As a result, state 
firms with board independence can have a lower cost of debt and hence become 
excessively leveraged. However, board size has a positive impact on the excess cost of 
debt, excess leverage and excess cash holdings. This is because a larger board has less 





in the boardroom. Therefore, creditors may require a higher risk premium, resulting in a 
higher cost of debt. Additionally, since the managers of state firms are more likely to 
entrench themselves, a larger board with less effective monitoring in state firms can 
further increase the level of cash holding to exceed the target value. In terms of leverage, 
a larger board can improve information quality by providing valuable and comprehensive 
resources for the board, signaling a higher board quality and receiving fewer loan 
covenants. Therefore, a larger board in state firms can lead to excessive leverage. 
5.2 Implications  
This thesis provides some useful implications for researchers and practitioners. With 
respect to board diversity, previous studies based on resource dependence theory have 
argued that a more diverse board provides more external resources and enhances firm 
performance. The findings in Chapter 2, however, indicate that under the weak corporate 
governance system in China, an age-diverse board is not beneficial for banks. Banks with 
weak governance should look to adding directors of a similar age into their board, to 
narrow the generation gap. In addition, results from Chapter 2 can be generalized to other 
transition countries that are transforming from a centrally planned economy to a market-
based economy. In these countries, since culture changes alongside economic 
development, directors from different generations are more likely to hold diverse values. 
To strive for optimal board composition, the board should appreciate the age and value 
differences among directors, utilize the benefits of directors’ different human capital, and 
create an effective and balanced board.  
 
Given the huge remuneration of CEOs and the increasing pay gap among executives, 
Chapter 3 highlights the importance of the rank order tournament as an incentive 
mechanism for motivating non-CEO executives in Chinese firms. Furthermore, Chapter 
3 also provides interdisciplinary evidence that the psychological composition of non-




current state of a weak corporate governance system in China, firms should consider 
adding executives of a similar age to their top team in order to narrow the generation gap 
and thereby improve firm performance. 
 
In relation to debt financing, the findings in Chapter 4 suggests that state firms in China 
recieve more preferential treatment than private firms due to implicit guarantees. With 
the benefits of government control in Chinese firms, Chapter 4 also indicates that state 
firms tend to take excessive managerial risks and that board characteristics can further 
increase the excessive risk. Under the current weak corporate governance system in China, 
state firms should look to improve the quality of board of directors and reduce excessive 
risk. 
5.3 Limitations and suggestions for future research 
This research has several limitations, which might be addressed in future studies. First, 
this thesis considers a single country, China. The findings can only be generalized to other 
transition countries who share similar legal traditions and governance systems with China. 
However, there are also limitations in the generalization of the results to the rest of the 
world. 
 
Second, Chapter 2 focuses on 97 Chinese banks. Although these banks include all the 
major larger banks, accounting for around three quarters of the total assets of Chinese 
banking institutions at the end of 2013, there is a concern about relatively small sample 
size, as there are many new, unlisted and smaller banks which do not disclose governance 
information. Thus, further research could take these banks into account.  
 
Third, due to the data limitation, it is not possible to control for the effect of some CEO 
characteristics (e.g., education and tenure) in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. Future research 




to have a significant influence in decision-making in Chinese firms. 
 
Fourth, in Chapter 4 I focus on state-owned firms in general owing to data limitations. 
Further research could divide the state-owned firms into firms controlled by the central 
or local government and by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This is because these two 
types of state control tend to have different impacts on Chinese firms, in particular on 
excessive risk-taking behaviour and board composition. In government-controlled firms, 
the board of directors are appointed or approved by the government and they have less 
incentives to monitor the firm. In contrast, SOE-controlled firms have more autonomy as 
there is less interference from the government and more responsibility regarding the 
firm’s profits. Directors in SOE-controlled firms are appointed by SOE controlling 
shareholders. 
5.4 Final remarks 
In summary, this thesis makes an important step towards a better understanding of the 
role of board of directors in banks as well as in non-financial firms in the context of 
economic, finance, organizational and psychological theories. All the findings in this 
research provide potential directions for future research in the field of board of directors, 
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